Пређи на садржај

Накба

С Википедије, слободне енциклопедије
Накба
Део израелско-палестинског сукоба
Горе, доле:
  • Палестинци се расељавају након пада Хаифе, у пратњи наоружаног особља Хагане, април 1948.
  • Палестинци у избегличком кампу Еин Ел Хилве у Либану, 1948
Датотека:Шаблон: Карта Накбе.
Карта Накбе.
МестоМандаторна Палестина, Палестинске територије, данашњи Израел
Датум31. децембар 1947. – данас
МетаПалестинци
Врста нападаЕтничко чишћење, присилно расељавање, отимање имовине, масовна убиства, досељенички колонијализам, биолошко ратовање
Убијено
Списак
Жртве
Списак
Починилац Држава Израел
пре 26. маја 1948:[а]

После 26. маја 1948:

Мотивционизам, досељенички колонијализам, антипалестинизам, антиарапски расизам

Накба (арап. النكبة — „несрећа, катастрофа, катаклизма”),[14] позната и као Палестинска катастрофа, јесте губитак палестинског друштва и домовине 1948, као и трајно расељавање већине палестинских Арапа.[15][16] Накба је етничко чишћење[17] Палестинаца кроз насилно расељавање и одузимање земље, имовине и ствари, заједно са уништавањем њиховог друштва и сузбијањем њихове културе, идентитета, политичких права и националних тежњи.[15][16] Термин се користи за описивање како догађаја из 1948, тако и текуће окупације палестинских територија (Западна обала и Појас Газе), прогона и расељавање Палестинаца широм регије.[18][19][20][21][22]

Током оснивачких догађаја Накбе 1948. године, приближно половина претежно арапског становништва Палестине, односно око 750.000 људи,[23][24] протерано је из својих домова или је приморано да побегне разним насилним средствима, прво од стране ционистичких паравојних формација, а након оснивања Израела, од стране њене војске. Извршено је десетине масакра палестинских Арапа, а преко 500 градова, села и урбаних насеља са арапском већином је напуштено. Многа насеља су или потпуно уништена или поново насељена Јеврејима и добила нова хебрејска имена.[25][26] Израел је користио биолошко ратовање против Палестинаца тровањем сеоских бунара. До краја рата, 78% укупне површине бивше мандатне Палестине било је под контролом Израела.

Палестински национални наратив посматра Накбу као колективну трауму која дефинише национални идентитет и политичке тежње Палестинаца. Израелски национални наратив посматра Накбу као компоненту Рата за независност којим је успостављена државност и суверенитет Израела.[27] Израел негира или пориче почињене злочине, тврдећи да су многи протерани Палестинци отишли ​​добровољно или да је њихово протеривање било неопходно и неизбежно. Порицање Накбе се све више оспорава од 1970-их у израелском друштву, посебно од стране Нових историчара, иако се званични наратив није променио.[27][28][29]

Палестинци обележавају 15. мај као Дан Накбе, у знак сећања на ратне догађаје дан након Дана независности Израела.[30][31] Године 1967, након Шестодневног рата, догодила се још једна серија палестинског егзодуса; ово је постало познато као Накса (дос. „Неуспех“) и такође има свој дан, 5. јун. Накба је у великој мери утицала на палестинску културу и темељни је симбол тренутног палестинског националног идентитета, заједно са политичким цртаним ликом Хандалом, палестинским куфијом и палестинским кључевима из 1948. године. О Накби је написано много књига, песама и поема.[32] Палестински песник Махмуд Дарвиш описао је Накбу као „проширену садашњост која обећава да ће се наставити у будућности.”[33][34]

Османски и британски мандатни периоди (пре 1948. године)

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Корени Накбе сежу до доласка циониста и њихове куповине земље у османској Палестини крајем 19. века.[35] Ционисти су желели да створе јеврејску државу у Палестини са што више земље, што више Јевреја и што мање палестинских Арапа.[36] До тренутка када су Британци објавили своју званичну подршку ционизму у Балфоровој декларацији 1917. године током Првог светског рата,[37] становништво у Палестини чинило је око 750.000 људи, од тога приближно 94% Арапа и 6% Јевреја.[38]

Након поделе Османског царства, британска мандатна Палестина је започела 1922. године.[39] До тада је јеврејско становништво порасло на око 10%.[40] И Балфурова декларација и Мандат за Палестину називали су 90% арапског становништва „постојећим нејеврејским заједницама“.[41]

Након Другог светског рата и Холокауста, у фебруару 1947. године, Британци су изјавили да ће окончати мандат и поднети будућност Палестине новоствореним Уједињеним нацијама на решавање.[42] Основан је Специјални комитет Уједињених нација за Палестину (UNSCOP), који је у септембру поднео извештај Генералној скупштини УН у којем је препоручио поделу.[43] Палестинци и већина Арапске лиге били су против поделе.[44] Ционисти су прихватили поделу, али су планирали да прошире границе Израела изван онога што су му доделиле УН.[45] У јесен 1947. године, Израел и Јордан, уз одобрење Велике Британије, тајно су се сложили да поделе земљу додељену Палестини између себе након завршетка британског мандата.[46]

Дана 29. новембра 1947. године, Генерална скупштина је усвојила Резолуцију 181 (II) – План Уједињених нација за поделу Палестине.[47] У то време, Арапи су чинили око две трећине становништва[48] и поседовали су око 90% земље,[3] док су Јевреји чинили између четвртине и трећине становништва[49] и поседовали око 7% земље.[50] План поделе УН доделио је Израелу око 55% земље, где је становништво било око 500.000 Јевреја и 407.000-438.000 Арапа. Палестини је додељено преосталих 45% земље, где је становништво било око 725.000-818.000 Арапа и 10.000 Јевреја. Јерусалим и Витлејем требало је да буду међународно управљани corpus separatum са популацијом од око 100.000 Арапа и 100.000 Јевреја.[51]

Критичари су план поделе сматрали проционистичким, са 56%[52] земље додељене јеврејској држави, иако је палестинско арапско становништво било двоструко веће од јеврејског становништва.[53] План је славила већина Јевреја у Палестини,[54] а ционистички лидери, посебно Давид Бен-Гурион, сматрали су план тактичким кораком и одскочном даском ка будућем територијалном ширењу на целу Палестину.[55][56][57][58] Виши арапски комитет, Арапска лига и други арапски лидери и владе одбацили су га на основу тога што, поред тога што Арапи чине двотрећинску већину, поседују већину земље.[59] Такође су указали на невољност да прихвате било какав облик територијалне поделе,[60] тврдећи да то крши принципе националног самоопредељења у Повељи УН која људима даје право да одлучују о својој судбини.[61][62] Најавили су своју намеру да предузму све неопходне мере како би спречили спровођење резолуције.[63][64][65][66]

Накба 1948.

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Централне чињенице о томе шта се догодило у Накби током палестинског рата 1948. године су добро утврђене, документоване и углавном се слаже већина израелских, палестинских и других историчара.[67] Око 750.000 Палестинаца - преко 80% становништва које је живело на територији онога што ће постати Држава Израел - протерано је или побегло из својих домова.[68] Једанаест арапских градова и преко 500 села је уништено или остало без становништва.[69] Хиљаде Палестинаца је убијено у десетинама масакра.[70] Документовано је око десетак силовања Палестинки од стране редовних и нередовних израелских војних снага, а сумња се да их је било још више.[71] Израелци су користили тактике психолошког ратовања како би застрашили Палестинце и натерали их да побегну, укључујући циљано насиље, кампање шаптања, радио емисије и комбије са разгласом.[72] Пљачка палестинских домова, предузећа, фарми, уметничких дела, књига и архива од стране израелских војника и цивила била је широко распрострањена.[73]

Новембар 1947. – мај 1948.

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Мањи локални сукоби почели су 30. новембра и постепено ескалирали до марта 1948. године.[74] Када је насиље почело, Палестинци су већ почели да беже, очекујући да ће се вратити после рата.[75] Масакр и протеривање палестинских Арапа и уништавање села почели су у децембру,[76] укључујући масакре у Ал-Хисасу (18. децембра 1947),[77] и Балад ел-Шејку (31. децембра).[78] До марта, између 70.000 и 100.000 Палестинаца, углавном средње и више класе урбане елите, протерано је или побегло.[79]

Почетком априла 1948. године, Израелци су покренули План Далет, офанзиву великих размера за заузимање земље и исељење палестинских Арапа са ње.[80] Током офанзиве, Израел је заузео и очистио земљу која је додељена Палестинцима резолуцијом УН.[81] Преко 200 села је уништено током овог периода.[82] Масакри и протеривања су се наставили,[83] укључујући и Деир Јасин (9. април 1948).[84] Велики палестински градови су били депопулирани, укључујући Тиберијас (18. април), Хаифу (23. април), Акру (6–18. мај), Сафед (10. мај) и Јафу (13. мај), и палестинско арапско насеље у западном Јерусалиму (24. април).[85] Израел је почео да се бави биолошким ратом у априлу и отровао је водоснабдевање одређених градова и села. У мају је једна таква операција изазвала епидемију тифуса у Акри, док су Египћани осујетили други покушај у Гази.[86]

Под интензивним јавним гневом због палестинских губитака, и настојећи да преузму палестинску територију за себе како би се супротставиле израелско-јорданском споразуму, преостале државе Арапске лиге су крајем априла и почетком маја одлучиле да уђу у рат након што су Британци отишли.[87] Међутим, војске новонезависних држава Арапске лиге су и даље биле слабе и неспремне за рат,[88] и ниједна од држава Арапске лиге није била заинтересована за успостављање независне палестинске државе са Амином ел Хусеинијем на челу. Ни експанзионистички краљ Абдулах I од Јордана ни Британци нису желели успостављање независне палестинске државе.[89] Мандат је формално завршен 14. маја, последње британске трупе су отишле, а Израел је прогласио независност.[90] До тада је палестинско друштво било уништено и преко 300.000 Палестинаца је протерано или побегло.[91]

Види још

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Референце

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  1. ^
  2. ^ Kober, Avi (2005). „From Blitzkrieg To Attrition: Israel's Attrition Strategy and Staying Power”. Small Wars & Insurgencies. 16 (2): 216—240. doi:10.1080/09592310500080005. 
  3. ^ „B'Tselem – Statistics – Fatalities”. B'Tselem. Архивирано из оригинала 1. 7. 2010. г. 
  4. ^ „Palestinians killed by Israeli security forces in the Gaza Strip, before Operation "Cast Lead"”. Архивирано из оригинала 10. 3. 2013. г. Приступљено 18. 2. 2024. 
  5. ^ Lappin, Yaakov (2009). „IDF releases Cast Lead casualty numbers”. The Jerusalem Post. Архивирано из оригинала 26. 3. 2013. г. Приступљено 5. 1. 2024. 
  6. ^ „Confirmed figures reveal the true extent of the destruction inflicted upon the Gaza Strip; Israel's offensive resulted in 1,417 dead, including 926 civilians, 255 police officers, and 236 fighters.”. 2009. Архивирано из оригинала 12. 6. 2009. г. Приступљено 5. 1. 2024. 
  7. ^ „Report of the detailed findings of the independent commission of inquiry established pursuant to Human Rights Council resolution S-21/1”. UN Human Rights Office (на језику: енглески). Human Rights Council. 23. 6. 2015. Архивирано из оригинала 25. 7. 2017. г. Приступљено 16. 5. 2024. 
  8. ^ „2021 was the deadliest year since 2014, Israel killed 319 Palestinians in oPt 5-year record in house demolitions: 895 Palestinians lost their homes”. B'Tselem. Архивирано из оригинала 4. 1. 2022. г. Приступљено 4. 1. 2022. 
  9. ^ Khatib, McKee & Yusuf 2024, стр. 237
  10. ^ Maragha, Alexandra V. „UNRWA & World Central Kitchen in Gaza (Oct 2023–Feb 2025): Operations, Political Targeting, and Humanitarian Challenges”. Journal of Integrated Sciences. 5 (2): 84—85. „To forcibly displace the entire population of Gaza, which before October 7, 2023, had a population of 2.3 million people (Dardona et al., 2024), an estimate can infer a death toll number closer to 400,000 people or more have been killed through intentional genocide in Gaza by occupying forces between October 7, 2023, and January of 2025.” 
  11. ^ „Mapping 1,800 Israeli settler attacks in the West Bank since October 2023”. Al Jazeera (на језику: енглески). 22. 1. 2025. Приступљено 2025-02-03. 
  12. ^ Brown, Jeremy (2003). Six Days: How the 1967 War Shaped the Middle East. Simon & Schuster, 2012. ISBN 978-1-4711-1475-5. „UNRWA put the figure at 413000” 
  13. ^ Tétrault-Farber, Gabrielle (6. 12. 2023). „UN rights chief warns of heightened risk of 'atrocity crimes' in Gaza”. Reuters (на језику: енглески). Приступљено 3. 1. 2024. 
  14. ^ Ghanim 2009.
  15. ^ а б Webman 2009, стр. 29: "The Nakba represented the defeat, displacement, dispossession, exile, dependence, insecurity, lack of statehood, and fight for survival of the Palestinians."
  16. ^ а б Sa'di 2002, стр. 175: "for Palestinians, Al-Nakbah represents, among many other things, the loss of the homeland, the disintegration of society, the frustration of national aspirations, and the beginning of a hasty process of destruction of their culture."
  17. ^ Sabbagh-Khoury 2023, стр. 30, 65, 71, 81, 182, 193–194; Abu-Laban & Bakan 2022, стр. 511; Manna 2022; Pappe 2022, стр. 33, 120–122, 126–132, 137, 239; Hasian Jr. 2020, стр. 77–109; Khalidi 2020, стр. 12, 73, 76, 231; Slater 2020, стр. 81–85; Shenhav 2019, стр. 49–50, 54, and 61; Bashir & Goldberg 2018, стр. 20 and 32 n.2; Confino 2018, стр. 138; Hever 2018, стр. 285; Masalha 2018, стр. 44, 52–54, 64, 319, 324, 376, 383; Nashef 2018, стр. 5–6, 52, 76; Auron 2017; Rouhana & Sabbagh-Khoury 2017, стр. 393; Al-Hardan 2016, стр. 47–48; Natour 2016, стр. 82; Rashed, Short & Docker 2014, стр. 3–4, 8–18; Masalha 2012; Wolfe 2012, стр. 153–154, 160–161; Khoury 2012, стр. 258, 263–265; Knopf-Newman 2011, стр. 4–5, 25–32, 109, 180–182; Lentin 2010, ch. 2; Milshtein 2009, стр. 50; Ram 2009, стр. 388; Shlaim 2009, стр. 55, 288; Esmeir 2007, стр. 249–250; Sa'di 2007, стр. 291–293, 298, 308; Pappe 2006; Schulz 2003, стр. 24, 31–32
  18. ^ Ashrawi, Hanan (28. 8. 2001). „Hanan Ashrawi's address to World Conference Against Racism”. MIFTAH (на језику: енглески). 
  19. ^ Erekat, Saeb (15. 5. 2016). „Israel Must Recognize Its Responsibility for the Nakba, the Palestinian Tragedy”. Haaretz (на језику: енглески). Приступљено 5. 11. 2023. 
  20. ^ Sa'di & Abu-Lughod 2007, стр. 10: "For Palestinians, still living their dispossession, still struggling or hoping for return, many under military occupation, many still immersed in matters of survival, the past is neither distant nor over. Unlike many historical experiences discussed in the literature on trauma, such as the Blitz, the merciless bombing of Hamburg and Dresden by the Allies at the closing stage of World War II, the Holocaust, the Algerian War of Independence, or the World Trade Center attack, which lasted for a limited period of time (the longest being the Algerian war of independence, lasting eight years), the Nakba is not over yet; after almost sixty years neither the Palestinians nor Israelis have yet achieved a state of normality; the violence and uprooting of Palestinians continues."
  21. ^ Manna' 2013, стр. 87: "Contrary to what many think, particularly in Israel, the Nakba was not a one-time event connected to the war in Palestine and its immediate catastrophic repercussions on the Palestinians. Rather, and more correctly, it refers to the accumulated Palestinian experience since the 1948 war up to the present. After the Oslo agreements in 1993, there were hopes that the stateless Palestinian people would soon earn freedom and independence. However, the failure of the peace process to end the Israeli occupation and allow the birth of an independent Palestinian state alongside Israel pushed the Palestinians back to square one. Furthermore, the erup- tion of a new cycle of violence which began in September 2000 added new dimensions to the disintegration of Palestinian society. For many Palestinians, these more recent events are adding new chapters and new meanings to the long-lived catastrophe since 1948."
  22. ^ Bashir & Goldberg 2018, стр. 33, footnote 4: "In Palestinian writings the signifier “Nakba" came to designate two central meanings, which will be used in this volume interchangeably: (1) the 1948 disaster and (2) the ongoing occupation and colonization of Palestine that reached its peak in the catastrophe of 1948"
  23. ^ Manna 2022, pp. 106 ("Simultaneously with the arrival of quality weapons from Prague, Ben-Gurion began implementing Plan Dalet which caused hundreds of casualties among the Palestinians.") and 107 ("the ethnic cleansing policy, which had entered a decisive phase in April"); Pappe 2022, p. 120, "In March 1948, the military campaign began in earnest. It was driven by Plan D, a military blueprint prepared by the Hagana in anticipation of combating the Arab forces in Palestine and facing the Arab armies after 14 May 1948 ... Plan D was put into full operation in April and May. It had two very clear objectives, the first being to take swiftly and systematically any installation, military or civilian, evacuated by the British ... The second, and far more important, objective of the plan was to cleanse the future Jewish state of as many Palestinians as possible."; Khalidi 2020, p. 73, "This first stage saw a bitterly fought campaign that culminated in a country-wide Zionist offensive dubbed Plan Dalet in the spring of 1948."; Masalha 2012, pp. 71–72, "First, there was Plan Dalet. This Haganah plan, a straightforward document, of early March 1948, was in many ways a blueprint for the expulsion of as many Palestinians as possible. It constituted an ideological-strategic anchor and basis for the destruction of Arab localities and expulsion of their inhabitants by Jewish commanders. In conformity with Plan Dalet, the Haganah cleared various areas completely of Arab villages."; Lentin 2010, pp. 109–111, "[p. 109] Dealing first with responsibility: while the ‘new historians’, especially Morris, uncovered individual cases of expulsions and massacres as well as plans – notably Plan Dalet – for the removal of Palestinians, they were unwilling to accept the Palestinian contention that Plan Dalet was a Zionist master plan for ethnic cleansing."; Morris 2008, pp. 93 ("Haganah went on the offensive in early April 1948") and 118-121 ("[p. 118] Plan D, formulated in early March and signed and dispatched to the Haganah brigade commanders on 10 March, was Yadin's blueprint for concerted operations on the eve of the final British departure and the pan-Arab invasion that was expected to follow hard on its heels ... But by the end of the period it was clear that a dramatic conceptual change had taken place and that the Yishuv had gone over to the offensive and was now engaged in a war of conquest. That war of conquest was prefigured in Plan D."); Sa'di 2007, p. 292, "However the conflict was abruptly changed at the beginning of April 1948. The Zionist leadership feared an alteration in the U.S. position, abandoning its support for partition in favor of a plan to place Palestine under international trusteeship (Pappé 2004: 130; Morris, 2001b: 204–5). In response, the Hagana, the main Jewish military force, opened a large-scale offensive.
  24. ^ Грешка код цитирања: Неважећа ознака <ref>; нема текста за референце под именом 750k.
  25. ^ Грешка код цитирања: Неважећа ознака <ref>; нема текста за референце под именом 500 villages.
  26. ^ Noga Kadman (7. 9. 2015). „Naming and Mapping the Depopulated Village Sites”. Erased from Space and Consciousness: Israel and the Depopulated Palestinian Villages of 1948. Indiana University Press. стр. 91—. ISBN 978-0-253-01682-9. 
  27. ^ а б Грешка код цитирања: Неважећа ознака <ref>; нема текста за референце под именом partner.
  28. ^ Golani, Motti; Manna, Adel (2011). Two sides of the coin: independence and Nakba, 1948: two narratives of the 1948 War and its outcome. Institute for Historical Justice and Reconciliation. стр. 14. ISBN 978-90-8979-080-4. Приступљено 14. 11. 2023. „The Palestinians regard the Nakba and its repercussions as a formative trauma defining their identity and their national, moral, and political aspirations. As a result of the 1948 war, the Palestinian people, which to a large degree lost their country to the establishment of a Jewish state for the survivors of the Holocaust, developed a victimized national identity. From their perspective, the Palestinians have been forced to pay for the Jewish Holocaust with their bodies, their property, and their freedom instead of those who were truly responsible. Jewish Israelis, in contrast, see the war and its outcome not merely as an act of historical justice that changed the historical course of the Jewish people, which until that point had been filled with suffering and hardship, but also as a birth – the birth of Israel as an independent Jewish state after two thousand years of exile. As such, it must be pure and untainted, because if a person, a nation, or a state is born in sin, its entire essence is tainted. In this sense, discourse on the war is not at all historical but rather current and extremely sensitive. Its power and intensity is directly influenced by present day events. In the Israeli and the Palestinian cases, therefore, the 1948 war plays a pivotal role in two simple, clear, unequivocal, and harmonious narratives, with both peoples continuing to see the war as a formative event in their respective histories.” 
  29. ^ Khalidi, Walid (1961)
  30. ^ Schmemann, Serge (15. 5. 1998). „MIDEAST TURMOIL: THE OVERVIEW; 9 Palestinians Die in Protests Marking Israel's Anniversary”. The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Архивирано из оригинала 5. 3. 2022. г. Приступљено 7. 4. 2021. „We are not asking for a lot. We are not asking for the moon. We are asking to close the chapter of nakba once and for all, for the refugees to return and to build an independent Palestinian state on our land, our land, our land, just like other peoples. We want to celebrate in our capital, holy Jerusalem, holy Jerusalem, holy Jerusalem.” 
  31. ^ Gladstone, Rick (15. 5. 2021). „An annual day of Palestinian grievance comes amid the upheaval.”. The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Архивирано из оригинала 15. 5. 2021. г. Приступљено 15. 5. 2021. 
  32. ^ Masalha 2012, стр. 11.
  33. ^ Darwish, Mahmoud (мај 2001). „Not to begin at the end”. ahram.org.eg (на језику: енглески). Al-Ahram Weekly. Архивирано из оригинала 2. 12. 2001. г. Приступљено 5. 11. 2023. 
  34. ^ Williams 2009, стр. 89.
  35. ^ Khalidi 2020, стр. 8–18; Bashir & Goldberg 2018, стр. 2 and 7; Khoury 2018, стр. xi-xiii and xv; Rouhana & Sabbagh-Khoury 2017, стр. 423; Rashed, Short & Docker 2014, стр. 8; Manna 2013, стр. 89; Masalha 2012, стр. 44, 70, and 168; Wolfe 2012, стр. 134; Morris 2008, стр. 1 and 392; Sa'di 2007, стр. 287–290
  36. ^ Manna 2022, pp. 2 ("the principal objective of the Zionist leadership to keep as few Arabs as possible in the Jewish state"), 4 ("in the 1948 war, when it became clear that the objective that enjoyed the unanimous support of Zionists of all inclinations was to establish a Jewish state with the smallest possible number of Palestinians"), and 33 ("The Zionists had two cherished objectives: fewer Arabs in the country and more land in the hands of the settlers.");
    • Khalidi 2020, стр. 76: "The Nakba represented a watershed in the history of Palestine and the Middle East. It transformed most of Palestine from what it had been for well over a millennium—a majority Arab country—into a new state that had a substantial Jewish majority. This transformation was the result of two processes: the systematic ethnic cleansing of the Arab-inhabited areas of the country seized during the war; and the theft of Palestinian land and property left behind by the refugees as well as much of that owned by those Arabs who remained in Israel. There would have been no other way to achieve a Jewish majority, the explicit aim of political Zionism from its inception. Nor would it have been possible to dominate the country without the seizures of land.";
    • Slater 2020, pp. 49 ("There were three arguments for the moral acceptability of some form of transfer. The main one—certainly for the Zionists but not only for them—was the alleged necessity of establishing a secure and stable Jewish state in as much of Palestine as was feasible, which was understood to require a large Jewish majority."), 81 ("From the outset of the Zionist movement all the major leaders wanted as few Arabs as possible in a Jewish state"), 87 ("The Zionist movement in general and David Ben-Gurion in particular had long sought to establish a Jewish state in all of “Palestine,” which in their view included the West Bank, Gaza, and parts of Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria."), and 92 ("As Israeli historian Shlomo Sand wrote: 'During every round of the national conflict over Palestine, which is the longest running conflict of its kind in the modern era, Zionism has tried to appropriate additional territory.'");
    • Segev 2019, стр. 418, "the Zionist dream from the start—maximum territory, minimum Arabs";
    • Cohen 2017, стр. 78, "As was suggested by Masalha (1992), Morris (1987), and other scholars, many preferred a state without Arabs or with as small a minority as possible, and plans for population transfers were considered by Zionist leaders and activists for years.";
    • Lustick & Berkman 2017, стр. 47–48, "As Ben-Gurion told one Palestinian leader in the early 1930s, 'Our final goal is the independence of the Jewish people in Palestine, on both sides of the Jordan River, not as a minority, but as a community numbering millions" (Teveth 1985:130). Ipso facto, this meant Zionism's success would produce an Arab minority in Palestine, no matter what its geographical dimensions.";
    • Rouhana & Sabbagh-Khoury 2014, стр. 6, "It was obvious to most approaches within the Zionist movement—certainly to the mainstream as represented by Labor Zionism and its leadership headed by Ben Gurion, that a Jewish state would entail getting rid of as many of the Palestinian inhabitants of the land as possible ... Following Wolfe, we argue that the logic of demographic elimination is an inherent component of the Zionist project as a settler-colonial project, although it has taken different manifestations since the founding of the Zionist movement.";
    • Masalha 2012, стр. 38, "From the late nineteenth century and throughout the Mandatory period the demographic and land policies of the Zionist Yishuv in Palestine continued to evolve. But its demographic and land battles with the indigenous inhabitants of Palestine were always a battle for 'maximum land and minimum Arabs' (Masalha 1992, 1997, 2000).";
    • Lentin 2010, стр. 7, "'the Zionist leadership was always determined to increase the Jewish space ... Both land purchases in and around the villages, and military preparations, were all designed to dispossess the Palestinians from the area of the future Jewish state' (Pappe 2008: 94).";
    • Shlaim 2009, стр. 56, "That most Zionist leaders wanted the largest possible Jewish state in Palestine with as few Arabs inside it as possible is hardly open to question.";
  37. ^ Masalha 2018, стр. 309–310 and 325; Bishara 2017, стр. 149; Manna 2013, стр. 89; Wolfe 2012, стр. 144; Morris 2008, стр. 9–10; Sa'di 2007, стр. 288
  38. ^ Khalidi 2020, pp. 27 ("around 94 percent [Arabs]"), 28 ("6 percent [Jews]"), and 43; Slater 2020, pp. 39 ("50,000 Jews ... 700,000 Arabs") and 44 ("about 750,000, of whom 50,000–60,000 or less than 9 percent were Jewish"); Masalha 2018, стр. 314, "[quoting Balfour in 1919] 700,000 Arabs"; Morris 2008, стр. 15, "Jewish numbers had grown under the Ottomans from some twenty-five thousand to sixty to eighty-five thousand between 1881 and 1914. The Arab increase had been less dramatic—from 450,000 (1881) to 650,000 (1918)"; Pappe 2006, стр. 11, "no more than five per cent [Jews]"
  39. ^ Sabbagh-Khoury 2023, стр. 53, "around 12 percent [Jews]"; Pappe 2022, стр. 79, "They [Palestinians] represented 90 per cent of the inhabitants, but were treated as if they constituted only 50 per cent"; Davis 2011, стр. 6, "11 percent [Jews]"
  40. ^ Sayigh 2023, стр. 281; Manna 2013, стр. 89; Masalha 2012, стр. 33, 54, and 150; Wolfe 2012, стр. 143; Davis 2011, стр. 6; Morris 2008, стр. 9–14; Sa'di 2007, стр. 288–290.
  41. ^ Sayigh 2023, стр. 281, "A more dangerous discursive deformation was the Balfour Declaration's designation of the Palestinians as 'existing non-Jewish communities' contrasted with 'the Jewish people' [Cronin 2017]. The political implications of this distinction are evident: a 'people' was qualified for nation/statehood, whereas disparate 'communities' were not."; Khalidi 2020, стр. 27, "Significantly, the overwhelming Arab majority of the population (around 94 percent at that time) went unmentioned by Balfour, except in a backhanded way as the 'existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine.'"; Slater 2020, стр. 39, "... the Balfour Doctrine and the League Mandate were conditional, stipulating that the 'non-Jewish' communities of Palestine—some 90 percent of the indigenous peoples!—must retain their 'civil and religious rights.'"; Wolfe 2012, стр. 146, "The Mandate's preamble included a safeguard clause protecting the rights of ‘existing non-Jewish communities’. This clause is significant on a number of counts, not least the transience implied in the term ‘existing’, whose suggestion of temporariness was reinforced by the designation of 91 per cent of the population as ‘non-Jewish’."; Shlaim 2009, стр. 23, "On the other hand, to refer to 90 per cent of the population as 'the non-Jewish communities in Palestine' was arrogant, dismissive and even racist. It was also the worst kind of imperial double standard, implying that there was one law for the Jews, and one law for everybody else."; Morris 2008, стр. 9–10
  42. ^ Pappe 2022, стр. 111–113; Khalidi 2020, стр. 72; Slater 2020, стр. 62; Cohen 2017, стр. 74; Davis 2011, стр. 6
  43. ^ Pappe 2022, стр. 115 и 119; Khalidi 2020, стр. 72; Slater 2020, стр. 62; Cohen 2017, стр. 74–75; Morris 2008, стр. 40–41 и 47–51
  44. ^ Manna 2022, стр. 31, "However, the Palestinian leadership, which was aware of the unfavorable balance of power, could not accept the unjust partition resolution. Being content to say 'no' without presenting acceptable alternatives put it in the position of the aggressor, and the Jewish side appeared to be the victim who was threatened with annihilation at the hands of neighboring Arab states. Despite their resounding utterances, these states were not prepared for a military battle in Palestine, nor were they united in their opinions as to what needed to be done. The Palestinians found themselves being propelled into battle without preparation and with neither a unified command nor sufficient awareness of what was happening in the corridors of the Arab League."; Pappe 2022, стр. 116, "Despite this, the Palestinians’ consensual rejection of partition was fully known to UNSCOP. For the Palestinians, leaders and common people alike, partition was totally unacceptable, the equivalent in their eyes of the division of Algeria between the French settlers and the indigenous population."; Bashir & Goldberg 2018, стр. 16, "The Arabs opposed the partition plan—which they justifiably saw as support for Zionist colonialism and imperialist intervention in the Arab Middle East—and especially the fact that it had awarded the Jews, a minority in Palestine, more than half of the territory."; Cohen 2017, стр. 74, "The Palestinian leadership and the Arab states rejected the Partition Plan (for figures and a detailed analysis of the UN Partition Plan and the Arab rejection of it, see Khalidi 1997). Two fundamental reasons are worth mentioning: first, they regarded the area in its entirety as Arab territory and refused to submit any of it to Jewish sovereignty. Secondly, they objected to a move that would render one-third of the Palestinian population a minority in a Jewish state."; Shlaim 2009, стр. 38, "Within the Arab League, however, there was no consensus on the future of Palestine. Most members, at least at the declaratory level, backed an uncompromising policy in the fight against Zionism, and denounced the United Nations partition plan of 29 November 1947 as illegal, impracticable and unjust, as did the AHC. The Arab League was fully behind the Palestinians in opposing partition and, from the time it was founded in March 1945 until Britain confirmed its decision to withdraw from Palestine in the autumn of 1947, there was consistent support for creating a unitary and independent Palestinian state. After that, however, there were conflicting views concerning the positive policy to adopt on the future of Palestine. On the one hand there was Haj Amin al-Husseini, the Mufti of Jerusalem, who pursued a maximalist programme for an independent and sovereign Palestinian state over the whole of Palestine. On the other hand there was King Abdullah of Transjordan, whose undeclared aim was to partition Palestine with the Zionists and to annex the Arab part to his kingdom."; Morris 2008, стр. 63–64, "The Zionists and their supporters rejoiced; the Arab delegations walked out of the plenum after declaring the resolution invalid. The Arabs failed to understand why the international community was awarding the Jews any part of Palestine. Further, as one Palestinian historian later put it, they could not fathom why 37 percent of the population had been given 55 percent of the land (of which they owned only 7 percent). Moreover, the Jews had been given the best agricultural lands (the Coastal Plain and Jezreel and Jordan Valleys) while the Arabs had received the 'bare and hilly' parts, as one Palestinian politician, 'Awni 'Abd al-Hadi, told a Zionist agent.162 More generally, 'the Palestinians failed to see why they should be made to pay for the Holocaust. . . . [And] they failed to see why it was not fair for the Jews to be a minority in a unitary Palestinian state, while it was fair for almost half of the Palestinian population—the indigenous majority on its own ancestral soil—to be converted overnight into a minority under alien rule.'". But see: Slater 2020, pp. 65-66 ("[p. 66] In any case, many Palestinians were prepared to negotiate a compromise settlement with the Zionists. As several of the Israeli 'New Historians' have demonstrated, the failure of the Palestinian revolt of the 1930s and the determination of the British and later the United Nations to enforce a compromise in Palestine resulted in greater moderation and realism among many Palestinians who by the mid-1940s had come to the realization that partition and the creation of a Jewish state in part of Palestine was unavoidable. As a result, a number of Palestinian proposals were made for a compromise settlement; they were ignored by Ben-Gurion and other Zionist leaders because of the Zionist determination, as Simha Flapan put it, 'to achieve full sovereignty [in a Palestine] at whatever cost.'") and 212 ("To be sure, the Palestinians and the Arab states also initially rejected a two-state compromise, for example, as it was embodied in the 1947 UN partition plan ...")
  45. ^ Pappe 2022, стр. 116, "In fact, the Yishuv's leaders felt confident enough to contemplate a takeover of fertile areas within the designated Arab state. This could be achieved in the event of an overall war without losing the international legitimacy of their new state."; Slater 2020, pp. 64-65, 75 ("... the evidence is overwhelming that the Zionist leaders had no intention of accepting partition as a necessary and just compromise with the Palestinians. Rather, their reluctant acceptance of the UN plan was only tactical; their true goals were to gain time, establish the Jewish state, build up its armed forces, and then expand to incorporate into Israel as much of ancient or biblical Palestine as they could.") and 212 ("... while for tactical reasons Ben-Gurion and the other Zionist leaders officially “accepted” it—but their fingers were crossed behind their backs, for they planned to expand from the partition borders once they had the power to do so. Which they did."); Masalha 2012, стр. 58, "[quoting Morris] large sections of Israeli [Yishuv] society — including the Ahdut Ha’avodah party, Herut, and Mapai leaders such as Ben-Gurion — were opposed to or extremely unhappy with partition and from early on viewed the war as an ideal opportunity to expand the new state's borders beyond the UN-earmarked partition boundaries and at the expense of the Palestinians. Like Jordan's King Abdullah, they too were opposed to the emergence of a Palestinian Arab state and moved to prevent it."; Morris 2008, стр. 101, "... mainstream Zionist leaders, from the first, began to think of expanding the Jewish state beyond the 29 November partition resolution borders."; Sa'di 2007, стр. 291, "According to the Israeli historian Benny Morris (2001: 138) the two leaders of the Zionist movement, Chaim Weizmann and David Ben-Gurion, 'saw partition as a stepping stone to further expansion and eventual takeover of the whole of Palestine.'". But see: Cohen 2017, стр. 74–76, "[p. 74] The Zionist leadership, for its part, promoted the proposal and worked with American assistance to secure its adoption by the UN General Assembly ... One of the questions often raised is whether the Zionists were genuine when they accepted it ... [p. 75] though the existence of a large Arab minority in the Jewish state was not seen by the Zionist leadership as the best, ideal situation, they nonetheless decided to adhere to international law and to the UN resolution if the Palestinian Arabs adhered to it."
  46. ^ Manna 2022, стр. 88, "Under the partition resolution, the Arab state included three basic areas: the Galilee mountains in the north, the mountains of central Palestine (subsequently called the West Bank), and a coastal strip which extends from north of Isdud (Ashdod) to Rafah. The presence of the Egyptian army in the south explains why the Gaza Strip remained under Arab rule, and the presence of the Jordanian Arab Legion in the center, and the prior agreement between King Abdullah and the Zionist leadership, explains what became of the West Bank."; Pappe 2022, pp. 123 ("The Legion paused near the city of Jerusalem, the fate of which remained undecided despite the tacit understanding before the war between the Hashemites and the Jews on the partitioning of post-Mandate Palestine between them.") and 129 ("The tacit understanding reached between Israel and Jordan during the war over the partitioning of post-Mandate Palestine neutralized the Arab Legion, Jordan's efficient, British-led army, which confined its activity to the area around Jerusalem. This was a strategic decision that determined the balance of power in the 1948 war."); Khalidi 2020, стр. 77–78, "Thereafter he sought to expand his territory through a variety of means. The most obvious direction was westward, into Palestine, whence the king's lengthy secret negotiations with the Zionists to reach an accommodation that would give him control of part of the country ... Both the king and the British opposed allowing the Palestinians to benefit from the 1947 partition or the war that followed, and neither wanted an independent Arab state in Palestine. They had come to a secret agreement to prevent this, via sending “the Arab Legion across the Jordan River as soon as the Mandate ended to occupy the part of Palestine allotted to the Arabs.” This goal meshed with that of the Zionist movement, which negotiated with ‘Abdullah to achieve the same end."; Slater 2020, pp. 79 ("In fall 1947, a number of meetings occurred between King Abdullah of Jordan and high Zionist leaders. These resulted in a secret agreement under which Abdullah would keep the Arab Legion out of any Arab invasion into the lands designated to Israel by the UN, and Israel would stay out of the West Bank, designated for an Arab state, and East Jerusalem, which was to be internationalized. Because of his ambitions to extend Hashemite rule into the West Bank, Abdullah had no interest in destroying a Jewish state within the UN boundaries; in fact, he preferred a friendly Jewish neighbor to a hostile Palestinian one.") and 88 ("Before the war, the Zionists and King Abdullah of Jordan had secretly reached an agreement to avoid war with each other: the Israelis would not oppose a Jordanian takeover of the West Bank as long as Abdullah kept the Arab Legion out of an Israel within its UN-designated boundaries."); Manna 2013, pp. 90-93 ("[p. 90] They failed also to consider the effects of factionalized Arab world and the clear interest of King Abdullah of Jordan in preventing the establishment of a Palestinian state, even if it meant colluding with Britain and the Jewish Yishuv."); Masalha 2012, стр. 150, "The picture that emerges from the 1948 war, for example, as historian Avi Shlaim has shown, is not the fictional one (still repeated by Israeli spokespersons) of Israel standing alone against the combined might of the Arab world. It is rather one of convergence between the interests of Israel and those of Hashemite Transjordan and the ‘tacit alliance’ between the Zionists and Hashemites (backed by the British) against other members of the divided Arab ‘war coalition’ (Shlaim 2001: 79–103) and especially against the creation of an independent state for the Palestinians, within the UN Partition Plan."; Shlaim 2009, pp. 38 ("King Abdullah of Transjordan, whose undeclared aim was to partition Palestine with the Zionists and to annex the Arab part to his kingdom"), 80 ("Greater tactical flexibility but a similar reluctance to pay a significant price emerge from the survey of Israel's negotiations with Jordan. That King Abdullah, the grandfather of King Hussein, dealt with the Jewish Agency was an open secret. These contacts were maintained from the establishment of the emirate of Transjordan in 1921 until Abdullahs assassination in 1951."), 169-170 ("In 1947 its leaders reached an agreement with King Abdullah of Jordan to partition Palestine at the expense of the Palestinians."), and 256 ("Britain's secret objective was partition between the Zionists and King Abdullah of Jordan, their loyal ally - which was the precise outcome of the 1948 war."); Morris 2008, стр. 189–195, "[p. 191] So partition it would have to be. This was agreed in principle in two secret meetings in August 1946 in Transjordan between 'Abdullah and Jewish Agency emissary Eliahu (Elias) Sasson. (Incidentally, 'Abdullah and his prime minister, Ibrahim Hashim, believed—as had the Peel Commission—that such a partition, in order to be viable and lasting, should be accompanied by a transfer of the Arab inhabitants out of the area of the Jewish state–to-be.) There matters stood until UNSCOP proposed partition—but between Palestine's Arabs and Palestine's Jews—as the preferred solution. Neither 'Abdullah nor the Jewish Agency wanted a Husseini-led Palestinian Arab state as their neighbor; both preferred an alternative partition, between themselves. On 17 November 1947, twelve days before the passage of the partition resolution, Golda Myerson (Meir), acting head of the Jewish Agency Political Department, secretly met 'Abdullah at Naharayim (Jisr al-Majami), to reaffirm the agreement in principle of August 1946. 'Abdullah at first vaguely reiterated his preference for incorporating all of Palestine in his kingdom, with the Jews enjoying autonomy. Meir countered that the Jews wanted peaceful partition between two sovereign “states.” The Jews would accept a Jordanian takeover of the West Bank as a fait accompli and would not oppose it—though, formally, the Jewish Agency remained bound by the prospective UN decision to establish two states. 'Abdullah said that he, too, wanted a compromise, not war. In effect, 'Abdullah agreed to the establishment of a Jewish state in part of Palestine and Meir agreed to a Jordanian takeover of the West Bank (albeit while formally adhering to whatever partition resolution the General Assembly would adopt). Both sides agreed not to attack each other. The subject of Jerusalem was not discussed or resolved ... [p. 193] Thus it was that when Golda Meir, disguised in an Arab robe, arrived on the night of 10–11 May in Amman for her second secret meeting with 'Abdullah, the previous months’ understanding about a peaceful Jewish-Hashemite partition was not reaffirmed ... There was a green light. Jordan had won British consent to occupy of the West Bank with the termination of the Mandate—so 'Abdullah, Abul Huda, and Glubb believed—and nothing the British did or said thereafter was to contradict this impression ... [p. 194] But 'Abdullah's bellicose tone and Meir's gloomy report notwithstanding, the king had decided—as became clear from the Legion's subsequent actions—to move into Arab Palestine while trying to avoid war with the Yishuv and refraining from attacking the territory of the UN-defined Jewish state."; Sa'di 2007, стр. 291, "Not content with the 56 percent of the country offered to them by the un plan, the Zionists colluded with ‘Abdallah, the Emir of Trans-Jordan, to partition the remaining 43 percent proposed for a Palestinian Arab State (Shlaim 1988; 2001; Rogan 2001) and ended up with more than three quarters of the country. Even this was not enough. Zionist leaders have always refused to accept a final demarcation of the Jewish State's borders."
  47. ^ Manna 2022, стр. 30; Pappe 2022, стр. 118; Khalidi 2020, стр. 72; Slater 2020, стр. 63; Bashir & Goldberg 2018, стр. 16; Masalha 2012, стр. 67, 150, 194, 196, and 224; Davis 2011, стр. 7; Shlaim 2009, стр. 256; Morris 2008, стр. 51–74; Sa'di 2007, стр. 290–291
  48. ^ Abu-Laban & Bakan 2022, стр. 511, "67 per cent"; Manna 2022, pp. 30 ("two-thirds of the population") and 90 ("more than two thirds (about 1,350,000) of the country's two million people"); Natour 2016, стр. 89, "around 70 %"; Morris 2008, стр. 15, "1.3 million"; Pappe 2006, стр. 29, "The indigenous Palestinians made up the two-third majority, down from ninety per cent at the start of the Mandate."
  49. ^ Abu-Laban & Bakan 2022, стр. 511, "the ‘Arabs’, who in 1948 owned 90 per cent of the land"; Rogan 2017, ch. 9, "By 1947 the Arabs of Palestine constituted a two-thirds majority with over 1.2 million people, compared to 600,000 Jews in Palestine ... Arabs owned 94 percent of the total land area of Palestine and some 80 percent of the arable farmland of the country."; Natour 2016, стр. 89, "Arabs with an ownership of ... around 94 %; Manna 2013, стр. 90, "At the end of 1947 the Arabs of Palestine ... possessed about 90% of Palestine's privately-owned land."; Sa'di 2007, стр. 291, "Furthermore, in terms of land ownership, the Jewish holdings in the proposed Jewish State were about 11 percent as compared to the 80 percent of land then owned by Palestinians. In the proposed Arab Palestinian state, Jews owned a mere 1 percent of the land."
  50. ^ Slater 2020, стр. 62, "one-third"; Natour 2016, стр. 89, "around 35 %"); Wolfe 2012, стр. 133–134, "26%"; Davis 2011, стр. 6, "33 percent"; Morris 2008, pp. 15 ("630,000") and 65 ("37 percent"); Sa'di 2007, стр. 290, "about one-third"; Pappe 2006, стр. 34, "no more than one third"
  51. ^ Manna 2022, pp. 30 ("It was expected that the Palestinians would not accept this unjust resolution, which gave 54 percent of their homeland to the Jews and gave them, who constituted two-thirds of the population, only 45 percent.") and 294 n. 41 ("According to estimates, up to the end of 1947 about 450,000 Palestinians lived in the area allocated for the Jewish state under the partition resolution; 95 percent of them became refugees, and only about 5 percent remained in Israel and became citizens."); Khalidi 2020, стр. 72, "The postwar realignment of international power was apparent in the workings of UNSCOP and in its majority report in favor of partitioning the country in a manner that was exceedingly favorable to the Jewish minority, giving them over 56 percent of Palestine, against the much smaller 17 percent for the Jewish state envisioned by the 1937 Peel partition plan."; Slater 2020, pp. 62 ("One problem with this solution was that the Jews were only one-third of the population of mandatory Palestine, so that to create a viable state with a Jewish majority, the UN engaged in a kind of gerrymandering, creating the proposed state on some 57 percent of the land, almost twice as large as that proposed by the Peel Commission ..."), 84 ("in December 1947, the area designated by the UN for a Jewish state was estimated to contain about 500,000 Jews and 400,000 Arabs"), and 86 ("Recall Ben-Gurion's assessment that on the eve of the UN partition there were 500,000 Jews and 400,000 non-Jews (mostly Arab Muslims) in the area allotted for a Jewish state. Other estimates differ only slightly; for example, in his history of Israel, Sachar gives the figures as 538,000 Jews, 397,000 Arabs. Using those figures, then, Jews comprised about 58 percent of the population of the coming Jewish state."); Bashir & Goldberg 2018, стр. 16, "... awarded the Jews, a minority in Palestine, more than half of the territory."; Bishara 2017, стр. 149–150, "The partition plan of 1947 stipulates clearly the partition of Palestine into 'a Jewish state' and an 'Arab state.' But in the context of the partition plan, 45% of the population of the Jewish state is Arab. It seems a Jewish state that was 45% Arab could be imagined at that time. The partition plan did not exhort, 'Deport these Arabs out of the Jewish state' but rather took the existing demographic structure of the country at the time for granted and accepted it as it was. It just drew a line, saying that in particular areas a Jewish state will emerge although it will include up to 45% Arabs, and in other areas an Arab state will emerge that has 10% Jews. The partition plan actually emphasizes that Arabs and Jews have to live together. In that plan, the Arabs were expected to be about half the population in the Jewish state and a big majority in the Arab state."; Cohen 2017, стр. 74, "... two states – one Jewish and one Arab – in the area of Mandate Palestine and proposed that Jerusalem in its entirety would be administered by an international regime. Approximately 800,000 Arabs and 9,000 Jews lived in the area earmarked for the Arab state. Half a million Jews and about 400,000 Arabs lived in the area designated as the Jewish state, where the Arabs constituted 40% (a proportion slated to decrease with expected waves of Jewish immigration). The estimated number of Jews and Arabs living in the greater area of Jerusalem was more or less equal (around 100,000 each)."; Natour 2016, стр. 89, "This plan proposed to divide the country between Jews, whose landownership would increase from 6 to 54 % (they made up for around 35 % of the population) and the Arabs with an ownership of 46 % instead of around 94 % (who made up for around 70 % of the population) ..."; Masalha 2012, стр. 68, "55 per cent"; Davis 2011, стр. 7, "On November 29, 1947, the United Nations General Assembly passed Resolution 181, which contained a plan to partition Palestine into Arab and Jewish states, with an international zone (called a corpus separatum) for the 'holy areas' in Jerusalem and Bethlehem, to be administered by the UN (see Map 1). The Arab state, which never came to fruition, was to have a population of 725,000 Arabs and 10,000 Jews on some 43 percent of the land of Palestine. The Jewish state was to have a Jewish population of 498,000 and an Arab population of 407,000 on 56 percent of the land. The population of the International Zone was to be 105,000 Arabs and 100,000 Jewish inhabitants."; Morris 2008, стр. 63–64, "Resolution 181[II] called for the partition of Palestine into two sovereign states, one Jewish, the other Arab ... The Jewish state, on about 55 percent of Palestine's territory ... The Arab state, on about 42 percent of Palestine ... The Jerusalem area—including the city itself, outlying villages ('Ein Karim and Abu Dis), and Bethlehem—was designated a corpus separatum"; Sa'di 2007, стр. 290–291, "Although Jews by then constituted only about one-third of the population, the proposed Jewish State was to be established on 56 percent of Palestine's territory and was to have included only a slight Jewish majority of 499,000 Jews versus 438,000 Palestinians. The Arab state was to have been composed of 43 percent of the country reflections and would include 818,000 Palestinians and fewer than 10,000 Jews (Khalidi 1997: 11)."; Pappe 2006, pp. 34 ("the Jews, who owned less than six per cent of the total land area of Palestine and constituted no more than one third of the population, were handed more than half of its overall territory.") and 35 ("On forty-two per cent of the land, 818,000 Palestinians were to have a state that included 10,000 Jews, while the state for the Jews was to stretch over almost fifty-six per cent of the land which 499,000 Jews were to share with 438,000 Palestinians. The third part was a small enclave around the city of Jerusalem which was to be internationally governed and whose population of 200,000 was equally divided between Palestinians and Jews.")
  52. ^ „BBC News”. news.bbc.co.uk. Приступљено 2023-10-23. 
  53. ^ Ben-Dror 2007, стр. 259–7260: "The Arabs overwhelmingly rejected UNSCOP's recommendations. The Arabs’ list of arguments against the majority's conclusions was indeed a long one. A Palestinian historian summarized it by saying ‘Everything about it was Zionist’. When one takes into consideration the majority's recommendations and the enthusiasm with which these recommendations were accepted by the Zionist leadership, then one can indeed affirm that claim. UNSCOP recommended an independent Jewish state, although the Arabs firmly objected to the principle of independence for the Jews, and did so in a way very generous to the Jews. More than half of the area of Palestine (62 percent) was allocated to be a Jewish state and the Arab state was supposed to make do with the remaining area, although the Palestinian Arab population numbered as much as twice the Jewish population in the land. The pro-Zionist results from UNSCOP confirmed the Arabs’ basic suspicions towards the committee. Even before the onset of its inquiry in Palestine, argued the Arabs, most of its members took a pro-Zionist stand. In addition, according to the Arabs, the committee's final object – the partition – was pre-decided by the Americans. According to this opinion, the outcome of the UNSCOP inquiry was a foregone conclusion. This perception, which led the Palestinian Arabs to boycott the committee, is shared by some modern studies as well."
  54. ^ „U.N.O. PASSES PALESTINE PARTITION PLAN.”. Newcastle Morning Herald and Miners' Advocate (NSW : 1876 – 1954). NSW: National Library of Australia. 1. 12. 1947. стр. 1. Приступљено 24. 10. 2014. „"Semi-hysterical Jewish crowds in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem were still celebrating the U.N.O. partition vote at dawn to-day. Great bonfires at Jewish collective farms in the north were still blazing. Many big cafes in Tel Aviv served free champagne. A brewery threw open its doors to the crowd. Jews jeered some British troops who were patrolling Tel Aviv streets but others handed them wine. In Jerusalem crowds mobbed armoured cars and drove through the streets on them. The Chief Rabbi in Jerusalem (Dr Isaac Herzog) said: "After the darkness of 2000 years, the dawn of redemption has broken. The decision marks at epoch not only in Jewish history, but in world history." The Jewish terrorist organisation, Irgun Zvai Leumi, announced from its headquarters that it would "cease to exist in the new Jewish state."” 
  55. ^ David McDowall (1990). Palestine and Israel: The Uprising and Beyond. I.B. Tauris. стр. 193. ISBN 9780755612581. „Although the Jewish Agency accepted the partition plan, it did not accept the proposed borders as final and Israel's declaration of independence avoided the mention of any boundaries. A state in part of Palestine was seen as a stage towards a larger state when opportunity allowed. Although the borders were 'bad from a military and political point of view,' Ben Gurion urged fellow Jews to accept the UN Partition Plan, pointing out that arrangements are never final, 'not with regard to the regime, not with regard to borders, and not with regard to international agreements'. The idea of partition being a temporary expedient dated back to the Peel Partition proposal of 1937. When the Zionist Congress had rejected partition on the grounds that the Jews had an inalienable right to settle anywhere in Palestine, Ben Gurion had argued in favour of acceptance, 'I see in the realisation of this plan practically the decisive stage in the beginning of full redemption and the most wonderful lever for the gradual conquest of all of Palestine.” 
  56. ^ Sean F. McMahon, The Discourse of Palestinian-Israeli Relations, Routledge 2010 p. 40. "The Zionist movement also accepted the UN partition plan of 1947 tactically. Palumbo notes that “[t]he Zionists accepted this scheme [the UN partition plan] since they hoped to use their state as a base to conquer the whole country.” Similarly, Flapan states that “[Zionist] acceptance of the resolution in no way diminished the belief of all the Zionist parties in their right to the whole of the country [Palestine]”; and that “acceptance of the UN Partition Resolution was an example of Zionist pragmatism par excellence. It was a tactical acceptance, a vital step in the right direction – a springboard for expansion when circumstances proved more judicious.”
  57. ^ Michael Palumbo (1990). Imperial Israel : the history of the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. Bloomsbury. стр. 19. ISBN 9780747504894. „The Zionists accepted this scheme [the UN partition plan] since they hoped to use their state as a base to conquer the whole country” 
  58. ^ Simha Flapan, The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities, Pantheon, 1988, ISBN 978-0-679-72098-0, Ch. 1 Myth One : Zionists Accepted the UN Partition and Planned for Peace, pages 13-53 "Every school child knows that there is no such thing in history as a final arrangement— not with regard to the regime, not with regard to borders, and not with regard to international agreements. History, like nature, is full of alterations and change. David Ben-Gurion, War Diaries, Dec. 3, 1947"
  59. ^ Eugene Rogan (2012). The Arabs: A History (3rd изд.). Penguin. стр. 321. ISBN 978-0-7181-9683-7. 
  60. ^ Benny Morris (2008). 1948: a history of the first Arab-Israeli war. Yale University Press. стр. 73. ISBN 978-0-300-12696-9. Приступљено 13. 7. 2013. „Bevin regarded the UNSCOP majority report of 1 September 1947 as unjust and immoral. He promptly decided that Britain would not attempt to im- pose it on the Arabs; indeed, he expected them to resist its implementation… The British cabinet...: in the meeting on 4 December 1947... It decided, in a sop to the Arabs, to refrain from aiding the enforcement of the UN resolution, meaning the partition of Palestine. And in an important secret corollary... it agreed that Britain would do all in its power to delay until early May the arrival in Palestine of the UN (Implementation) Commission. The Foreign Office immediately informed the commission "that it would be intolerable for the Commission to begin to exercise its authority while the [Mandate] Palestine Government was still administratively responsible for Palestine"... This... nullified any possibility of an orderly implementation of the partition resolution.” 
  61. ^ „The Question of Palestine and the UN, "The Jewish Agency accepted the resolution despite its dissatisfaction over such matters as Jewish emigration from Europe and the territorial limits set on the proposed Jewish State."” (PDF). Приступљено 18. 1. 2025. 
  62. ^ Sami Hadawi, Bitter Harvest: A Modern History of Palestine, Olive Branch Press, (1989) 1991 p. 76.
  63. ^ Perkins, Kenneth J.; Gilbert, Martin (1999). „Israel: A History”. The Journal of Military History. 63 (3): 149. ISSN 0899-3718. JSTOR 120539. doi:10.2307/120539. 
  64. ^ Best, Antony (2004), International History of the Twentieth Century and beyond, Routledge, стр. 531, ISBN 978-1-315-73971-7, doi:10.4324/9781315739717-1, Приступљено 2022-06-29 
  65. ^ Live by the Sword: Israel's Struggle for Existence in the Holy Land, James Rothrock, p. 14
  66. ^ Lenczowski, G. (1962). The Middle East in World Affairs (3rd Edition). Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. p. 723
  67. ^ Abu-Laban & Bakan 2022, стр. 511, "In light of the ever-growing historiography, serious scholarship has left little debate about what happened in 1948."; Khalidi 2020, стр. 60, "What happened is, of course, now well known."; Slater 2020, стр. 406 n.44, "There is no serious dispute among Israeli, Palestinian, or other historians about the central facts of the Nakba."; Khoury 2012, pp. 258 ("The realities of the nakba as an ethnic cleansing can no more be neglected or negated ... The ethnic cleansing as incarnated by Plan Dalet is no longer a matter of debate among historians ... The facts about 1948 are no longer contested, but the meaning of what happened is still a big question.") and 263 ("We don't need to prove what is now considered a historical fact. What two generations of Palestinian historians and their chronicles tried to prove became an accepted reality after the emergence of the Israeli new historians."); Wolfe 2012, стр. 133, "The bare statistics of the Nakba are well enough established."; Lentin 2010, стр. 6, "That the 1948 war that led to the creation of the State of Israel resulted in the devastation of Palestinian society and the expulsion of at least 80 per cent of the Palestinians who lived in the parts of Palestine upon which Israel was established is by now a recognised fact by all but diehard Zionist apologists."; Sa'di 2007, pp. 290 ("Although the hard facts regarding the developments during 1947–48 that led to the Nakba are well known and documented, the obfuscation by the dominant Israeli story has made recovering the facts, presenting a sensible narrative, and putting them across to the world a formidable task.") and 294 ("Today, there is little or no academic controversy about the basic course of events that led to the Zionist victory and the almost complete destruction of Palestinian society.")
  68. ^ Abu-Laban & Bakan 2022, стр. 511, "over 80 per cent"; Pappe 2022, стр. 128, "Three-quarters of a million Palestinians ... almost 90 per cent"; Khalidi 2020, стр. 60, "Some 80 percent ... At least 720,000 ..."; Slater 2020, pp. 81 ("about 750,000"), 83 ("over 80 percent"), and 350 ("It is no longer a matter of serious dispute that in the 1947–48 period—beginning well before the Arab invasion in May 1948—some 700,000 to 750,000 Palestinians were expelled from or fled their villages and homes in Israel in fear of their lives—an entirely justifiable fear, in light of massacres carried out by Zionist forces."); Shenhav 2019, стр. 49, "750,000"; Bashir & Goldberg 2018, стр. 7, "some 750,000"; Bishara 2017, pp. 138 ("expelled close to 750,000") and 148 n. 21 ("number of the refugees displaced ranged between 700,000 and 900,000"; Bäuml 2017, стр. 105, "approximately 750,000"; Cohen 2017, стр. 87, "approximately 700,000 ... between half a million and a million"; Manna 2013, pp. 93 ("approximately 750,000") and 99 n. 12 ("Recently, both Palestinian and Israeli scholars seem to agree on this estimate of 700,000–750,000 refugees."); Masalha 2012, стр. 2, "about 90 per cent ... 750,000 refugees"; Wolfe 2012, стр. 133, "some three quarters of a million"; Davis 2011, pp. 7 ("more than 750,000") and 237 n. 21 ("Most scholars generally agree with the UN number, which it was somewhere in the vicinity of 750,000"); Lentin 2010, pp. 6 ("at least 80 per cent") and 7 ("more than 700,000"); Ghanim 2009, стр. 25, "Around 750,000-900,000"; Kimmerling 2008, стр. 280, "700,000 to 900,000"; Morris 2008, стр. 407, "some seven hundred thousand"; Sa'di 2007, стр. 297, "at least 780,000 ... more than 80 percent"
  69. ^ Abu-Laban & Bakan 2022, стр. 511; Manna 2022, стр. 17; Pappe 2022, pp. 121 and 128 ("Half of the villages had been destroyed, flattened by Israeli bulldozers ..."); Khalidi 2020, стр. 73, "conquest and depopulation ... of scores of Arab cities, towns, and villages"; Shenhav 2019, стр. 49, "abolition of hundreds of Palestinian towns and villages"; Bashir & Goldberg 2018, стр. 1, "destruction of hundreds of villages and urban neighborhoods ... evacuation of villages"; Cohen 2017, стр. 80; Pappe 2017, стр. 66, "In a matter of seven months, 531 villages were destroyed and eleven urban neighborhoods emptied." Rouhana & Sabbagh-Khoury 2017, стр. 400, "Palestinian cities whose inhabitants were almost completely forced out ... hundreds of evacuated and destroyed towns"; Rashed, Short & Docker 2014, p. 10 (quoting Mark Levene) "With at least 5,000 men, women, and children slaughtered in the massacres, 531 villages and 11 major towns destroyed and up to 800,000 folk uprooted, mostly into exile, the point of Pappe's effort can only be affirmed."; Manna 2013, стр. 91; Khoury 2012, стр. 259; Masalha 2012, pp. 3 ("over 500 villages and towns and a whole country and its people disappeared from international maps and dictionaries ... Walid Khalidi ... listed 418 depopulated and destroyed villages. However, Salman Abu-Sitta's figure of 531 includes 77 destroyed Bedouin villages in the south"), 7 ("coastal cities of Palestine — Jaffa, Haifa and Acre — were largely depopulated"), 74 ("hundreds of villages had been completely depopulated and their houses blown up or bulldozed"), 90-91 ("Of the 418 depopulated villages documented by Khalidi, 293 (70 per cent) were totally destroyed and 90 (22 per cent) were largely destroyed."), 107 ("nearly 500 destroyed and depopulated villages"), and 115 ("towns and villages of southern Palestine, including the cities of Beer Sheba and al-Majdal, were completely depopulated"); Wolfe 2012, стр. 161 n.1, "According to official Israeli estimates, over 85% of Palestinian villages were ‘abandoned’ in the Nakba, 218 villages being listed as destroyed."; Davis 2011, pp. 7 ("destruction of more than four hundred villages ... depopulation of Palestinians from cities"), 9 ("418 villages that were emptied"), and 237 n. 20 ("The total number of depopulated villages, hamlets, settlements, and towns is estimated to be between 290 and 472. The most comprehensive study and the clearest on its methods for including and eliminating population settlements is the massive All That Remains (W. Khalidi 1992), which estimates the number of villages to be 418. According to this study, Israeli topographical maps chart 290 villages, Benny Morris's 1987 study lists 369, and the Palestinian encyclopedia published by Hay’at al-Mawsu‘a al-Filastiniyya gives 391 (among other sources on the subject)."); Ghanim 2009, стр. 25, "about 531 villages were deliberately destroyed"; Kimmerling 2008, стр. 280, "Most of their villages, towns, and neighborhoods were destroyed or repopulated by Jewish residents"; Sa'di 2007, pp. 293-297 ("[p. 297] destruction of some 420 Palestinian towns and villages")
  70. ^ Abu-Laban & Bakan 2022, стр. 511; Pappe 2022, стр. 128, "a few thousand died in massacres"; Manna 2022, стр. 16–17,"There is now a general consensus among the parties to the historical discussion that there were dozens of massacres and acts of expulsion of Palestinians from their country prior to and after May 1948. The debate revolves essentially around the extent to which the top Israeli leadership was responsible for these acts and gave the orders to carry them out."; Hasian Jr. 2020, стр. 100, "[According to Saleh Abdel Jawad:] between December of 1947 and January of 1949 ... 'nearly 70 massacres' had been committed, and he was adamant that this was a conservative count"; Khalidi 2020, стр. 93, "civilian massacres at Dayr Yasin and at least twenty other locations"; Slater 2020, pp. 77 ("Zionist massacres and forced expulsion of the Palestinians, which began well before the invasion") and 81-82 ("the massacres and expulsions of the Palestinians—today widely known as the Nakba"); Shenhav 2019, стр. 49, "It is now clear that expulsions and massacres took place all over Palestine, not only in Dir Yasin, al-Lod, and al-Tantura."; Rashed, Short & Docker 2014, стр. 11, "The ‘standard operating procedure’ of Zionist troops was to surround a village, and even though the villagers might surrender, ‘able men and boys were lined up, and sometimes shot’, and in the worst cases ‘a more general massacre ensued’ ... following Pappé, Levene summarises that ‘at least 5,000 men, women, and children [were] slaughtered in the massacres’"; Rouhana & Sabbagh-Khoury 2014, стр. 6, "Throughout the extensive deliberations about the future of the Arabs (what was known as the ‘Arab Question’ in the Zionist vernacular until 1948) and in particular the issue of their expulsion, physical elimination was not considered an option, as it was for some other settler-colonial projects. Many massacres against Palestinians took place, some of which were discussed in the Zionist narrative. We agree with the historians who argue that the goal of many of these massacres was not the physical elimination of the Palestinians but rather their evacuation from Palestine.38 Massacres were strategically used to terrorize Palestinians into leaving their towns. One can call this ‘demographic elimination’ to distinguish it from ‘physical elimination’."; Docker 2012, стр. 19, "There were further ‘atrocities’ including mutilation, cruelty, and weapons of terror."; Masalha 2012, стр. 76 and 84–87, "[p. 76] scores of massacres carried out in 1948"; Lentin 2010, стр. 109–111; Morris 2008, стр. 405, pp. 405 ("In truth, however, the Jews committed far more atrocities than the Arabs and killed far more civilians and POWs in deliberate acts of brutality in the course of 1948.") and 406 ("In the yearlong war, Yishuv troops probably murdered some eight hundred civilians and prisoners of war all told—most of them in several clusters of massacres in captured villages during April–May, July, and October–November 1948. The round of massacres, during Operation Hiram and its immediate aftermath in the Galilee and southern Lebanon, at the end of October and the first week of November 1948 is noteworthy in having occurred so late in the war, when the IDF was generally well disciplined and clearly victorious. This series of killings—at 'Eilabun, Jish, 'Arab al-Mawasi, Saliha, Majd al-Kurum, and so on—was apparently related to a general vengefulness and a desire by local commanders to precipitate a civilian exodus."; Abu-Lughod 2007, стр. 104 n. 7, "sixty-eight massacres of Palestinians conducted in 1948 by Zionist and Israeli forces"; Sa'di 2007, стр. 293 and 300, "Morris (2004a) also mentions twenty-four cases of massacre, while Palestinian scholars using oral historical methods have documented more than sixty"; Slyomovics 2007, стр. 29–31 and 37; Pappe 2006, стр. 258, "Palestinian sources, combining Israeli military archives with oral histories, list thirty-one confirmed massacres - beginning with the massacre in Tirat Haifa on 11 December 1947 and ending with Khirbat Ilin in the Hebron area on 19 January 1949 - and there may have been at least another six. We still do not have a systematic Nakba memorial archive that would allow one to trace the names of all those who died in the massacres - an act of painful commemoration that is gradually getting underway as this book goes to press."
  71. ^ Sabbagh-Khoury 2023, стр. 185–186; Sayigh 2023, стр. 282; Manna 2022, pp. 75-77 ("[p. 75] The Israeli army carried out killings (including massacres), pillaged, and raped in a number of border villages, including Safsaf, Saliha, Jish, Hula, and Sa‘sa‘, on the day the villages were occupied or shortly thereafter."), 202, and 301 nn. 79-81 ("[n. 79] It seems likely that cases of rape during and after the 1948 war were underreported in the historical literature. With time, it becomes more difficult to investigate those events."); Hasian Jr. 2020, стр. 84, "Palestinian researchers, archivists, interviewers, and others who help chronicle these events now have transcontinental allies who collect oral histories that are filled with tales of the rape of women and the killing of innocent children during the involuntary transfers of the 1940s."; Natour 2016, стр. 94; Khoury 2012, стр. 263, "Many stories of massacres, rape, and expulsion are known, and many other stories are still to be revealed: Tantura, Safsaf, Ein al-Zeitun, Sa’sa’, Sha’ab, Kabri, Abou Shousha, Ai’laboun, and so on."; Masalha 2012, стр. 82–84, "[p. 82] The use of rape and other forms of sexual violence by Jewish forces in 1948 as weapons of war and instruments of ethnic cleansing has yet to be studied. In 1948 the rape of Arab women and girls was not a rare or isolated act committed by individual forces, but rather was used deliberately as an instrument to terrorise the civilian population and push people into fleeing their homes."; Knopf-Newman 2011, стр. 183; Lentin 2010, стр. 31; Ram 2009, стр. 373; Morris 2008, стр. 406–407, "The Israelis’ collective memory of fighters characterized by 'purity of arms' is also undermined by the evidence of rapes committed in conquered towns and villages. About a dozen cases—in Jaffa, Acre, and so on—are reported in the available contemporary documentation and, given Arab diffidence about reporting such incidents and the (understandable) silence of the perpetrators, and IDFA censorship of many documents, more, and perhaps many more, cases probably occurred. Arabs appear to have committed few acts of rape."; Humphries & Khalili 2007, pp. 209, 211-213 ("[p. 211-212] As Benny Morris writes, the regular and irregular military forces of the Yishuv had employed rape in 'several dozen cases' (Morris 2004a: 592) and the news of the rape, though subsequently silenced by both perpetrators and victims, spread as quickly as the news of massacres, aided by the fear and horror of the Palestinians and the 'whispering campaign' of the Yishuv military commanders ... these rapes were one of the more devastating components of Hagana assaults and perhaps the primary explanation behind the decision of many of the refugees to flee."), and 223-226; Sa'di 2007, pp. 293 ("On numerous occasions in the execution of Plan D, the Zionist forces expelled people from their towns and villages, committed rape and other acts of violence, massacred civilians, and executed prisoners of war."), 299-300 ("Morris (2004a) reports that there were 'about a dozen' cases of documented rape, often followed by murder. As he notes, 'We have to assume that the dozen cases of rape that were reported . . . are not the whole story. They are just the tip of the iceberg' (Morris, 2004b: 39)."), and 303-304; Slyomovics 2007, pp. 31 ("Morris documents statistics of a dozen cases of rapes and twenty-four instances of massacres as supporting evidence for a pattern") and 33-38 ("[p. 37] It has been a major achievement by historians of 1948 that the conditions and numbers of actual rape and civilian massacre of the Palestinian population are finally recognized."); Pappe 2006, pp. 90, 132, 156, 184, 196, and 208-211 ("[p. 209] David Ben-Gurion seems to have been informed about each case and entered them into his diary. Every few days he has a sub-section: 'Rape Cases'."); Schulz 2003, pp. 28 and 136 ("According to [Kitty] Warnock [Land Before Honor: Palestinian Women in the Occupied Territories, Monthly Review Press 1990], honour was an ingredient in the exodus as fear and concern to save women from being raped was a reason for flight.")
  72. ^ Hasian Jr. 2020, pp. 101 ("Israeli-sponsored radio messages that were used to 'wage psychological warfare'") and 103 ("Walid Khalidi, who wrote some of the first Palestinian summaries of what happened during the fall of Haifa in 1959, has recently revisited these issues and concluded that the British colluded with the Haganah in ways that made sure that the use of “psychological warfare tactics” would be used in ruthless ways so that the Plan Dalet could be carried out against unarmed civilians who needed to be moved out of these lands."); Slater 2020, стр. 81; Cohen 2017, стр. 79; Masalha 2012, стр. 2 and 68, "From the territory occupied by the Israelis in 1948, about 90 per cent of the Palestinians were driven out — many by psychological warfare and/or military pressure and a very large number at gunpoint."; Lentin 2010, стр. 109; Shlaim 2009, стр. 55, "Morris describes the flight of the Palestinians wave after wave, town by town, and village by village. He gives numerous specific examples of psychological warfare, of intimidation, of expulsion by force and of atrocities committed by the armed forces of the infant Jewish state."; Morris 2008, pp. 160 ("To reinforce this “whispering,” or psychological warfare, campaign, Allon's men distributed fliers, advising those who wished to avoid harm to leave “with their women and children.”") and 332 ("employing 'psychological warfare by means of flyers and ‘treatment’ of civilian inhabitants'"); Sa'di 2007, стр. 308, "Morris's (2004a) research confirms what Palestinians have argued all along; he shows definitively that active expulsion by the Jewish forces, the flight of civilians from the battle zones following the attacks of Jewish forces, psychological warfare, and fear of atrocities and random killing by the advancing Jewish forces were the main causes for the Palestinian refugee problem."; Pappe 2006, pp. 156 ("The UN 'peace' plan had resulted in people being intimidated and terrorised by psychological warfare, heavy shelling of civilian populations, expulsions, seeing relatives being executed, and wives and daughters abused, robbed and in several cases, raped."), 197 ("... from the Chief of Staff, Yigael Yadin: 'Your preparations should include psychological warfare and "treatment" (tipul) of citizens as an integral part of the operation.'"), and 278 n. 27 ("A range of strategies that could only be described as psychological warfare was used by the Jewish forces to terrorize and demoralize the Arab population in a deliberate attempt to provoke a mass exodus. Radio broadcasts in Arabic warned of traitors in the Arabs' midst, describing the Palestinians as having been deserted by their leaders, and accusing Arab militias of committing crimes against Arab civilians. They also spread fears of disease. Another, less subtle, tactic involved the use of loudspeaker trucks. These would be used in the villages and towns to urge the Palestinians to flee before they were all killed, to warn that the Jews were using poison gas and atomic weapons, or to play recorded 'horror sounds' - shrieking and moaning, the wail of sirens, and the clang of fire-alarm bells."); Morris 2004, pp. 129, 168-169 ("Jewish tactics in the battle were designed to stun and quickly overpower opposition; demoralisation was a primary aim. It was deemed just as important to the outcome as the physical destruction of the Arab units. The mortar barrages and the psychological warfare broadcasts and announcements, and the tactics employed by the infantry companies, advancing from house to house, were all geared to this goal. The orders of Carmeli's 22nd Battalion were ‘to kill every [adult male] Arab encountered’ and to set alight with firebombs ‘all objectives that can be set alight. I am sending you posters in Arabic; disperse on route.’"), 230, 246, 250, 252, 468 ("He also ordered the launching of ‘psychological warfare operations’ and instructed the units ‘to deal with the civilian [populations]’. Yadin did not elaborate but presumably the intention was to frighten civilian communities into flight."), 522 (Israel agreed that 'those of the civilian population who may wish to remain in Al Faluja and ‘Iraq al Manshiya are to be permitted to do so ...' But within days Israel went back on its word. Southern Front's soldiers mounted a short, sharp, well-orchestrated campaign of low-key violence and psychological warfare designed to intimidate the inhabitants into flight. According to one villager's recollection, the Jews ‘created a situation of terror, entered the houses and beat the people with rifle butts’.128 Contemporary United Nations and Quakers documents support this description. The UN Mediator, Ralph Bunche, quoting UN observers on the spot, complained that ‘Arab civilians . . . at Al Faluja have been beaten and robbed by Israeli soldiers and . . . there have been some cases of attempted rape’."), and 591 ("If Jewish attack directly and indirectly triggered most of the exodus up to June 1948, a small but significant proportion was due to direct expulsion orders and to psychological warfare ploys (‘whispering propaganda’) designed to intimidate people into flight."); Masalha 2003, стр. 26–27
  73. ^ Sabbagh-Khoury 2023, стр. 36, 44, 163, 169–177, 183, 186–189, 226–236, 241, 247–251, 256, 265; Sayigh 2023, стр. 281–282; Manna 2022, стр. 49, 83, 152, 169–170, 174–176, 182, 201, 287 n. 2, 316 n. 26; Khalidi 2020, стр. 250 n. 4 and 287 n. 58; Shenhav 2019, стр. 49; Confino 2018, стр. 141–143; Masalha 2018, стр. 185; Nashef 2018, стр. 95, 143 n. 4, 178–179, and 180 n.8; Lustick & Berkman 2017, стр. 41; Rouhana & Sabbagh-Khoury 2017, стр. 396 n. 6 and 413; Natour 2016, стр. 94; Fierke 2014, стр. 805 n. 17; Masalha 2012, стр. 16, 135–147; Lentin 2010, стр. 31, 70, and 84; Ram 2009, стр. 371; Morris 2008, стр. 154–155, 163, and 281; Abu-Lughod 2007, стр. 89; Pappe 2006, стр. 91–95, 100, 109, 125, 147, 167–169, 190, 200, 204–211
  74. ^ Manna 2022, стр. 293 n. 18, "Some researchers, particularly on the Israeli side, describe the events of the war in its first months as a “civil war.” This description is inaccurate and controversial; it is preferable to divide the war into two stages without describing the first stage as a civil war."; Pappe 2022, стр. 118–120, "[p. 118] The next day brought the first outburst of intra-communal violence, activated by hot-headed youth on both sides ... A slow deterioration into a widespread civil war in the next few months generated second thoughts in the UN, and in Washington, about the desirability, indeed, the feasibility, of the partition plan. But it was too late for a large number of Palestinians, evicted from their houses after their leaders lost the early battles with the Jewish forces ... [p. 120] Until March 1948, clashes between the two communities, beginning the day after the UN partition plan was accepted by the General Assembly, were scattered, random and uncontrolled."; Khalidi 2020, стр. 73, "Like a slow, seemingly endless train wreck, the Nakba unfolded over a period of many months. Its first stage, from November 30, 1947, until the final withdrawal of British forces and the establishment of Israel on May 15, 1948, witnessed successive defeats by Zionist paramilitary groups, including the Haganah and the Irgun, of the poorly armed and organized Palestinians and the Arab volunteers who had come to help them."; Cohen 2017, стр. 78, "The outbreak of hostilities immediately after the UN vote in favor of the Partition Plan ..."; Davis 2011, стр. 235 n. 1, "The fighting began in late 1947, following the United Nations decision to partition Palestine into a Jewish state and an Arab state, and continued until Israel reached separate truce agreements with Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria in Rhodes between February and July of 1949 (Shlaim 2000, pp. 41–47)."; Morris 2008, стр. 75–78, "[p. 77] This stage was characterized by gradually expanding, continuous, small-scale, small-unit fighting. There was terrorism, and counterterrorist strikes, in the towns and ambushes along the roads. Arab armed bands attacked Jewish settlements, and Haganah units occasionally retaliated. It was formless—there were no front lines (except along the seams between the two communities in the main, mixed towns), no armies moving back and forth, no pitched battles, and no conquests of territory."; Sa'di 2007, стр. 292, "Soon after the announcement of the UN partition resolution in November 1947, local skirmishes erupted between the two communities. Attacks and retributions escalated into civil strife."; Masalha 2003, стр. 26, "Within weeks of the UN partition resolution, the country was plunged in what soon became a full-scale civil war. By mid-December 1947, ‘spontaneous and unorganised’ Palestinian outbreaks of violence were being met with the full weight of Yishuv's armed forces, the Haganah, in what the British High Commissioner for Palestine called ‘indiscriminate action against the Arabs’ ..."
  75. ^ Pappe 2022, pp. 119 ("... the hasty departure of many members of the local Palestinian elite, who left in fear of the oncoming conflict and in the hope of returning to a calmer Palestine (70,000 left between September 1947 and March 1948). This exodus produced a collective sense of insecurity and terror among many segments of the Palestinian urban population.") and 121 ("the first wave of about 70,000 Palestinians belonging to the social and economic elite of the country, who had fled Palestine by January 1948"); Morris 2008, pp. 93 ("But the disintegration of Arab Palestine, which underlay the military collapse, began well before the Haganah went on the offensive in early April 1948; indeed, there were telling signs even before the UN partition vote and the start of the accelerated British evacuation. The trigger appears to have been the UNSCOP partition proposals and Britain's announced intention to leave. Already in early November 1947, an official reported chaos in the largely Arab-staffed Nazareth District administration; the offices had ceased to function."), 94 ("Flight was the earliest and most concrete expression of Palestinian demoralization. Within twenty-four hours of the start of the (still low-key) hostilities, Arab families began to abandon their homes in mixed or border neighborhoods in the big towns."), and 411 ("Most of the displaced likely expected to return to their homes within weeks or months, on the coattails of victorious Arab armies or on the back of a UN decision or Great Power intervention. Few expected that their refugeedom would last a lifetime or encompass their children and grandchildren. But it did."); Morris 2004, стр. 6, "The Arab exodus from the areas that became the Jewish State at the end of the war occurred over the space of 20 months, from the end of November 1947 to July 1949, with several small appendages during the following months and years."
  76. ^ Pappe 2022, стр. 118–119, "Twelve days after the adoption of the UN resolution, the expulsion of Palestinians began. A month later, the first Palestinian village was wiped out by Jewish retaliation to a Palestinian attack on convoys and Jewish settlements. This action was transformed into an ethnic cleansing operation in March, which resulted in the loss to Palestine of much of its indigenous population."; Khalidi 2020, стр. 72, "The expulsion of enough Arabs to make possible a Jewish majority state necessarily and inevitably followed [partition]."; Slater 2020, стр. 81, "In fact, the forced transfer of the Palestinians began not as a response to the Arab invasion in the spring of 1948, but nearly six months earlier in December 1947, following the proclamation of the UN partition plan."; Docker 2012, стр. 19, "In Jaffa in February 1948 ‘houses were randomly selected and then dynamited with people still in them’."; Masalha 2012, стр. 79, "Ilan Pappé, commenting on the massacres carried out by Jewish forces during the Nakba, writes: 'Palestinian sources, combining Israeli military archives with oral histories, list thirty-one confirmed massacres — beginning with the massacre in Tirat Haifa on 11 December 1947 and ending with Khirbat Illin in the Hebron area on 19 January 1949 — and there may have been at least another six. We still do not have a systematic Nakba memorial archive that would allow one to trace the names of all those who died in the massacres.' (Pappé 2006: 258)"; Morris 2008, стр. 117–118, "Until the end of March ... no territory was conquered and no village—with two exceptions over December 1947–March 1948 ('Arab Suqreir and Qisariya)—was destroyed."; Pappe 2006, стр. 40, "Coerced expulsions followed in the middle of February 1948 when Jewish troops succeeded in emptying five Palestinian villages in one day."; Morris 2004, стр. 76–77
  77. ^ Manna 2022, стр. 32, "One of the first operations was directed at the village of Khisas, north of Hula Lake, and was conducted by the Palmach on 18 December 1947. A dozen residents of the village were killed, including some children. The blowing up of houses and the killings caused panic to spread among the villagers and the inhabitants of neighboring villages as well, so that hundreds took flight and went about searching for a refuge for their families in Syria."; Morris 2008, стр. 103, "In Khisas, the Palmahniks stormed a house, killing three men, a woman, and four children, and then blew it up, also damaging an adjacent building; at the mansion, they killed four men ... Much of Khisas's population fled—and those who remained sued for peace ... No one was punished."; Pappe 2006, стр. 57, "Jewish troops attacked the village on 18 December 1947, and randomly started blowing up houses at the dead of night while the occupants were still fast asleep. Fifteen villagers, including five children, were killed in the attack."; Masalha 2003, pp. 35, 47 ("12 Arab villagers were murdered in cold blood in a Haganah raid."), 144, and 152
  78. ^ Manna 2022, стр. 34, "After midnight of the new year, the Palmach unit carried out an attack on the village from the east, using firearms and grenades, which resulted in dozens of dead and wounded among the residents who were asleep in their homes."; Pappe 2022, стр. 121, "Their fear for their lives was accentuated by massacres committed in Balad al-Shaykh, where on the last day of 1947, scores of Palestinians were slaughtered in retaliation for a terrorist attack on Jewish workers in the nearby refinery."; Confino 2018, стр. 151 n.13, "The Haganah occupation of Balad al-Sheikh came next, leaving several dozen civilians dead, including men, women, and children."; Masalha 2012, стр. 85, "Balad al-Shaykh, 11 December 1947 and 31 December–1 January 1948: 14 civilians, of whom 10 were women and children were killed in the second attack by the Haganah"; Lentin 2010, стр. 74, "In December 1947 the Hagana killed many of the inhabitants of Balad al-Shaysh, the burial place of Shaykh Izz al-Din al-Qassam, one of Palestine's most revered leaders of the 1930s, killing over sixty Palestinians, including women and children."; Morris 2008, стр. 103, "On the night of 31 December–1 January, the Haganah sent in a Palmah company and several independent platoons. The orders were to 'kill as many men as possible'—or, alternatively, '100' men—and 'destroy furniture, etc.,' but to avoid killing women and children. The raiders moved from house to house, pulling out men and executing them. Sometimes they threw grenades into houses and sprayed the interiors with automatic fire. There were several dozen dead, including some women and children."
  79. ^ Pappe 2022, стр. 119, "70,000 left between September 1947 and March 1948"; Morris 2008, стр. 94–95, "Despite the haphazard efforts of some Arab local authorities, the following months were marked by increasing flight from the main towns and certain rural areas. By the end of March 1948 most of the wealthy and middle class families had fled Jaffa, Haifa, and Jerusalem, and most Arab rural communities had evacuated the heavily Jewish Coastal Plain; a few had also left the Upper Jordan Valley. Most were propelled by fear of being caught up, and harmed, in the fighting; some may have feared life under Jewish rule. It is probable that most thought of a short, temporary displacement with a return within weeks or months, on the coattails of victorious Arab armies or international diktats. Thus, although some (the wealthier) moved as far away as Beirut, Damascus, and Amman, most initially moved a short distance, to their villages of origin or towns in the West Bank or Gaza area, inside Palestine, where they could lodge with family or friends. During this period Jewish troops expelled the inhabitants of only one village—Qisariya, in the Coastal Plain, in mid-February (for reasons connected to Jewish illegal immigration rather than the ongoing civil war)—though other villages were harassed and a few specifically intimidated by IZL, LHI, and Haganah actions (much as during this period Jewish settlements were being harassed and intimidated by Arab irregulars). Altogether some seventy-five thousand to one hundred thousand Arabs fled or were displaced from their homes during the first stage of the civil war, marking the first wave of the exodus."; Pappe 2006, стр. 40, "Though sporadic, these early Jewish assaults were severe enough to cause the exodus of a substantial number of people (almost 75,000)."; Morris 2004, стр. 67, "By then, the Arab exodus from Palestine was well under way. By the end of March 1948, some 100,000 Arabs, mostly from the urban upper and middle classes of Jaffa, Haifa and Jerusalem, and from villages in Jewish-dominated areas such as the Jordan Valley and the Coastal Plain, had fled to Arab centres to the east, including Nazareth, Nablus, and Bethlehem, or out of the country altogether."
  80. ^ Manna 2022, pp. 106 ("Simultaneously with the arrival of quality weapons from Prague, Ben-Gurion began implementing Plan Dalet which caused hundreds of casualties among the Palestinians.") and 107 ("the ethnic cleansing policy, which had entered a decisive phase in April"); Pappe 2022, стр. 120, "In March 1948, the military campaign began in earnest. It was driven by Plan D, a military blueprint prepared by the Hagana in anticipation of combating the Arab forces in Palestine and facing the Arab armies after 14 May 1948 ... Plan D was put into full operation in April and May. It had two very clear objectives, the first being to take swiftly and systematically any installation, military or civilian, evacuated by the British ... The second, and far more important, objective of the plan was to cleanse the future Jewish state of as many Palestinians as possible."; Khalidi 2020, стр. 73, "This first stage saw a bitterly fought campaign that culminated in a country-wide Zionist offensive dubbed Plan Dalet in the spring of 1948."; Masalha 2012, стр. 71–72, "First, there was Plan Dalet. This Haganah plan, a straightforward document, of early March 1948, was in many ways a blueprint for the expulsion of as many Palestinians as possible. It constituted an ideological-strategic anchor and basis for the destruction of Arab localities and expulsion of their inhabitants by Jewish commanders. In conformity with Plan Dalet, the Haganah cleared various areas completely of Arab villages."; Lentin 2010, стр. 109–111, "[p. 109] Dealing first with responsibility: while the ‘new historians’, especially Morris, uncovered individual cases of expulsions and massacres as well as plans – notably Plan Dalet – for the removal of Palestinians, they were unwilling to accept the Palestinian contention that Plan Dalet was a Zionist master plan for ethnic cleansing."; Morris 2008, pp. 93 ("Haganah went on the offensive in early April 1948") and 118-121 ("[p. 118] Plan D, formulated in early March and signed and dispatched to the Haganah brigade commanders on 10 March, was Yadin's blueprint for concerted operations on the eve of the final British departure and the pan-Arab invasion that was expected to follow hard on its heels ... But by the end of the period it was clear that a dramatic conceptual change had taken place and that the Yishuv had gone over to the offensive and was now engaged in a war of conquest. That war of conquest was prefigured in Plan D."); Sa'di 2007, стр. 292, "However the conflict was abruptly changed at the beginning of April 1948. The Zionist leadership feared an alteration in the U.S. position, abandoning its support for partition in favor of a plan to place Palestine under international trusteeship (Pappé 2004: 130; Morris, 2001b: 204–5). In response, the Hagana, the main Jewish military force, opened a large-scale offensive.
  81. ^ Morris 2008, стр. 179, "The Haganah, after holding its own on the defensive for four months while it transformed from a militia into an army, launched a series of offensives—most precipitated by Arab attacks—that, within six weeks, routed the Arab militias and their ALA reinforcements. Important pieces of territory assigned in the UN Partition Resolution to Palestinian Arab or international control—including Jaffa and West Jerusalem—fell under Zionist sway as hundreds of thousands of Arabs fled or were driven out."; Sa'di 2007, стр. 292, "The aim of Plan D, as the offensive was known, was to capture the territories allocated to the Jewish state, as well as areas in Galilee and on the highway between Tel-Aviv and Jerusalem that were part of the proposed Palestinian state (Flapan 1987: 42)."
  82. ^ Masalha 2012, стр. 12–13, "Hundreds of villages would be destroyed, urban life in Palestine's most populous Arab communities would disappear, and almost a million Palestinians would be rendered homeless and/or stateless.'"; Morris 2008, pp. 118-121 ("[p. 118] But henceforward, Haganah policy would be permanently to secure roads, border areas, and Jewish settlements by crushing minatory irregular forces and destroying or permanently occupying the villages and towns from which they operated ... [p. 120] To achieve these objectives, swathes of Arab villages, either hostile or potentially hostile, were to be conquered, and brigade commanders were given the option of “destruction of villages (arson, demolition, and mining of the ruins)” or “cleansing [of militiamen] and taking control of [the villages]” and leaving a garrison in place. The commanders were given discretion whether to evict the inhabitants of villages and urban neighborhoods sitting on vital access roads. The individual brigades were instructed in detail about which British police stations and army camps they were to occupy, the particular roads they were to secure, and the specific villages and towns they were to conquer and either depopulate, destroy, and mine or garrison ... The plan gave the brigades carte blanche to conquer the Arab villages and, in effect, to decide on each village's fate—destruction and expulsion or occupation. The plan explicitly called for the destruction of resisting Arab villages and the expulsion of their inhabitants. In the main towns, the brigades were tasked with evicting the inhabitants of resisting neighborhoods to the core Arab neighborhoods (not expulsion from the country). The plan stated: “[The villages] in your area, which have to be taken, cleansed or destroyed—you decide [on their fate], in consultation with your Arab affairs advisers and HIS officers.” Nowhere does the document speak of a policy or desire to expel “the Arab inhabitants” of Palestine or of any of its constituent regions; nowhere is any brigade instructed to clear out “the Arabs.”""), 126-138, and 303-305 ("[p. 304] During the following weeks, Haganah/IDF units as a matter of routine destroyed—when they had sufficient explosives or caterpillars—captured villages, partially or wholly."); Sa'di 2007, pp. 292 ("The plan, as quoted in Morris (2004a: 164) called for “operations against enemy settlements which are in the rear of, within or near our defense lines, with the aim of preventing their use as bases for an active armed force.” However, as Morris points out, given the size of the country, most Palestinians towns and villages within and beyond the proposed Jewish state fell within this category. According to Plan D, the brigade commanders were given “discretion” in what to do with the villages they occupied—that is, to destroy them or leave them standing (Morris 2004a.: 165). On numerous occasions in the execution of Plan D, the Zionist forces expelled people from their towns and villages, committed rape and other acts of violence, massacred civilians, and executed prisoners of war. As we will see, these acts have been widely documented, most forcefully by Israeli historians using military and state archives.") and 294 ("In the coastal area between Haifa and Tel-Aviv, for example, fifty-eight out of the sixty-four villages that had existed were wiped out (Pappé 2004: 137). By the end of the war only two remained. In the course of this campaign even villages that maintained good relations with nearby Jewish settlements and refrained from resorting to violence, such as Deir Yassin, were not spared."); Pappe 2006, стр. 104, "Between 30 March and 15 May, 200 villages were occupied and their inhabitants expelled. This is a fact that must be repeated, as it undermines the Israeli myth that the 'Arabs' ran away once the 'Arab invasion' began. Almost half of the Arab villages had already been attacked by the time the Arab governments eventually and, as we know, reluctantly decided to send in their troops."; Morris 2004, стр. 34, "But in the end, the Palestinians and the ALA failed to capture a single Jewish settlement, while the Jews, by mid-May, conquered close to 200 Arab villages and towns, including Jaffa, Beisan, Safad, Arab Haifa and Arab Tiberias."
  83. ^ Cohen 2017, стр. 79–80, "At this stage of the clashes, the gap between the Zionist discourse and Zionist practices widened. The change in the conduct of the Jewish forces – above all the expulsion of Arab communities – was not accompanied by a change in the discourse."; Morris 2008, стр. 100, pp. 100 ("As late as 24 March 1948, Galili instructed all Haganah units to abide by standing Zionist policy, which was to respect the “rights, needs and freedom,” “without discrimination,” of the Arabs living in the Jewish State areas. The policy changed only in early April, as reflected in the deliberations of the Arab affairs advisers in the Coastal Plain. At their meeting of 31 March, the advisers acted to protect Arab property and deferred a decision about expelling Arabs or disallowing Arabs to cultivate their fields. But a week later the advisers ruled that “the intention [policy] was, generally, to evict the Arabs living in the brigade's area.”"), 161 ("Together, the Yiftah and Golani Brigades, over late April–mid-May, had conquered Eastern Galilee and largely cleared out its Arab inhabitants."), and 410-411 ("And it was that war that propelled most of those displaced out of their houses and into refugeedom. Most fled when their villages and towns came under Jewish attack or out of fear of future attack. They wished [p. 411] to move out of harm's way. At first, during December 1947–March 1948, it was the middle- and upper-class families who fled, abandoning the towns; later, from April on, after the Yishuv shifted to the offensive, it was the urban and rural masses who fled, in a sense emulating their betters."); Sa'di 2007, стр. 293, "By then, many acts of expulsion and massacre had occurred, including the widely publicized massacre of Deir Yassin (April 9, 1948) ..."; Pappe 2006, pp. 40 ("About 250,000 Palestinians were uprooted in this phase, which was accompanied by several massacres, most notable ofwhich was the Deir Yassin massacre."), 104 ("Villages near urban centres were taken and expelled, and sometimes subjected to massacres, in a campaign of terror designed to prepare the ground for a more successful takeover of the cities."); Morris 2004, стр. 593, "In general, the Jewish commanders preferred to completely clear the vital roads and border areas of Arab communities – Allon in Eastern Galilee, Carmel around Haifa and in Western Galilee, Avidan in the south. Most villagers fled before or during the fighting. Those who stayed put were almost invariably expelled."
  84. ^ Manna 2022, pp. 37-38 ("killing and wounding hundreds of men, women, and children ... mutilation and burning of corpses and the humiliation and torture of hundreds of prisoners"), 75 ("The massacre at Dayr Yasin holds a central symbolic position in the Palestinian memory of the Nakba ..."), and 295 n. 51 ("For several years Haganah sources were relied on, which the British and others adopted, and which indicated that over 250 people were killed in the Dayr Yasin massacre. However, recent Palestinian research indicates that the number of those killed was 104, less than half the original Haganah estimate."); Pappe 2022, стр. 121, "a well-publicized bloodbath"; Hasian Jr. 2020, стр. 83, "For more than 70 years many Israeli researchers, journalists, military planners, and others have admitted that incidents like the killings of between 100 and 250 civilians at Deir Yassin in April of 1948 can be documented from materials that can be found in Israel Defense Force archives, but this is contextualized as an atypical incident that proves the rule of Jewish avoidance of civilian casualties during wartime."; Khalidi 2020, стр. 74, "People fled as news spread of massacres like that on April 9, 1948, in the village of Dayr Yasin near Jerusalem, where one hundred residents, sixty-seven of them women, children, and old people, were slaughtered when the village was stormed by Irgun and Haganah assailants."; Slater 2020, стр. 82, "In addition to the forced expulsions, Zionist forces carried out several massacres, some of them even before the May 1948 Arab state invasion. The most notorious of them was the April 8–9 killing of over one hundred Palestinian civilians in the village of Deir Yassin, near Jerusalem. There is a lively debate among Israeli historians over whether Deir Yassin and other massacres reflected deliberate Zionist policy or rather was perpetrated by individual military units, particularly by the Irgun and fanatical “Stern Gang” terrorists who operated independently of the Haganah, the military arm of the Zionist leadership. However, from the point of view of terrorized Palestinians who learned of the massacres, it was entirely irrelevant whether the killings represented official policy or not—either way, they had very good reasons to flee."; Shenhav 2019, стр. 49; Ghanim 2018, стр. 104–107, "Deir Yassin witnessed a horrific massacre in 1948 in which tens of civilians were killed, including women and children, after which the entire village, excepting a few buildings, was demolished, and Kfar Shaul was established upon its ruins."; Rashed, Short & Docker 2014, стр. 11, "the ‘infamous massacre’ of Dayr Yasin in April 1948"; Docker 2012, стр. 19, "When the Jewish soldiers burst into Deir Yassin, the bodies of the men killed were ‘abused’."; Khoury 2012, стр. 261; Masalha 2012, стр. 79–83, "[p. 80] Although not the bloodiest massacre of the war, Dayr Yasin was the site of the most notorious mass murder of Palestinian civilians in 1948 — an event which became the single most important contributory factor to the 1948 exodus, a powerful marker of the violence at the foundation of the State of Israel. On 9 April, between 120 and 254 unarmed villagers were murdered, including women, the elderly and children.56 There were also instances of rape and mutilation. Most Israeli writers today have no difficulty in acknowledging the occurrence of the Dayr Yasin massacre and its effect, if not its intention, of precipitating the exodus."; Wolfe 2012, стр. 160; Knopf-Newman 2011, стр. 182–183, "Dayr Yasin was one of numerous massacres that Jewish militias enacted as part of Plan Dalet, the Zionists’ blueprint to cleanse Palestine of its indigenous population."; Lentin 2010, стр. 139, "between 93 and 254 Palestinians, including 30 babies, were massacred"; Kimmerling 2008, p. 313 ("about 120 villagers killed") and 410 n. 17 ("the massacre of about 125 villagers"); Morris 2008, стр. 125–129, "[p. 126] The IZL and LHI troopers moved from house to house, lobbing in grenades and spraying the interiors with small arms fire. They blew up houses and sometimes cut down those fleeing into the alley-ways, including one or two families. ... It quickly emerged that the fighting had been accompanied, and followed, by atrocities. ... Some militiamen and unarmed civilians were shot on the spot. A few villagers may have been trucked into Jerusalem and then taken back to Deir Yassin and executed; a group of male prisoners were shot in a nearby quarry; several of those captured were shot ... [p. 127] The IZL and LHI troopers systematically pillaged the village and stripped the inhabitants of jewelry and money. Altogether, 100–120 villagers (including combatants) died that day —though the IZL, Haganah, Arab officials, and the British almost immediately inflated the number to “254” (or “245”), each for their own propagandistic reasons. Most of the villagers either fled or were trucked through West Jerusalem and dumped at Musrara, outside the Old City walls. ... But the real significance of Deir Yassin lay, not in what had actually happened on 9 April, or in the diplomatic exchanges that followed, but in its political and demographic repercussions. ... The most important immediate effect of the media atrocity campaign, however, was to spark fear and further panic flight from Palestine's villages and towns."; Abu-Lughod 2007, стр. 104 n. 7, "by conservative estimates slaughtered about 115 men, women, and children and stuffed their bodies down wells"; Humphries & Khalili 2007, стр. 211; Jayyusi 2007, стр. 132 n. 12, "The massacre at Deir Yassin was frequently cited in the Lifta accounts as having been a landmark, a focal point in the events of the Nakba itself."; Sa'di 2007, pp. 293 ("By then [May 15], many acts of expulsion and massacre had occurred, including the widely publicized massacre of Deir Yassin (April 9, 1948)") and 304; Slyomovics 2007, стр. 35, "the most famous atrocity of the 1948 war, which was carried out on April 9 in Deir Yassin near Jerusalem. Approximately 105 Palestinian villagers were massacred by Jewish forces."; Schulz 2003, стр. 28, "The most stark example is Deir Yasin, carved into the memory of Palestinian suffering. The Deir Yasin massacre, conducted by a joint IZL—LHI operation with the reluctant, but nevertheless given, consent of the Haganah, was the one event that had the most immediate effect upon flight. The attack was connected to an operation intended to secure the western entrance to Jerusalem (ibid.: 113). The atrocities that were committed in the event, in which 250 villagers were massacred and scores of others subject to rape, torture and mutilation, contributed to the spread of panic among Palestine's Arabs (ibid.: 113f.). Deir Yasin came to serve as a representation of what Jewish forces (irregular or not) might be capable of. Deir Yasin continues to stand out as a symbol of the nakba and the main focal point in remembering the catastrophe."
  85. ^ Manna 2022, стр. 17, "Palestinian cities of Haifa, Jaffa, Safad, and Tiberias were depopulated"; Pappe 2022, стр. 121, "This meant occupation and the expulsion of the Palestinian population. This was the fate of Jaffa, Haifa, Safad and Tiberias."; Khalidi 2020, стр. 73–74, "Plan Dalet involved the conquest and depopulation in April and the first half of May of the two largest Arab urban centers, Jaffa and Haifa, and of the Arab neighborhoods of West Jerusalem, as well as of scores of Arab cities, towns, and villages, including Tiberias on April 18, Haifa on April 23, Safad on May 10, and Beisan on May 11. Thus, the ethnic cleansing of Palestine began well before the state of Israel was proclaimed on May 15, 1948 ... Jaffa was besieged and ceaselessly bombarded with mortars and harassed by snipers. Once finally overrun by Zionist forces during the first weeks of May, it was systematically emptied of most of its sixty thousand Arab residents. Although Jaffa was meant to be part of the stillborn Arab state designated by the 1947 Partition Plan, no international actor attempted to stop this major violation of the UN resolution ... [p. 74] Subjected to similar bombardments and attacks on poorly defended civilian neighborhoods, the sixty thousand Palestinian inhabitants of Haifa, the thirty thousand living in West Jerusalem, the twelve thousand in Safad, six thousand in Beisan, and 5,500 in Tiberias suffered the same fate. Most of Palestine's Arab urban population thus became refugees and lost their homes and livelihoods."; Cohen 2017, стр. 80, "On May 14, Ben-Gurion read the Declaration of Independence at the founding of the state ceremony which included the following widely quoted appeal: “We appeal – in the very midst of an onslaught that has been raging against us for months – to the Arab inhabitants of the state of Israel to preserve peace and participate in the building of the state on the basis of full and equal citizenship and due representation in all its provisional and permanent institutions.” At that time, the Arabs of Tiberias, Safed, and most of the Arabs of Haifa (who were supposed to be citizens of the Jewish state, according to the Partition Plan) as well as those of Jaffa (in the planned Arab state) had already been uprooted from their cities (on the occupation of these cities, see Morris 1987). They were not to enjoy the promised equality of the Jewish state."; Khoury 2012, стр. 259, "They also lost their cities. The three major coastal cities—Jaffa, Haifa, and Aka [Acre]—were occupied and their citizens evacuated."; Masalha 2012, стр. 7, "coastal cities of Palestine — Jaffa, Haifa and Acre — were largely depopulated";; Davis 2011, стр. 7, "the depopulation of Palestinians from cities—Acre, Haifa, Safad, Tiberius, Beersheba, Jaffa, and Baysan"; Morris 2008, pp. 138 ("During the following weeks, the Jewish forces assaulted and conquered key urban areas ... Arab Tiberias and Arab Haifa, Manshiya in Jaffa, and the Arab neighborhoods of West Jerusalem all fell in quick succession."), 138-139 (Tiberias), 140-147 (Haifa), 155-159 (Safed), 147-155 (Jaffa), and 164-167 (Acre); Sa'di 2007, стр. 293–294, "occupation of cities and the expulsion of their inhabitants in Tiberias (April 18), Haifa [p. 294] (April 22), Safad (May 11) and Jaffa (May 13)"; Pappe 2006, pp. 91-92 (Tiberias), 92-96 (Haifa), 97-98 (Safed), 98-99 (Jerusalem), 100-101 (Acre), and 102-103 (Jaffa)
  86. ^ Morris & Kedar 2023, стр. 752–776, "[p. 752] Taken together, these documents revealed that the Acre and Gaza episodes were merely the tip of the iceberg in a prolonged campaign ... But bulldozing or blowing up houses and wells was deemed insufficient. With its back to the wall, the Haganah upped the ante and unleashed a clandestine campaign of poisoning certain captured village wells with bacteria – in violation of the Geneva Protocol ... The aim of Cast Thy Bread ... like the demolitions, was to hamper an Arab return. Over the weeks, the well-poisoning campaign was expanded to regions beyond the Tel Aviv-Jerusalem road and included Jewish settlements captured or about to be captured by Arab troops, and then to inhabited Arab towns, to facilitate their prospective conquest by the Haganah or to hinder the progress of the invading Arab armies ... [p. 768] The Yishuv's decision to use the bacteriological weapons was taken at the highest level of the government and military and was, indeed, steered by these officers, with Ben-Gurion's authorization, through the campaign ... [p. 769] The use of the bacteria was apparently fairly limited in Israel/Palestine during April–December 1948, and apart from Acre, seems to have caused no epidemic and few casualties. At least, that is what emerges from the available documentation."; Nashef 2018, p. 143 n. 4 (quoting Pappe 2006); Carus 2017, стр. 145, "Some BW programs relied on extremely crude methods, about as sophisticated as those employed by some terrorist groups or criminals ... The same was true of the reported activities associated with the early Israeli program in 1948."; Docker 2012, стр. 19–20, "The urbicide of May 1948 directed against the old Crusader city of Acre involved biological warfare, including poisoning of water, Pappé writing that it seems clear from Red Cross reports that the Zionist forces besieging the city injected ‘typhoid germs’ into the water supply, which led to a ‘sudden typhoid epidemic’. There was a similar attempt to ‘poison the water supply in Gaza’ on 27 May 1948 by injecting typhoid and dysentery viruses into wells; this attempt was fortunately foiled."; Martin 2010, стр. 7, "Israeli biological warfare activities included Operation Shalach, which was an attempt to contaminate the water supplies of Egyptian Army. Egypt reports capture of four ‘Zionists’ trying to infect wells with dysentery and typhoid. There are also allegations that a typhoid outbreak in Acre in 1948 resulted from a biological attack and that there were attacks in Egypt in 1947 and in Syria in 1948."; Sayigh 2009, "A unit had been formed to develop biological weapons, and there is evidence that these were used during 1948 to poison the water supplies of Akka and Gaza with typhoid bacteria."; Ackerman & Asal 2008, стр. 191, "Egyptian Ministry of Defense and, later, Israeli historians, contend that Israeli soldiers contaminated Acre's water supply."; Pappe 2006, pp. 73–4 ("The flame-thrower project was part of a larger unit engaged in developing biological warfare under the directorship of a physical chemist called Ephraim Katzir ... The biological unit he led together with his brother Aharon, started working seriously in February [1948]. Its main objective was to create a weapon that could blind people.") and 100–101 ("During the siege [of Acre] typhoid germs were apparently injected into the water. Local emissaries of the International Red Cross reported this to their headquarters and left very little room for guessing whom they suspected: the Hagana. The Red Cross reports describe a sudden typhoid epidemic and, even with their guarded language, point to outside poisoning as the sole explanation for this outbreak ... A similar attempt to poison the water supply in Gaza on 27 May was foiled."); Abu Sitta 2003, "The Zionists injected typhoid in the aqueduct at some intermediate point which passes through Zionist settlements ... The city of Acre, now burdened by the epidemic, fell easy prey to the Zionists. ... Two weeks later, after their "success" in Acre, the Zionists struck again. This time in Gaza, where hundreds of thousands of refugees had gathered after their villages in southern Palestine were occupied. The end however was different. ... The biological crimes perpetrated against the Palestinians in Acre and Gaza in 1948 are still being enacted today."; Leitenberg 2001, стр. 289, "As early as April 1948, Ben Gurion directed one of his operatives in Europe (Ehud Avriel) to seek out surviving East European Jewish scientists who could “either increase the capacity to kill masses or to cure masses: both things are important.” At that time, that ‘capacity’ meant chemical and biological weapons ... These were ultimate weapons that could be used either for offense or defense (and the context of the immediate military operations, as well as those that had preceded it, would be the critical factors in that categorization)."; Cohen 2001, стр. 31, "It is believed that one of the largest operations in this campaign was in the Arab coastal town of Acre, north of Haifa, shortly before it was conquered by the IDF on May 17, 1948. According to Milstein, the typhoid epidemic that spread in Acre in the days before the town fell to the Israeli forces was not the result of wartime chaos but rather a deliberate covert action by the IDF—the contamination of Acre's water supply ... The success of the Acre operation may have persuaded Israeli decisionmakers to continue with these activities. On May 23, 1948, Egyptian soldiers in the Gaza area caught four Israeli soldiers disguised as Arabs near water wells ... It seems that many people knew something about these operations, but both the participants and later historians chose to avoid the issue, which gradually became a national taboo ... Despite the official silence, it appears there is little doubt now about the mission of the failed Gaza operation."
  87. ^ Pappe 2022, стр. 122, "Only at the end of April 1948 did the politicians in the Arab world prepare a plan to save Palestine, which in practice was a scheme to annex as much of it as possible to the Arab countries participating in the war."; Khalidi 2020, стр. 75, "The second phase followed after May 15, when the new Israeli army defeated the Arab armies that joined the war. In belatedly deciding to intervene militarily, the Arab governments were acting under intense pressure from the Arab public, which was deeply distressed by the fall of Palestine's cities and villages one after another and the arrival of waves of destitute refugees in neighboring capitals."; Slater 2020, стр. 77–78, "[p. 77] Moreover, there had been no Arab state intervention in the six months preceding the war—the civil war period between the Jewish and Palestinian peoples, as it is often termed—during which the Zionist forces mainly seized only the areas that the UN had allocated to Israel. The intervention came only after the Zionists began seizing land allocated to the Arabs ... [p. 78] In any case, the Israeli New Historians agree that the primary cause of the Arab invasion was less that of sympathy for the Palestinians than the result of inter-Arab monarchical and territorial rivalries, especially the fears of other Arab monarchs that King Abdullah of Jordan would seize the West Bank and then use it as a springboard for his long dream of creating a Hashemite kingdom extending over parts of Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, and Iraq."; Morris 2008, pp. 155 ("The mass flight from the towns and villages of Palestine at the end of April triggered anxiety and opposition among the Arab leaders."), 180-183 ("[p. 180] As the months passed and the Palestinian Arabs, beefed up by contingents of foreign volunteers, proved incapable of defeating the Yishuv, the Arab leaders began more seriously to contemplate sending in their armies. The events of April 1948—Deir Yassin, Tiberias, Haifa, Jaffa—rattled and focused their minds, and the arrival of tens of thousands of refugees drove home the urgency of direct intervention. By the end of April, they decided to invade ... [p. 183] The decision to invade was finally taken on 29–30 April, at the simultaneous meetings of the Arab heads of state in Amman and the military chiefs of staff in Zarka. Egypt still held back. But the die was cast. And on 11–12 May Egypt would also commit itself to invasion ... For all their bluster from Bludan through Cairo, the Arab leaders—except Jordan's—did almost nothing to prepare their armies for war."), 194-195 ("[p. 194] 'Abdullah's aim was to take over the West Bank rather than destroy the Jewish state—though, to be sure, many Legionnaires may have believed that they were embarked on a holy war to “liberate” all of Palestine. Yet down to the wire, his fellow leaders suspected 'Abdullah of perfidy (collusion with Britain and/or the Zionists) ... But once he had radically restricted the planned Jordanian (or Jordanian-Iraqi) contribution to the war effort, the other invasion participants had felt compelled to downgrade their own armies’ objectives ... [p. 195] The altered Hashemite dispositions and intentions posed a dilemma for King Farouk: he was not about to allow his archrival, 'Abdullah, to make off with the West Bank (and possibly East Jerusalem) while completely avoiding war with the Israelis (something, incidentally, that all along he had suspected 'Abdullah intended) ... Thus, in the days before and after 15 May the war plan had changed in essence from a united effort to conquer large parts of the nascent Jewish state, and perhaps destroy it, into an uncoordinated, multilateral land grab. As a collective, the Arab states still wished and hoped to destroy Israel—and, had their armies encountered no serious resistance, would, without doubt, have proceeded to take all of Palestine, including Tel Aviv and Haifa. But, in the circumstances, their invasion now aimed at seriously injuring the Yishuv and conquering some of its territory while occupying all or most of the areas earmarked for Palestinian Arab statehood."), and 396-397, "[p. 396] The Arab war aim, in both stages of the hostilities, was, at a minimum, to abort the emergence of a Jewish state or to destroy it at inception. The Arab states hoped to accomplish this by conquering all or large parts of the territory allotted to the Jews by the United Nations. And some Arab leaders spoke of driving the Jews into the sea and ridding Palestine “of the Zionist plague.” The struggle, as the Arabs saw it, was about the fate of Palestine/the Land of Israel, all of it, not over this or that part of the country. But, in public, official Arab spokesmen often said that the aim of the May 1948 invasion was to “save” Palestine or “save the Palestinians,” definitions more agreeable to Western ears. The picture of Arab aims was always more complex than Zionist historiography subsequently made out. The chief cause of this complexity was that fly-in-the-ointment, King 'Abdullah. Jordan's ruler, a pragmatist, was generally skeptical of the Arabs’ ability to defeat, let alone destroy, the Yishuv, and fashioned his war aim accordingly: to seize the Arab-populated West Bank, preferably including East Jerusalem ... [p. 397] Other Arab leaders were generally more optimistic. But they, too, had ulterior motives, beyond driving the Jews into the sea or, at the least, aborting the Jewish state. Chief among them was to prevent their fellow leaders (especially 'Abdullah) from conquering and annexing all or too much of Palestine and to seize as much of Palestine as they could for themselves."; Sa'di 2007, стр. 293–294, "It was not until May 15, a month and a half after the implementation of Plan D, that neighboring Arab states sent in armed forces in an attempt to halt the Zionist seizure of territory and the ethnic cleansing of the population ... The physical and psychological condition of the refugees as well as the horror stories they carried intensified the pressures on Arab leaders to commit their regular armies to the battle ... Their intervention came too late, when their ability to tip the balance of power had already been lost. The Zionist forces were able to repel the attacks of the Arab armies, to pursue the campaign of conquest, and to continue expelling Palestinians and destroying their villages ... Moreover, because of political rivalries between Arab leaders, there was a failure to coordinate operations (Flapan 1987; Gerges 2001: 151–158; Shlaim 2001)."
  88. ^ Morris 2008, pp. 181 ("In general, in private they appreciated and admitted their military weakness and unpreparedness. But in public, militant bluster was the norm.") and 401 ("Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan had all achieved independence (or semi-independence) a few years before, and most had new armies with inadequate training and no experience of combat. Their populations consisted largely of illiterate peasants for whom religion, family, clan, and village were the cores of identity and loyalty. They were relatively untouched by the passions of modern nationalism (though were easily swayed by Islamic rhetoric) and lacked technological skills, which bore heavily on the functioning of air and naval forces, artillery, intelligence, and communications. The states themselves were all poor and poorly organized and led by self-serving politicians of varied abilities and ethics; all, except Lebanon, were governed by shambling autocracies, and none, except perhaps Jordan's, enjoyed popular legitimacy or support."); Sa'di 2007, стр. 294, "Although Arab military commanders and some politicians were well aware of the weakness of their armies, they bent to public pressure and tried to salvage what they could. The newly independent Arab states, most of which were still to some degree under the military control of Western powers, were unable to conduct a military campaign. Their national armies were unprepared for war. They were small, poorly equipped and inexperienced."
  89. ^ Khalidi 2020, стр. 77–78, "Thereafter he sought to expand his territory through a variety of means. The most obvious direction was westward, into Palestine, whence the king's lengthy secret negotiations with the Zionists to reach an accommodation that would give him control of part of the country ... Both the king and the British opposed allowing the Palestinians to benefit from the 1947 partition or the war that followed, and neither wanted an independent Arab state in Palestine. They had come to a secret agreement to prevent this, via sending “the Arab Legion across the Jordan River as soon as the Mandate ended to occupy the part of Palestine allotted to the Arabs.” This goal meshed with that of the Zionist movement, which negotiated with ‘Abdullah to achieve the same end."; Slater 2020, стр. 77, "First, while none of the Arab states were interested in the establishment of a Palestinian state—that would interfere with their own territorial ambitions in the area—there is no reason to doubt what they said at the time, namely, that they were furious at Zionist massacres and forced expulsion of the Palestinians, which began well before the invasion."; Morris 2008, стр. 195, "From the start, the invasion plans had failed to assign any task whatsoever to the Palestinian Arabs or to take account of their political aspirations. Although the Arab leaders vaguely alluded to a duty to “save the Palestinians,” none of them seriously contemplated the establishment of a Palestinian Arab state with Husseini at its head. All the leaders loathed Husseini; all, to one degree or another, cared little about Palestinian goals, their rhetoric notwithstanding. It was with this in mind that Jordan, on the eve of the invasion, ordered the ALA out of the West Bank and subsequently disarmed the local Arab militias. The Arab states’ marginalization of the Palestinian Arabs was in some measure a consequence of their military defeats of April and the first half of May. These had also rendered them politically insignificant."
  90. ^ Pappe 2022, стр. 123; Slater 2020, стр. 75; Davis 2011, стр. 7; Morris 2008, стр. 177–179
  91. ^ Manna 2022, стр. 41, "Most of the four hundred thousand Palestinians who lived in those areas had become refugees before the intervention of the Arab armies began"; Pappe 2022, стр. 121, "By the time the British left in the middle of May, one-third of the Palestinian population had already been evicted"; Khalidi 2020, стр. 75, "In this first phase of the Nakba before May 15, 1948, a pattern of ethnic cleansing resulted in the expulsion and panicked departure of about 300,000 Palestinians overall and the devastation of many of the Arab majority's key urban economic, political, civic, and cultural centers."; Slater 2020, pp. 81 ("While a number of studies have found no evidence to support the Israeli claim of an Arab propaganda campaign to induce the Palestinians to flee, well before the Arab invasion some 300,000 to 400,000 Palestinians (out of a population of about 900,000 at the time of the UN partition) were either forcibly expelled—sometimes by forced marches with only the clothes on their backs—or fled as a result of Israeli psychological warfare, economic pressures, and violence, designed to empty the area that would become Israel of most of its Arab inhabitants.") and 406 n.44 ("Reviewing the evidence marshaled by Morris and others, Tom Segev concluded that 'most of the Arabs in the country, approximately 400,000, were chased out and expelled during the first stage of the war. In other words, before the Arab armies invaded the country' (Haaretz, July 18, 2010). Other estimates have varied concerning the number of Palestinians who fled or were expelled before the May 1948 Arab state attack; Morris estimated the number to be 250,000–300,000 (The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited, 262); Tessler puts it at 300,000 (A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 279); Pappé’s estimate is 380,000 (The Making of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 96) ... Daniel Blatman estimates the number to be about 500,000 (Blatman, “Netanyahu, This Is What Ethnic Cleansing Really Looks Like”). Whatever the exact number, even Israeli 'Old Historians' now admit that during the 1948 war, the Israeli armed forces drove out many of the Palestinians, though they emphasized the action as a military 'necessity.' For example, see Anita Shapira, Israel: A History, 167–68."); Cohen 2017, стр. 80, "On May 14, Ben-Gurion read the Declaration of Independence ... At that time, the Arabs of Tiberias, Safed, and most of the Arabs of Haifa (who were supposed to be citizens of the Jewish state, according to the Partition Plan) as well as those of Jaffa (in the planned Arab state) had already been uprooted from their cities (on the occupation of these cities, see Morris 1987). They were not to enjoy the promised equality of the Jewish state."; Masalha 2012, стр. 12–13, "‘Between the last month of 1947 and the four and a half months of 1948, the Palestinian Arab community would cease to exist as a social and political entity.’ Hundreds of villages would be destroyed, urban life in Palestine's most populous Arab communities would disappear, and almost a million Palestinians would be rendered homeless and/or stateless.'"; Morris 2008, pp. 78 ("Then, in early April, the Haganah went over to the offensive, by mid-May crushing the Palestinians. This second stage involved major campaigns and battles and resulted in the conquest of territory, mainly by the Jews."), 93 ("The civil war half of the 1948 War, which ended with the complete destruction of Palestinian Arab military power and the shattering of Palestinian society, began on 30 November 1947 and ended on 14 May 1948, by which time hundreds of thousands of townspeople and villagers had fled or been forcibly displaced from their homes."), 118 ("The moment the Haganah switched to the offense and launched large-scale, highly organized, and sustained operations, the Arab weaknesses came to the fore—and their militias, much like Palestinian society as a whole, swiftly collapsed, like a house of cards."), 138 ("in effect delivering a death-blow to Palestine Arab military power and political aspirations"), 171, 179 ("Palestinian Arab military power was crushed, and Palestinian Arab society, never robust, fell apart, much of the population fleeing to the inland areas or out of the country altogether."), and 400; Sa'di 2007, стр. 294, "This campaign led to the expulsion of some 380,000 Palestinians, about one-half of the total Palestinian refugees who would soon be created."

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