Malajski ustanak
Malajski ustanak ili Malajska vanredna situacija, poznata i kao Antibritanski nacionalno-oslobodilački rat[1] (1948–1960), bio je gerilski rat koji se vodio u britanskoj Malaji između komunističkih boraca za nezavisnost Malajske nacionalne oslobodilačke armije (MNLA) i vojnih snaga. Federacije Malaje, Britanske imperije i Komonvelta. Komunisti su se borili da osvoje nezavisnost Malaje od Britanske imperije i da uspostave socijalističku ekonomiju, dok su se Malajska federacija i snage Komonvelta borile za borbu protiv komunizma i zaštitu britanskih ekonomskih i kolonijalnih interesa.[2][3][4] Mnogi pisci veruju da su termin „Hitna situacija“ izabrali Britanci zato što osiguravači sa sedištem u Londonu ne bi isplatili u slučajevima građanskih ratova.[5]
17. juna 1948. Britanija je proglasila vanredno stanje u Malaji nakon napada na plantaže,[6] koji su zauzvrat bili osvetnički napadi za ubistvo levičarskih aktivista.[7] Lider Malajske komunističke partije (MCP) Čin Peng i njegovi saveznici pobegli su u džunglu i formirali MNLA da bi vodili rat za nacionalno oslobođenje protiv britanske kolonijalne vlasti. Mnogi borci MNLA bili su veterani Malajske narodne antijapanske armije (MPAJA), komunističke gerilske vojske koju su Britanci prethodno obučavali, naoružani i finansirali za borbu protiv Japana tokom Drugog svetskog rata.[8] Komunisti su dobili podršku velikog broja civila, uglavnom onih iz kineske zajednice.[9] Pored toga, između 200-400 japanskih vojnika stacioniranih u Malaji tokom Drugog svetskog rata pridružilo se komunističkoj gerili.[10]
Nakon uspostavljanja niza baza u džungli, MNLA je počela upadati u britansku kolonijalnu policiju i vojne objekte. MNLA je napala rudnike, plantaže i vozove kako bi stekla nezavisnost Malaje slomom britanske okupacije. Britanci su pokušali da izgladnjuju MNLA koristeći politiku spaljene zemlje kroz racionalizaciju hrane, ubijanje stoke i prskanje herbicida Ejdžent Orandž iz vazduha.[16] Britanski pokušaji da poraze komuniste uključivali su vansudska ubistva nenaoružanih seljana, što je kršenje Ženevskih konvencija.[17] Najzloglasniji primer je masakr Batang Kali, koji je štampa nazvala britanskim Mi Lajom.[22] Brigsov plan je prisilno preselio 400.000 do milion civila u koncentracione logore, koje su Britanci nazvali „nova sela“.[23][24][25] Mnoge domorodačke zajednice Orang Aslija takođe su bile meta internacije jer su Britanci verovali da podržavaju komuniste.[26][27] Verovanje komunista u klasnu svest, kao i etničku i rodnu ravnopravnost, inspirisalo je mnoge žene i starosedeoce da se pridruže i MNLA i njenoj tajnoj mreži snabdevanja Min Juen.[28]
Iako je vanredno stanje proglašeno gotovim 1960. godine, komunistički vođa Čin Peng je ponovo pokrenuo pobunu protiv malezijske vlade 1967. godine. Ova druga faza pobune trajala je do 1989. godine.
Reference[uredi | uredi izvor]
- ^ Amin, Mohamed (1977). Caldwell, Malcolm, ur. The Making of a Neo Colony. Spokesman Books, UK. str. 216.
- ^ Deery, Phillip. "Malaya, 1948: Britain's Asian Cold War?" Journal of Cold War Studies 9, no. 1 (2007): 29–54.
- ^ Siver, Christi L. "The other forgotten war: understanding atrocities during the Malayan Emergency." In APSA 2009 Toronto Meeting Paper. 2009., p.36
- ^ Newsinger 2013, str. 217.
- ^ Burleigh, Michael (2013). Small Wars, Faraway Places: Global Insurrection and the Making of the Modern World 1945–1965. New York: Viking – Penguin Group. str. 164. ISBN 978-0-670-02545-9.
- ^ Burleigh, Michael (2013). Small Wars Faraway Places: Global Insurrection and the Making of the Modern World 1945–1965. New York: Viking – Penguin Group. str. 163–164. ISBN 978-0-670-02545-9.
- ^ Newsinger 2013, str. 216–217.
- ^ Hack, Karl (28. 9. 2012). „Everyone Lived in Fear: Malaya and the British way of Counterinsurgency”. Small Wars and Insurgencies. 23 (4–5): 672. doi:10.1080/09592318.2012.709764 — preko Taylor and Francis Online.
- ^ Datar, Rajan (host), with author Sim Chi Yin; academic Show Ying Xin (Malaysia Institute, Australian National University); and academic Rachel Leow (University of Cambridge): "The Malayan Emergency: A long Cold War conflict seen through the eyes of the Chinese community in Malaya," November 11, 2021, The Forum (BBC World Service), (radio program) BBC, retrieved November 11, 2021
- ^ Hara, Fujio (2016). „Former Japanese Soldiers Who Joined Communist Guerrillas in Malaya”. Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society. 89 (2 (311)): 67—99. JSTOR 26527760. doi:10.1353/ras.2016.0025. Pristupljeno 11. 1. 2023.
- ^ „The Malayan Emergency - Britain's Vietnam, Except Britain Won”. Forces Network (na jeziku: engleski). Gerrards Cross: British Forces Broadcasting Service. 4. 10. 2021. Arhivirano iz originala 5. 10. 2021. g. „One of these strategies was the 'Scorched Earth Policy' which saw the first use of Agent Orange – a herbicide designed to kill anything that it came in contact with.”
- ^ Mann, Michael (2013). The Sources of Social Power. Volume 4: Globalizations, 1945–2011. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. str. 16. ISBN 9781107028678. „A bloody ten-year civil war, the Malayan Emergency was finally won by British forces using scorched earth tactics, including the invention of forcible relocation of villages into areas controlled by British forces.”
- ^ Hay, Alastair (1982). The Chemical Scythe: Lessons of 2, 4, 5-T, and dioxin. New York: Plenum Press / Springer Nature. str. 149—150. ISBN 9780306409738. S2CID 29278382. doi:10.1007/978-1-4899-0339-6. „It was the British who were actually the first to use herbicides in the Malayan 'Emergency'...To circumvent surprise attacks on their troops the British Military Authorities used 2,4,5-T to increase visibility in the mixed vegetation”
- ^ Jacob, Claus; Walters, Adam (2021). „Risk and Responsibility in Chemical Research: The Case of Agent Orange”. Ur.: Schummer, Joachim; Børsen, Tom. Ethics Of Chemistry: From Poison Gas to Climate Engineering. Singapore: World Scientific. str. 169—194. ISBN 978-981-123-353-1. S2CID 233837382. doi:10.1142/12189.
- ^ Newsinger 2015, str. 52.
- ^ [11][12][13][14][15]
- ^ Siver, Christi (2018). „Enemies or Friendlies? British Military Behavior Toward Civilians During the Malayan Emergency”. Military Interventions, War Crimes, and Protecting Civilians. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan / Springer Nature. str. 2—8, 19—20, 57—90. ISBN 978-3-319-77690-3. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-77691-0. „British efforts to educate soldiers about the Geneva Conventions either did not ever reach units deployed in Malaya or left no impression on them...All of these regiments went through the introductory jungle warfare course and received the same instruction about 'snap shooting' and differentiating between targets. Differences in training do not seem to explain why some units killed civilians while others did not.”
- ^ „A mistake or murder in cold blood? Court to rule over 'Britain's My Lai'”. The Times (na jeziku: engleski). London. 28. 4. 2012.
- ^ Connett, David (18. 4. 2015). „Batang Kali killings: Britain in the dock over 1948 massacre in”. The Independent (na jeziku: engleski). London.
- ^ Bowcott, Owen (25. 1. 2012). „Batang Kali relatives edge closer to the truth about 'Britain's My Lai massacre'”. The Guardian (na jeziku: engleski). London.
- ^ Hughes, Matthew (oktobar 2012). „Introduction: British ways of counter-insurgency”. Small Wars & Insurgencies. London: Taylor & Francis. 23 (4–5): 580—590. doi:10.1080/09592318.2012.709771
.
- ^ [18][19][20][21] While the phrase has often been used in the British press, the scholar Matthew Hughes has pointed out in Small Wars & Insurgencies that in terms of the number killed the massacre at Batang Kali is not of a comparable magnitude to the one at Mỹ Lai.
- ^ Keo, Bernard Z. (mart 2019). „A small, distant war? Historiographical reflections on the Malayan Emergency”. History Compass. Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell. 17 (3): e12523. doi:10.1111/hic3.12523. „Despite their innocuous nomenclature, New Villages were in fact, as Tan demonstrates, concentration camps designed less to keep the communists out but to place the rural Chinese population under strict government surveillance and control.”
- ^ Newsinger 2015, str. 50, "Their homes and standing crops were fired, their agricultural implements were smashed and their livestock either killed or turned loose. Some were subsequently to receive compensation, but most never did. They were then transported by lorry to the site of their 'new village' which was often little more than a prison camp, surrounded by a barbed wire fence, illuminated by searchlights. The villages were heavily policed with the inhabitants effectively deprived of all civil rights.".
- ^ Sandhu, Kernial Singh (mart 1964). „The Saga of the "Squatter" in Malaya”. Journal of Southeast Asian History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 5 (1): 143—177. doi:10.1017/s0217781100002258. „The outstanding development of the Emergency in Malaya was the implementation of the Briggs Plan, as a result of which about 1,000,000 rural people were corralled into more than 600 'new' settlements, principally New Villages.”
- ^ Jones, Alun (septembar 1968). „The Orang Asli: An Outline of Their Progress in Modern Malaya”. Journal of Southeast Asian History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 9 (2): 286—305. doi:10.1017/s0217781100004713. „Thousands of Orang Asli were escorted out of the jungle by the police and the army, to find themselves being herded into hastily prepared camps surrounded by barbed wire to prevent their escape. The mental and physiological adaption called for was too much for many of the people of the hills and jungle and hundreds did not survive the experience.”
- ^ Idrus, Rusalina (2011). „The Discourse of Protection and the Orang Asli in Malaysia”. Kajian Malaysia. Penang: Universiti Sains Malaysia. 29 (Supp. 1): 53—74.
- ^ Khoo, Agnes (2007). Life as the River Flows: Women in the Malayan Anti-Colonial Struggle (na jeziku: engleski). Monmouth, Wales: Merlin Press. str. 12—13.
Literatura[uredi | uredi izvor]
- Christopher, Paul (2013). „Malaya, 1948–1955: Case Outcome: COIN Win”. Paths to Victory: Detailed Insurgency Case Studies. str. 51—63.
- Komer, R.W (februar 1972). The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect: Organisation of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort (PDF). Rand Corporation. Arhivirano (PDF) iz originala 3. 1. 2021. g. Pristupljeno 12. 5. 2019.
- Newsinger, John (2013). The Blood Never Dried: A People's History of the British Empire (2nd izd.). London: Bookmarks Publications. ISBN 9781909026292.
- Newsinger, John (2015). British Counterinsurgency (2nd izd.). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 978-0-230-29824-8.
- Hack, Karl (2018). „'Devils that suck the blood of the Malayan People': The Case for Post-Revisionist Analysis of Counter-insurgency Violence”
. War in History. 25 (2): 202—226. S2CID 159509434. doi:10.1177/0968344516671738 — preko Sage Journals.
- Taber, Robert (2002). War of the flea: the classic study of guerrilla warfare. Brassey's. ISBN 978-1-57488-555-2.
Dodatna literatura[uredi | uredi izvor]
- Director of Operations, Malaya (1958). The Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya. Federation of Malaya: Director of Operations Malaya. ISBN 1907521747.
- Comber, Leon (2003). „The Malayan Security Service (1945–1948)”. Intelligence and National Security. 18 (3): 128—153. S2CID 154320718. doi:10.1080/02684520412331306950.
- Comber, Leon (februar 2006). „The Malayan Special Branch on the Malayan-Thai Frontier during the Malayan Emergency”. Intelligence and National Security. 21 (1): 77—99. S2CID 153496939. doi:10.1080/02684520600568352.
- Comber, Leon (2006). „Malaya's Secret Police 1945–60. The Role of the Special Branch in the Malayan Emergency”. PhD dissertation, Monash University. Melbourne: ISEAS (Institute of SE Asian Affairs, Singapore) and MAI (Monash Asia Institute).
- Hack, Karl (1999). „'Iron claws on Malaya': the historiography of the Malayan Emergency”
. Journal of Southeast Asian Studies. 30 (1): 99—125. S2CID 163010489. doi:10.1017/S0022463400008043.
- Hack, Karl (1999). „Corpses, Prisoners of War and Captured documents: British and Communist Narratives of the Malayan Emergency, and the Dynamics of Intelligence Transformation”
. Intelligence and National Security. 14 (4): 211—241. ISSN 0268-4527. doi:10.1080/02684529908432578.
- Jackson, Robert (2011). The Malayan Emergency and Indonesian Confrontation: The Commonwealth's Wars 1948–1966. Pen and Sword. ISBN 9781848845558.
- Jumper, Roy (2001). Death Waits in the Dark: The Senoi Praaq, Malaysia's Killer Elite. Greenwood Press. ISBN 0-313-31515-9.
- Keo, Bernard Z. (mart 2019). „A small, distant war? Historiographical reflections on the Malayan Emergency”
. History Compass. 17 (3): e12523. S2CID 150617654. doi:10.1111/hic3.12523. Arhivirano iz originala 3. 1. 2021. g.
- Mitchell, David F. (2016). „The Malayan Emergency: How to Fight a Counterinsurgency War”. Warfare History Network. Arhivirano iz originala 3. 1. 2021. g. Pristupljeno 5. 7. 2018.
- Nagl, John A. (2002). Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam. University of Chicago. ISBN 0-226-56770-2.
- Newsinger, John. (2016) British counterinsurgency (Springer, 2016) compares British measures in Mayaya, Palestine, Kenya, Cyprus, South Yemen, Dhofar, & Northern Ireland
- Short, Anthony (1975). The Communist Insurrection in Malaya 1948–1960. London and New York: Frederick Muller. Reprinted (2000) as In Pursuit of Mountain Rats. Singapore.
- Stubbs, Richard (2004). Hearts and Minds in Guerilla Warfare: The Malayan Emergency 1948–1960. Eastern University. ISBN 981-210-352-X.
- Sullivan, Michael D. "Leadership in Counterinsurgency: A Tale of Two Leaders" Military Review (Sep/Oct 2007) 897#5 pp 119–123.
- Th'ng, Bee Fu (2019). „Forbidden Knowledge: Response from Chinese-Malay Intellectuals to Leftist-Books Banning During the Emergency Period”. Sun Yat-sen Journal of Humanities (na jeziku: kineski). Arhivirano iz originala 3. 1. 2021. g. Pristupljeno 15. 9. 2019.
- Thompson, Sir Robert (1966). Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam. London: F. A. Praeger. ISBN 0-7011-1133-X.
- Ucko, David H. (2019). „Counterinsurgency as armed reform: The political history of the Malayan Emergency”
. Journal of Strategic Studies. 42 (3–4): 448—479. S2CID 158297553. doi:10.1080/01402390.2017.1406852.