Sovjetska ekonomska reforma 1965.

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Sovjetska ekonomska reforma 1965, koja se ponekad naziva i reforma Kosigina (rus. Косыгинская реформа) ili Libermanova reforma, bila je skup planiranih promena u privredi SSSR. Centralni deo ovih promena bilo je uvođenje profitabilnosti i prodaje kao dva ključna indikatora uspeha preduzeća. Deo profita preduzeća bi otišao u tri fonda, koji bi se koristio za nagrađivanje radnika i proširenje poslovanja; većina bi išla u centralni budžet.

Reforme je politički uveo Aleksej Kosigin — koji je upravo postao premijer Sovjetskog Saveza nakon smene Nikite Hruščova — i ratifikovao ih je Centralni komitet u septembru 1965. Oni su odražavali neke dugo tinjale želje SSSR-ovih matematički orijentisanih ekonomskih planera i inicirali pomak ka većoj decentralizaciji u procesu ekonomskog planiranja.

Pozadina[uredi | uredi izvor]

Pod Lenjinom, Nova ekonomska politika je dozvoljavala i koristila koncepte profita i podsticaja za regulaciju sovjetske ekonomije. Staljin je ovu politiku brzo transformisao kolektivizacijom farmi i nacionalizacijom industrije, što je bilo rezultat ubrzanja centralnog planiranja, što je ilustrovano u „petogodišnjim planovima“.[1] Otprilike od 1930. godine, Sovjetski Savez je koristio centralizovani sistem za upravljanje svojom ekonomijom. U ovom sistemu, jedinstvena birokratija je kreirala ekonomske planove, koji su raspoređivali radnike na poslove, određivali plate, diktirali raspodelu resursa, uspostavljali nivoe trgovine sa drugim zemljama i planirali tok tehnološkog napretka. Maloprodajne cene robe široke potrošnje fiksirane su na nivoima namenjenim tržišnom obračunu. Cene veleprodajne robe su takođe bile fiksne, ali su one više služile računovodstvenoj funkciji nego kao tržišni mehanizm. Kolektivne farme su takođe plaćale centralno određene cene za zalihe koje su im bile potrebne, a za razliku od drugih sektora, njihovi radnici su primali plate koje su direktno zavisile od profitabilnosti poslovanja.[2]

Iako su sovjetska preduzeća teoretski bila vođena principom hozračeta (rus. хозрасчёт ili „računovodstvo“) – što je od njih zahtevalo da ispune očekivanja planera u okviru sistema utvrđenih cena za svoje ulaze i izlaze – imali su malo kontrole nad najvećim odlukama koje su uticale na njihovo poslovanje.[3] Menadžeri su imali odgovornost da planiraju buduću bruto proizvodnju, koju su stalno procenjivali ispod mogućnosti da bi kasnije na papiru premašili predviđanje.[4] Menadžeri su tada dobijali bonuse ( premije ) za višak proizvoda bez obzira na to da li je proizveden na isplativ način ili je njihovo preduzeće uopšteno profitabilno. Bonusi za učinak dolazili su u iznosima koji su ponekad jednaki osnovnim platama menadžera. Sistem je takođe podsticao besmislena povećanja veličine, težine i cene proizvodnih rezultata, jednostavno zato što je proizvedeno „više“.[5]

Uspon optimalnih planera[uredi | uredi izvor]

Ekonomske reforme su se pojavile tokom perioda velike ideološke debate o ekonomskom planiranju. Više matematički, „kibernetički“, gledišta su u početku smatrana devijantnim od ortodoksne marksističke ekonomije, koja je smatrala da vrednost dobra proizilazi isključivo iz rada .[6] Ova doktrina, razrađena u takvim delima kao što je Staljinova knjiga iz 1952. godine, Ekonomski problemi socijalizma u SSSR-u, opisuje sistem cena kao kapitalistički relikt koji će na kraju nestati iz komunističkog društva.[7]

Ipak, kompjuterizovana ekonomija je dobila važnu ulogu za vrhunske planere, čak i dok se konvencionalna marksističko-lenjinistička politička ekonomija predavala u većini škola i bila promovisana kao ishodište skupa stavova za regulisanje javne potrošnje.[8][9] Sve veći uticaj statističkog planiranja u sovjetskoj ekonomiji ogledao se u stvaranju Centralnog ekonomskog matematičkog instituta (Centralьnij ekonomsko-matematičeskij institut; TSEMI), koji je vodio Vasilij Sergejevič Nemčinov.[10] Nemčinov, zajedno sa pronalazačem linearnog programiranja Leonidom Kantorovičem i investicionim analitičarem Viktorom Valentinovičem Novožilovim, dobio je Lenjinovu nagradu[11] Bitka između „optimalnog“ planiranja i planiranja konvencija besnila je tokom 1960-ih.[12]

Druga tendencija u ekonomskom planiranju isticala je „normativnu vrednost prerade“, odnosno važnost potreba i želja u proceni vrednosti proizvodnje.[13]

Kosigin i Brežnjev zamenjuju Hruščova[uredi | uredi izvor]

Velike promene širom sovjetskog sveta postale su moguće 1964. godine sa svrgavanjem Nikite Hruščova i usponom Alekseja Kosigina i Leonida Brežnjeva.[14] Ekonomska politika je bila značajno područje retrospektivne antihruščovljevske kritike u sovjetskoj štampi.[15][16] Ova „reformistička“ ekonomska tendencija u Sovjetskom Savezu imala je posledice i izvesno uzajamno pojačanje u Istočnoj Evropi.[17]

Kosigin je kritikovao neefikasnost i inertnost ekonomske politike pod prethodnom administracijom.[18] On je predstavio plan, uključujući ideje Libermana i Nemčinova, na plenumu Centralnog komiteta Komunističke partije u septembru 1965.[19] Prihvatanje plana od strane Centralnog komiteta postalo je ključno za praktičnu implementaciju teorijskih ideja.[20]

Obrazloženje[uredi | uredi izvor]

Nedostatak podsticaja[uredi | uredi izvor]

Svakodnevno poslovanje 1967. godine u ekonomski reformisanoj fabrici odeće Bolshevichka u Moskvi — pionirski praktikant nove ekonomske politike

Prema zvaničnom obrazloženju reforme, sve veća složenost ekonomskih odnosa smanjila je efikasnost ekonomskog planiranja i samim tim smanjila privredni rast. Uočeno je da postojeći sistem planiranja nije motivisao preduzeća da dostignu visoke stope proizvodnje ili uvedu organizacione ili tehničke inovacije.[21] Za to nije bilo podsticaja.[21]

Dajući više slobode da se javno odstupe od partijske ortodoksije, novine su nudile nove predloge za sovjetsku ekonomiju. Inženjer aviona O. Antonov je 22. novembra 1961. objavio članak u Izvestijama pod naslovom „Za sve i za sebe“—zalažući se za više moći za direktore preduzeća.[22]

Libermanovi predlozi[uredi | uredi izvor]

Evsej Liberman sa Harkovskog instituta za inženjerstvo i ekonomiju dao je ekonomsko obrazloženje za reformu. Članak Libermana na ovu temu pod naslovom „Planovi, profiti i bonusi“ pojavio se u Pravdi septembra 1962. [14] Liberman, pod uticajem ekonomskih „optimizatora“,[23][24] se zalagao za (ponovno) uvođenje profitabilnosti kao osnovnog ekonomskog indikatora.[22][25] Liberman je izneo ideju da se društveni interes može unaprediti pažljivim postavljanjem mikroekonomskih parametara: „Ono što je profitabilno za društvo trebalo bi da bude profitabilno za svako preduzeće“.[26]

Ovi predlozi su bili kontroverzni i kritikovani posebno kao nazadovanje ka kapitalističkom ekonomskom sistemu. Kritičari su takođe tvrdili da bi oslanjanje na profitabilnost iskrivilo proporcije u kojima se proizvodila različita dobra.[27][28]

Za razliku od Libermana 1962. godine, Trapeznikov je sugerisao da su partijski donosioci odluka prihvatili potrebu za reformom i da će uskoro postati stvarnost. Sledećeg meseca, Pravda je objavila još šest članaka akademika, planera i menadžera koji se zalažu za reformu. Poslednji od njih je došao iz Libermana. Ovog puta kritike su bile prigušene.[29]

Pokrenuto je nekoliko ekonomskih eksperimenata da bi se testirali Libermanovi predlozi. Oni su počeli 1964. godine sa novom politikom za dve fabrike konfekcije: Boljševičku u Moskvi i Majak u Gorkom.[19][30] Kada se rad u fabrikama odeće pokazao podnošljivo uspešnim, eksperiment je proširen na oko 400 drugih preduzeća, uglavnom u velikim gradovima.[31][32] Jedan eksperiment u Lavovu uključivao je rudnik uglja i fabrike koje su proizvodile odeću, obuću i opremu za dizanje teških tereta.[33] Rudnik uglja je, posebno, navodno postao profitabilniji nakon prelaska na sistem koji koristi bonuse i nezavisnije donošenje odluka.[34] Međutim, neka eksperimentalna postrojenja su naišla na probleme zbog nepouzdanosti dobavljača koji su nastavili da rade na starom sistemu.[32] Fabrika Majak bila je suočena sa dilemom u pokušaju da sprovede eksperimentalne reforme na osnovu centralnog mandata, dok je istovremeno primala kontradiktorna naređenja od lokalnog sovnarhoza (regionalnog saveta).[35]

Nacrt[uredi | uredi izvor]

Reformu su vodili Centralni komitet Komunističke partije Sovjetskog Saveza i Savet ministara. Sastojao se od pet „grupa aktivnosti“:

  1. Preduzeća su postala glavne ekonomske jedinice.
  2. Broj ciljeva politike smanjen je sa 30 na 9 .[36] Velikih devet su: ukupna proizvodnja u tekućim veleprodajnim cenama, najvažniji proizvodi u fizičkim jedinicama, ukupan platni spisak, ukupni profit i profitabilnost, izražena kao odnos dobiti prema osnovnim sredstvima i normalizovanim obrtnim sredstvima; uplate u budžet i izdvajanja iz budžeta; ukupni ciljevi kapitalnih investicija za uvođenje nove tehnologije; i obim nabavke sirovina i opreme.
  3. Ekonomska nezavisnost preduzeća. Preduzeća su bila obavezna da utvrde detaljan asortiman i asortiman proizvoda, sopstvenim sredstvima ulažući u proizvodnju, uspostave dugoročne ugovorne aranžmane sa dobavljačima i kupcima i odrede broj osoblja.
  4. Ključni značaj pridavan je integralnim pokazateljima ekonomske efikasnosti proizvodnje — profitu i rentabilnosti. Postojala je mogućnost stvaranja niza fondova na osnovu profita — sredstava za razvoj proizvodnje, materijalnih podsticaja, stanovanja itd. Preduzeću je bilo dozvoljeno da koristi sredstva po sopstvenom nahođenju.
  5. Cene: Veleprodajne cene bi se ponovo kalibrisale kako bi odražavale troškove i podsticale ekonomsku efikasnost.[37]

Profit, bonusi i plate[uredi | uredi izvor]

Najvažnije promene koje su proizašle iz reformi Libermana/Kosigina uključivale su ulogu profita u sovjetskom ekonomskom sistemu. Rentabelnost (profitabilnost, rus. рентабельность) i realizacija (prodaja", rus. реализация) su postali dvostruki indikatori uspeha za preduzeća. Rentabelnost je bila definisana u smislu odnosa između profita i kapitala, dok je realizacija (takođe u značenju sprovođenje) zavisila od ukupnog obima prodaje.[38][39] Uspeh ovih merenja je doveo do alokacije novca u fond, koji je mogao da se isplaćuje prema unapred definisanom redosledu. Sredstva su prvo otišla za plaćanje kapitala — uključujući kamate plaćene Gosbanci, Državnoj banci. Zatim su prešli na nova podsticajna sredstva. Konačno, preduzeće ih može koristiti za proširenje svog kapitala za poslovanje. Svaki profit koji prelazi maksimum za potrošnju otišao bi u centralni budžet.[40]

Tri „podsticajna“ fonda su bila:[41][42]

  1. Fond materijalnog podsticaja (MIF): novac za novčane bonuse radnicima profitabilnih preduzeća;
  2. Socio-kulturni i stambeni fond (SCF): Fond za društveno i kulturno programiranje; i
  3. Fond za razvoj proizvodnje (PDF): „Razvojni“ fond za celokupnu organizaciju.

Ranije su bonusi davani iz istog fonda kao i plate.[43] Sada su menadžeri preduzeća imali malo više diskrecije u pogledu toga kako da ih rasporede.[44] Mogli bi prebaciti neke sume novca između bonus fonda i fonda socijalnog staranja.[45] Takođe su imali više moći da utiču na plate tako što su klasifikovali različite radnike.[44]

U praksi, bonusi su imali najveći uticaj na plaćanje elitnog osoblja (tehničara i „zaposlenih“ za razliku od „ radnika“), čime su se suprotstavili efektu reformi plata iz Hruščovljeve ere.[46][47]

Eksperimentalni sistem uveden u nekim preduzećima nudio je dodatne bonuse za određena dostignuća — ne samo kao deo ukupnog profita. Na primer, inženjeri koji efikasnije koriste gorivo (tokom nestašice) mogli bi da dobiju velike premije izračunate kao procenat novca koji su uštedeli.[48]

Pored direktnije odgovornosti za fond zarada, preduzeća su dobila i pravo da otpuštaju radnike. U stvari, reforma je dala novi podsticaj za otpuštanja, što bi u nekim slučajevima moglo povećati profitabilnost. (Kada se to dogodilo, radnici nisu imali uspostavljenu „mrežu socijalne zaštite“ u vidu osiguranja za slučaj nezaposlenosti i pomoći u karijeri).[49]

Računovodstvo preduzeća[uredi | uredi izvor]

Da bi se podstaklo tačno planiranje, preduzeća bi sada bila kažnjena za učinak ispod ili iznad planiranih ciljeva.[50][51]

Preduzeća bi takođe plaćala rentu za zemljište i prirodne resurse. Obrazloženje za ovu praksu bila je ekonomska optimizacija. Na primer, zemljište različitog kvaliteta zahtevalo je različite inpute radne snage da bi se postigao isti učinak, i stoga bi trebalo različito da se uračunava u budžet preduzeća.[52]

Bankarski krediti, koji bi se kasnije otplaćivali sa kamatama, koristili bi se za finansiranje više investicionih projekata — da bi se podstaklo pažljivo korišćenje sredstava i brzo stvaranje profita.[53] Bilo bi postavljeno pet različitih kamatnih stopa, u rasponu od preferencijalnih preko normalnih do kaznenih.[54]

Dodatni kapitalni trošak — tj. porez — bi se procenjivao za svako preduzeće na osnovu kapitala koje je zadržalo: obrtni kapital, oprema i višak zaliha.[55]

Više kontrole preduzeća nad investicionim odlukama[uredi | uredi izvor]

Preduzeća su morala da podnose godišnje planove, zvane tehpromfinplan (od rus. техпромфинплан ( ru:Tehprofinplan ) - tehničko-finansijski plan proizvodnje), koji predviđa planove proizvodnje po kvartalima i mesecima. Viši službenici bi tada odobrili ove planove (ili ne) i dodelili zalihe i novac.[56] Preduzeće zatim prodaje svoje proizvode, u okviru ograničenja plana. Ovlašćeno je da odbije ili vrati (u roku od deset dana) nepotrebne inpute dobavljaču.[57]

Ključna promena koja je predstavljala „decentralizaciju” bila je delegiranje odgovornosti nad investicijama u modernizaciju. Međutim, planovi modernizacije ostali su podložni centralnom odobrenju, kao i odobrenju banke koja je pozajmila novac.[58]

Obim razvoja koji se očekivao pod ovim pokroviteljstvom bio je daleko ispod očekivanja, pošto je neophodna radna snaga i materijali jednostavno bila nedovoljna.[59] Jedan odgovor na ovaj problem 1969. godine bio je prebacivanje više podsticaja na izvođače radova.[60]

Plan je takođe pozivao na kultivaciju nove vrste efikasnijih i modernijih menadžera.[61]

Politička reorganizacija[uredi | uredi izvor]

U prethodnim epohama, važan sloj administrativne kontrole nad proizvodnjom su bili sovnarhozi (sovnarhozi, skraćenica reči koje znače „Savet narodne privrede“), regionalni ekonomski saveti stvoreni 1. decembra 1917. pod kontrolom Vrhovnog sovjeta nacionalna privreda (VSNKh, Vesenkha). Ovi saveti su označili kraj kratkotrajne faze radničke kontrole nad proizvodnjom, koju su boljševici smatrali neefikasnom.[62] Prema Novoj ekonomskoj politici koja je počela 1921. godine, preduzeća su klasifikovana na osnovu njihove relativne međuzavisnosti (i neophodnosti ratne proizvodnje) ili autonomije (tj. ona koja su „obdarena potpunom finansijskom i komercijalnom nezavisnošću“). Mnoga preduzeća u poslednjoj kategoriji nisu nacionalizovana, već su stavljena pod vođstvo VSNKh, sa planom da se grupišu u „trustove“ na osnovu proizvodnih lanaca ili geografske blizine.[63] Ovaj model je prošao kroz razne reorganizacije, uključujući jačanje edinonačalije, kontrolu proizvodnih jedinica od strane jednog menadžera. Ovi pojedinačni menadžeri su povremeno kontrolisali širok spektar proizvodnih aktivnosti unutar jedne oblasti.[64] Ekonomska reforma iz 1957. godine ponovo je uvela sovnarhozi, njih 104, da upravljaju proizvodnjom po regionima. Tamo gde je primenjivo, oni su blisko korespondirali sa granicama oblasti (političke jurisdikcije).[65] Odmah su se pojavile pritužbe da ovi saveti nisu optimizovali ukupne proizvodne lance, zbog regionalne usmerenosti, i da su u suprotnosti sa ovlašćenjima Gosplana.[66] Godine 1962. 104 sovnarhozija su konsolidovana u 47 većih jurisdikcija (od kojih je jedna kontrolisala ceo Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tadžikistan i Kirgiziju). Međutim, do 1962–1963, sovnarhozi su postali potčinjeni brojnim drugim agencijama i organizacijama. Gosplan je trebalo da bude lišen svojih ovlašćenja za planiranje u korist revitalizovanog VSNKh.[67]

Kosigin je ciljao na ove „zastarele oblike upravljanja“ i uključio je u svom govoru iz 1965. povratak ministarstvima kao glavnim administratorima. Njegov plan je ličio na sistem ministarstva pod Staljinom, ali sa manjim brojem: devet svesaveznih ministarstava organizovanih od strane industrije (npr. Ministarstvo lake industrije, Ministarstvo radio industrije, Ministarstvo hemijske industrije) i jedanaest nadzornih operacija unutar svakog sindikata -republika. Potonje regionalne agencije izveštavale su i lokalno veće i centralno ministarstvo koje je nadležno za vrstu proizvodnje. Gosplan je imao odgovornost za izradu godišnjih i dugoročnih planova, kao i za usmeravanje razvoja i upravljanja resursima. Gosnab je postao primarni koordinator materijalno-tehničkog snabdevanja i bio je zadužen za analizu velikih razmera (moguće korišćenjem kompjutera) kako bi povećao efikasnost lanca snabdevanja.[68]

Reforme iz 1965. donekle su izmenile ulogu Partije u ekonomskoj administraciji.[69] Lokalni zvaničnici trebalo je da nadgledaju operacije sa distance kako bi osigurali usklađenost sa duhom reformi.[70]

Rafiniranje centralnog planiranja[uredi | uredi izvor]

Plan je zahtevao detaljnije i naučno centralno planiranje, uključujući godišnje ciljeve.[71][72] Ovi planovi bi se izračunavali korišćenjem kompjuterskih sistema.[71]

Distribucija zaliha i proizvoda odvijala bi se na različite načine. Centralni planeri bi izdvojili određena oskudna i vitalna dobra. Za druge, preduzeća bi mogla da formiraju "direktne veze" u okviru kojih su razvila ugovorni odnos razmene.[73]

Implementacija[uredi | uredi izvor]

Autori reformi su od samog početka znali da će promene stupiti na snagu postepeno, na osnovu pažljivog pisanja planova tokom 1966. i 1967.[74] Prva 43 preduzeća, zajedno sa nekoliko „eksperimenata“ za koje je planiranje počelo pre septembarskog plenuma 1965. godine, prešlo je na novi model početkom 1966.[75][76] Prelazak dodatnih 180–200 obavljen je početkom 1966.[77] To su već bila profitabilna, dobro pozicionirana preduzeća i dobro su se odrazila na reformu u ranim evaluacijama.[78] Prvog jula 1966. prešlo je još 430 preduzeća; one su uključivale neke velike operacije i same su činile 12% ukupne proizvodnje. Do kraja 1966. godine, više od 704 preduzeća je uvelo novi model.[79][80]

Osmi petogodišnji plan bi inicirao neke od predloženih reformi.[81] (Petogodišnji plan se bavio širokim spektrom pitanja, sa više fokusa na sveukupne uslove života ljudi. Očekivalo se da će biti sprovedena unutar Partije.)[82]

Većina lake industrije trebalo je da se pređe na novi model početkom 1967. godine. Preostala preduzeća će se prebaciti u dve faze, stupajući na snagu 1. jula 1967. i 1. januara 1968.[77] Potpuni prenos svih preduzeća odvijao se stabilno, ako ne baš po planu. Do 1. aprila 1967. promenilo se 2.500 preduzeća, odgovornih za 20% proizvodnje. Do kraja godine prešlo je 7.000 industrijskih preduzeća (od 45.000), 1.500 autoprevoznika (od 4.100) i svih 25 železničkih sistema. Oni su zajedno činili kičmu sovjetske industrije.[79] Za njima su sledila manja preduzeća: 11.000 više 1968.[83]

Plan je doveo do značajne prvobitne konfuziju od strane menadžera preduzeća koji su tokom svoje karijere potcenjivali svoj potencijalni učinak da bi kasnije premašili svoju kvotu. [4] Takođe je bio težak zahtev da se ispoštuju nove direktive pre nego što su se svi aspekti ekonomije (tj. cene, dostupnost resursa) promenili.[84] A nevoljnost određenih birokrata da se pridržavaju nove politike bila je predmet stalne kritike u štampi, uključujući i više uvodnika samog Libermana. U aprilu 1966, na primer, Liberman je preporučio stvaranje „mozga trusta rekonstrukcije“ koji bi mogao staviti veto na kontrareformističku politiku u birokratiji.[85] Službenici višeg administrativnog nivoa (tj. ministarstva) su nastavili da izdaju naredbe u suprotnosti sa planovima profitabilnosti menadžera preduzeća.[86] Neki tradicionalni problemi – kao što je akumulacija, kontra profitabilnost, viška vrednih zaliha, kako ne bi bili potrebni kasnije u vreme nestašice – i dalje su i dalje prisutni.[87] Gosnab i ministarstva su okrivljeni što nisu dali odgovarajuće inpute na raspolaganje preduzećima.[88]

Revizija cena, prva od 1955. godine, objavljena je sredinom 1966. godine, očigledno nakon nekih netrivijalnih unutrašnjih sporova.[89] Revizija je zahtevala umereno ponovno usklađivanje cena, kako bi se više uskladila sa troškovima proizvodnje, i stupila je na snagu u julu 1967.[90] Cene goriva i rude na veliko su porasle.[91] Cene robe široke potrošnje zvanično uopšte nisu porasle; pa ipak, potrošači su plaćali veće cene za stvari koje su želeli i koje su im bile potrebne, pošto su novije, skuplje robe uvedene na tržište, a stare verzije povučene.[92]

Rezultati[uredi | uredi izvor]

Rad na vozilu 1969. godine u novoj fabrici AvtoVAZ-a u Toljatiju

Ekonomija je rasla više u periodu 1966–1970 nego u periodu 1961–1965.[93] Mnoga preduzeća su podsticana da prodaju ili daju višak opreme, pošto je sav raspoloživi kapital uračunat u obračun produktivnosti. Određena merenja efikasnosti su poboljšana. To uključuje rast prodaje po rublji kapitala i pad plata po rublji prodaje.[94][95] Preduzeća su veliki deo svog profita, ponekad i 80%, davala u centralni budžet. Ove isplate "besplatnog" preostalog profita znatno su premašile kapitalne troškove.[96]

Međutim, centralni planeri nisu bili zadovoljni uticajem reforme. Posebno su primetili da su plate porasle bez srazmernog porasta produktivnosti.[93] Mnoge specifične promene su revidirane ili poništene 1969–1971.[97]

Reforme su donekle smanjile ulogu Partije u mikroupravljanju ekonomskim operacijama.[69] Reakcija na ekonomski reformizam udružila se sa protivljenjem političkoj liberalizaciji, što je podstaklo invaziju na Čehoslovačku 1968.[98]

Reference[uredi | uredi izvor]

  1. ^ Katz, Economic Reform (1972), pp. 8–17.
  2. ^ Adam, Economic Reforms (1989), pp. 5–11.
  3. ^ Adam, Economic Reforms (1989), pp. 11–13.
  4. ^ a b Katz, Economic Reform (1972), p. 155. "The old-style director who was good at obtaining materials in short supply and fighting successfully with the authorities to get a low 'val' plan that he could comfortably overfill was lost in the new circumstances, and there was a serious problem of psychological reorientation."
  5. ^ Tubis, Decision-Making in the Soviet Economic Bureaucracy (1973), pp. 22–27. "The amount of premia was determined on the basis of the fulfillment of the norms for each plan index, and a certain rate was established for fulfillment and higher rates for overfulfillment of each norm. Since gross output was considered the most important index by the leadership, it carried with it the highest rates. The manipulation of these bonuses was very important because management personnel oriented production to get the most favorable sums, especially since the premia often amounted to a sum equal to the manager's regular salary. Moreover, whereas bonuses for workers and lower management personnel, e.g., a shop chief, were paid out of the enterprise fund made up of a part of the enterprise profit, the bonuses of the managerial personnel were, for the most part, paid out of the State budget. Thus, the premia of the manager and his staff came from fulfilling the production plan regardless of how the enterprise did financially."
  6. ^ Ellman, Soviet Planning Today (1971), p. 4.
  7. ^ Ellman, Soviet Planning Today (1971), p. 30. "In Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR (1952) Stalin repeated the familiar Maxist–Leninist argument that price-market relationships in a socialist economy are a relic of capitalism, the persistence of which in a socialist economy is due to the existence side by side with the socialist sector of a cooperative sector (the collective farms), and that these price-market relationships are destined to wither away under communism."
  8. ^ Ellman, Soviet Planning Today (1971), p. 11. "Political economy is discussed in the press, lectures are given on it in the factories, and it is taught to students throughout the higher educational system. Economic cybernetics is a specialized academic discipline which is taught to future planners."
  9. ^ Feiwel, Quest for Economic Efficiency (1972), p. 199. "The mathematical school represents a major breakthrough in the approach to price formation and resource allocation, even though its exponents--to a larger or smaller degree--are cautious in advocating an immediate radical overhaul of the present system."
  10. ^ Ellman, Soviet Planning Today (1971), p. 2.
  11. ^ Feiwel, Quest for Economic Efficiency (1972), pp. 197–198. "The impact of the mathematical economists is evident from the growing recognition and honors bestowed on them. In 1964 Kantorovich was promoted to the rank of Academician, and in 1965 the Lenin Prize was awarded to Kantorovich, Nemchinov, and Novozhilov for their pioneering work in planometrics. Even though, as can be expected, there were discordant voices among the economic fraternity, the mathematical school is gaining respectability by claiming the Soviet priority in input-output and linear programming."
  12. ^ Ellman, Soviet Planning Today (1971), pp. 11–12.
  13. ^ Tubis, Decision-Making in the Soviet Economic Bureaucracy (1973), pp. 85–86.
  14. ^ a b Adam, Economic Reforms (1989), p. 23–24.
  15. ^ Katz, Economic Reform (1972), p. 105. "It was clear from the context of the articles that economic policy was a major, if not the major, area for condemnation of the deposed leader, and the three major subdivisions of the criticism were the issue of resource allocations, the successive reorganizations, and the mess in agriculture."
  16. ^ Feiwel, Quest for Economic Efficiency (1972), p. 256. "Undoubtedly one of the major reasons for Khrushchev's ouster on October 15, 1964, was the state of the economy and his erratic handling of the situation."
  17. ^ Katz, Economic Reform (1972), p. 123. "Throughout this period, there were numerous published reports concerning other Eastern European reforms in the Soviet press and journals, which undoubtedly served the purpose of propagandizing and stimulating the reform movement. [...] In addition to publicizing their efforts at reform, the Soviet leaders were actively engaged in discussion with the Eastern European regimes and actually had something to learn from their junior partners in the matter of reform."
  18. ^ Feiwel, Quest for Economic Efficiency (1972), p. 257. "In his report of December 9, 1969, to the Supreme Soviet, Kosygin assaulted the inefficiency of the planning system. He welt on the misuse of investment resources, the protracted construction periods and underestimated costs [...]. He condemned the enterprise's unwillingness and inertia in introducing technical progress and accentuated the inferior output quality. He pointed to the endless links in the chain of command, the superimposition of strata in administration, the muddle created by duplication of work in many agencies, and the ever-growing mutual coordination, often responsible for delaying solutions to arising problems."
  19. ^ a b Adam, Economic Reforms (1989), p. 40.
  20. ^ Tubis, Decision-Making in the Soviet Economic Bureaucracy (1973), p. 110. "The September, 1965 plenum thus acts as a bridge between the reform debate of 1962–1965 and the actual instillation of the reform in the Soviet economy. In the case of the former, the Plenum represents the culmination of the debate with the Soviet leadership announcing which of the ideas and proposals of the reformers it found to be the most valid and compelling; in the case of the latter, the Plenum laid out the path which the infusion of reform proposals was to take."
  21. ^ a b Protocol of the 22nd Congress of the CPSU, Moscow 1961
  22. ^ a b Katz, Economic Reform (1972), p. 66.
  23. ^ Ellman, Soviet Planning Today (1971), p. 17.
  24. ^ Katz, Economic Reform (1972), p. 71. "In March, for example, Kommunist, No. 5, carried a major article by Nemchinov, the venerable mathematical economist, who, it is believed, from his powerful academic position, personally picked Liberman to spark the second phase of the discussion."
  25. ^ Feiwel, Quest for Economic Efficiency (1972), p. 218. "In place of a multiplicity of performance criteria, Liberman proposes to use a single one: profitability, expressed as a ratio of profit to productive fixed and working capital."
  26. ^ Tubis, Decision-Making in the Soviet Economic Bureaucracy (1973), pp. 1, 81–85.
  27. ^ Katz, Economic Reform (1972), p. 67. "Thus, despite Liberman's assurances that price formation would be in the hands of the state and although he appeared to suggest a manipulative approach to price policy, the conservative critics were quick to point out that Liberman's proposals 'lead to the conclusion that the methodological basis of price formation in a planned socialist economy should be the prices of production, which is characteristic of the capitalist system of economy.'"
  28. ^ Tubis, Decision-Making in the Soviet Economic Bureaucracy (1973), pp. 87–88.
  29. ^ Tubis, Decision-Making in the Soviet Economic Bureaucracy (1973), pp. 91–92.
  30. ^ Feiwel, Quest for Economic Efficiency (1972), p. 237.
  31. ^ Feiwel, Quest for Economic Efficiency (1972), p. 242.
  32. ^ a b Tubis, Decision-Making in the Soviet Economic Bureaucracy (1973), pp. 93–94.
  33. ^ Katz, Economic Reform (1972), p. 111.
  34. ^ Katz, Economic Reform (1972), p. 112. "Effective January 1, 1965, the mine received notice of a quarterly extraction plan, of the amount of government subsidy per ton extracted (coal mining is a loss industry and profitability is calculated in relative uslovno[pojasniti] terms), and of the permissible acreage of ash content. All other indicators were determined by the mine enterprise itself, bearing in mind the 'maximum utilization of reserves.' The miners received bonuses based on the fulfillment and overfulfillment of the extraction plan. Executives, engineers, and technicians, received premia based on the fulfillment of the production plan and the achieved level of relative profitability. The various published sources are replete with statistics concerning the increase in extraction and productivity under the new experiments."
  35. ^ Tubis, Decision-Making in the Soviet Economic Bureaucracy (1973), p. 95. "More ominous was 'the widespread opposition of the regional sovnarkhoz officials who refused to recognize the special status of the experimenting plants and continued to issue orders, instructions, and plans as usual.' Despite the right of enterprises working under the special provisions of the reform, sovnarkhoz officials would arbitrarily change plan assignments or redirect the delivery of output. The Maiak plant particularly suffered this; at one point, Maiak's manager was threatened with punishment if he did not cancel his contracts with retailers and produce what the sovnarkhoz ordered, as if the reform never existed. At other times, the sovnarkhoz would put through an 'emergency' request to fill local orders."
  36. ^ Katz, Economic Reform (1972), p. 143.
  37. ^ Feiwel, Quest for Economic Efficiency (1972), p. 262.
  38. ^ Katz, Economic Reform (1972), p. 137. "The theory of this aspect of the reform was that the two indicators 'control' or 'guarantee' each other. Realizatsiya, or the sales indicator, prevents profitability from rising at the expense of the volume, assortment, and quality of the products demanded, whereas the profitability indicator prevents the plan from being carried out as regards volume and assortment of products at 'any price,' regardless of the costs."
  39. ^ Feiwel, Quest for Economic Efficiency (1972), p. 260. "Both the increase of the absolute amount of profit and that of its rate, reflecting the return per rouble of production assets (rate of return) are required."
  40. ^ Adam, Economic Reforms (1989), p. 42. "The reform set rules for the order and the way in which profit should be distributed. [...] Enterprises were obliged to use their profit first to pay the capital charge and interest on bank credit. After these payments were made, profit could be used for feeding three incentive funds. Next in order was the use of profit for the repayment of credit, expansion of working capital, and so on. The difference between the sum of produced profit and the allowable payments from profit was surrednered to the budget as the free remainder of profit (see 'Decisions' of the Central Committee of the CPSU and Council of Ministers of 4 October 1965, hereafter 'decisions of 1965')(Khoziaistevennaia ..., 1969, p. 121)."
  41. ^ Adam, Economic Reforms (1989), pp. 42–43.
  42. ^ Ellman, Soviet Planning Today (1971), p. 131.
  43. ^ Adam, Economic Reforms (1989), p. 45.
  44. ^ a b Feiwel, Quest for Economic Efficiency (1972), p. 271.
  45. ^ Feiwel, Quest for Economic Efficiency (1972), p. 309.
  46. ^ Ellman, Soviet Planning Today (1971), p. 139. "The main distributive effect has been to improve the incomes of employees and engineering-technical personnel relative to workers. In enterprises which transferred to the new system in 1966, the average pay of employees was 10.3 per cent higher, of engineering-technical personnel 8.2 per cent higher, and of workers only 4.1 per cent higher than in 1965. It is officially considered that this is a desirable reaction to excessive equalising tendencies in 1959–65."
  47. ^ Katz, Economic Reform (1972), pp. 140–141. "At the beginning of 1966, the premia of executives and engineering and technical staffs compromised [sic] 11 per cent of total salaries of this group under the old system. In the first quarter, in the cases of those factories that transferred to the new system, these premia amounted to 30 to 35 per cent of the salaries of this category."
  48. ^ Feiwel, Quest for Economic Efficiency (1972), pp. 273–274.
  49. ^ Tubis, Decision-Making in the Soviet Economic Bureaucracy (1973), pp. 193–194. "One of the rights granted to the enterprise under the reform was the ability to lay off excess workers. Formerly, the enterprises would hire as many workers as they could get since the wage fund was determined by higher organs based upon existing manpower; under the reform the wage fund was to be determined as part of the plan and so the less workers, the larger the wages which could be paid to the existing work force as an incentive or saved to increase profitability. In some cases, comparison between growth in the rate of labor productivity and the rise in wages would seem to indicate a decline in the size of the work force."
  50. ^ Adam, Economic Reforms (1989), p. 43. "The new system penalized both over-fulfilment and under-fulfilment of the plan. If an enterprise over-fulfilled both or one of the fund-forming indicators, the normative for that portion which exceeded the plan was reduced by at least 30 per cent. A roughly similar disincentive was specified for under-fulfilment of plans (Egiazarian, 1976. p. 155; Khoziaistevennaia ..., 1969, p. 245; Kletskii and Risini, 1970). This provision aimed not only at encouraging enterprises, as already mentioned, to accept demanding plans, but also at discouraging them from committing themselves to unrealistic plans."
  51. ^ Katz, Economic Reform (1972), p. 141. "If the sales or profit plan was overfulfilled, the norms of deduction from profit were reduced by 30 to 40 per cent. Underfulfillment was penalized at a rate of 3 per cent for each percentile of underfulfillment to a floor of 40 percent of the planned deductions into the enterprise fund."
  52. ^ Ellman, Soviet Planning Today (1971), p. 35–36. "Traditionally Soviet enterprises have not had to pay for the use of land or natural resources. Rent payments for the use of scarce natural resources were introduced as part of the reform, and the further development of this principle is currently very topical. [...] Hence, the shadow prices of pieces of land of different fertilities reflect the saving of labour resulting from production on the best and middling pieces of land rather than on the worst piece."
  53. ^ Feiwel, Quest for Economic Efficiency (1972), p. 290. "The reform is to invigorate the role of credit. Preliminary calculations indicated that over half of the present volume of investment can be financed by bank credits to induce investment planners to be more cautious in their demands for funds and to justify them by sounder efficiency calculations, and to encourage enterprises to make more profitable ventures, to accelerate the mastering of capacities, and to speed up repayment of borrowed funds. As for working capital about 40 per cent of it is already financed by bank credits and it is envisaged that this share will increase."
  54. ^ Feiwel, Quest for Economic Efficiency (1972), p. 292.
  55. ^ Feiwel, Quest for Economic Efficiency (1972), p. 306.
  56. ^ Feiwel, Quest for Economic Efficiency (1972), p. 269.
  57. ^ Feiwel, Quest for Economic Efficiency (1972), p. 270.
  58. ^ Adam, Economic Reforms (1989), p. 49. "Financing of modernisation of existing enterprises was to come from the enterprise development funds and credit (again from the Construction Bank) repayable from the development funds. If the credit contributed to the expansion of consumer goods production, 50 per cent of the turnover-tax yields could be used to pay off the credit (Kosygin, 1966, pp. 9–12; 22–5; Khoziaistevennaia ..., 1969, pp. 132–2). Thus the real involvement of enterprises in investment was in modernisation, and only this investment could be termed decentralised or non-centralised as it was called in official documents. The rationale for this decentralisation was to give enterprises greater responsibility for investment in the hope that, if their own funds were involved, they would care more about the effectiveness of investment. There was no great fear that such investment would escape the control of authorities. Investment in modernisation had to be included in the plans of enterprises, and these required the seal of approval. Some control was also exercised by the bank extending credit."
  59. ^ Adam, Economic Reforms (1989), p. 50. "It was calculated that, with the conversion of the whole industry to the new system of management, the development fund would make up 20 per cent of all industrial capital investment and represent 5.5–6 per cent of all fixed assets (Feiwel, 1972, p. 392, even mentioned a figure of 11–12 per cent). In reality, it was much lower, 2–3 per cent of fixed assets. In spite of the rules some ministries withheld a portion of the amortisation fund belonging to enterprises (probably for financing centralized investment), and a portion of the development fund had to be used for the construction of roads. What is perhaps even worse, enterprises could not fully use the remaining development fund (in 1964 they only used 60 per cent). Enterprises had difficulty obtaining needed machinery and equipment and finding construction enterprises that would be willing to perform the construction work, particularly if a small project was involved. The plan for investment for 1966–1970 was too demanding. It exceeded the capacity of construction enterprises and the potential supply of materials and machinery, and centralized investment had a preferential claim on construction capacity and supply (Krylov, Rothstein and Tsarev, 1966; Rumiantsev and Filippov, 1969, p. 36; Feiwel, 1972, pp. 394, 488–90)."
  60. ^ Adam, Economic Reforms (1989), p. 51.
  61. ^ Tubis, Decision-Making in the Soviet Economic Bureaucracy (1973), pp. 106–107.
  62. ^ Tubis, Decision-Making in the Soviet Economic Bureaucracy (1973), pp. 7–8. "However, the system of worker's control quickly broke down into a general disintegration of industry. Many worker's councils used the doctrine to settle old scores with the former owners and management; even those which did not seldom were able to master the technical details of running the factory, especially in the area of finances. It, therefore, seemed to the Bolsheviks advisable to set up some kind of centralized machinery to control nationalized industry in the hopes of salvaging some kind of order from the chaos. On December 1, 1917, the Supreme Council of the National Economy (VSNKh) was created in order to control the nationalized sector of the economy. VSNKh and its system of local Councils of People's Commissars (sovnarkhozy) were charged with the job of nationalizing and regulating industry. [...] After the creation of the Supreme Council, worker's councils died a rather rapid death."
  63. ^ Tubis, Decision-Making in the Soviet Economic Bureaucracy (1973), pp. 8–11. "The bulk of industry which now would be in the hands of private owners or cooperative groups was to be supervised by sixteen central industrial departments under the administration of VSNKh which was charged with the function of supervising 'industrial reorganization along the new lines, and thereafter to exercise a general regulation of the policies and activities of industrial trusts falling within their several spheres."
  64. ^ Tubis, Decision-Making in the Soviet Economic Bureaucracy (1973), pp. 16–22.
  65. ^ Tubis, Decision-Making in the Soviet Economic Bureaucracy (1973), pp. 48–50.
  66. ^ Tubis, Decision-Making in the Soviet Economic Bureaucracy (1973), pp. 54–60.
  67. ^ Tubis, Decision-Making in the Soviet Economic Bureaucracy (1973), pp. 63–67.
  68. ^ Tubis, Decision-Making in the Soviet Economic Bureaucracy (1973), pp. 101–103.
  69. ^ a b Katz, Economic Reform (1972), p. 173. "It is clear that, in general, the pendulum again shifted to an emphasis on staying out of day-to-day management problems, however. Thus, in September, 1966, Pravda concluded that party organs in the Perm oblast were relying on 'administrative methods' or were caught up in 'paper creativity.'"
  70. ^ Tubis, Decision-Making in the Soviet Economic Bureaucracy (1973), pp. 108–109. "The main tasks of the Party at all levels would be two-fold. First, the Party organs will ensure that the correct application of the reform principles is made, and they must constantly focus their attention on the major problems of the economics of industry. To emphasize this point, Mazurov, in a speech to the USSR Supreme Soviet, stated that this means 'precise and on-time fulfillment of the plan assignments' and that 'nonfulfillment of the plan must be regarded as a very gross violation of state discipline.'"
  71. ^ a b Adam, Economic Reforms (1989), p. 41.
  72. ^ Feiwel, Quest for Economic Efficiency (1972), p. 261. "Existing potential must be scientifically analyzed to uncover the emergent tendencies and perspectives. Planners should be alert to raising the efficiency of new technology, improving the structure of production and consumption, and coordinating regional development. Enlargement of management's time horizon must rely on drafting five-year plans at enterprises, to encourage development and arrangement of permanent ties with suppliers and buyers. The five-year plan, broken down by years for crucial targets, should become the basic form of planning."
  73. ^ Feiwel, Quest for Economic Efficiency (1972), p. 294–296.
  74. ^ Feiwel, Quest for Economic Efficiency (1972), p. 265. "The transition to the new system will be gradual so as not to endanger the fulfillment of plans and the normal operation of industry. Gosplan, the MF, the State Committee for Labor and Wages, the SCP, Gosbank, and the industrial ministries will be charged with drafting regulations, methodological instructions, and directives during the period 1966–1967 for implementing the new system."
  75. ^ Katz, Economic Reform (1972), p. 151–152.
  76. ^ Feiwel, Quest for Economic Efficiency (1972), p. 299.
  77. ^ a b Katz, Economic Reform (1972), pp. 152–153.
  78. ^ Tubis, Decision-Making in the Soviet Economic Bureaucracy (1973), pp. 118–119.
  79. ^ a b Katz, Economic Reform (1972), p. 154.
  80. ^ Feiwel, Quest for Economic Efficiency (1972), p. 300.
  81. ^ Katz, Economic Reform (1972), p. 151. "...there is a remarkable continuity in the issues and debate over them at the end of the 1966-70 Five-Year Plan, the period of implementation of the reform.
  82. ^ Tubis, Decision-Making in the Soviet Economic Bureaucracy (1973), p. 180. "Those problems to which the Party must direct its creative energies were listed as implementation of the Five-year Plan (improve economic development, improve the rate of the production of consumer goods, successful industrial construction, and improved living conditions for workers); improvement of technical progress, especially in machine-building, instrument-making, and chemicals; improvement in capital construction; further exposure of production reserves; full utilization of the potential of the new system; and raising the level of Party leadership."
  83. ^ Katz, Economic Reform (1972), p. 155.
  84. ^ Katz, Economic Reform (1972), p. 158.
  85. ^ Katz, Economic Reform (1972), pp. 158, 161.
  86. ^ Tubis, Decision-Making in the Soviet Economic Bureaucracy (1973), pp. 222–223. "The most pervasive problem, however, was the continuing inclination of ministries to change the plans of their subordinate enterprises in clear violation of the principles of the reform. For example, the Ukrainian Ministry of Light Industry twice changed the output plan of the Chernovitskii Hosiery Combine without changing its sales volume. The Combine's cost plan was changed three times, and it was ordered to plan for val, production cost, and number of employees despite these plans no longer existing under the reform. In a more extreme case, the USSR Ministry of Machine-Building for Construction, Road-Building, and Civil Engineering changed the plan for the Kharkov Conditioner Plant 17 times between January and April, 1967."
  87. ^ Feiwel, Quest for Economic Efficiency (1972), p. 298.
  88. ^ Tubis, Decision-Making in the Soviet Economic Bureaucracy (1973), pp. 226–229. "Of all the economic problems, the most serious one was the continuing shortcomings in the field of material-technical supply. Reports appeared in the Soviet press indicating that shortages and foul-ups were still numerous and, in some cases, rather serious for the affected enterprises. [...] Much of the blame for supply problems at the enterprise level was the result of administrative red-tape at higher levels, beyond the control of the enterprise."
  89. ^ Katz, Economic Reform (1972), p. 164. "When Gosplan deputy chairman Bachurin discussed the schedule for implementation of the reform in February 1966, he was able to report that the State Committee for Prices had already worked out the principles of price formation but that there remained the task of ensuring that prices approximate as closely as possible the 'level of socially useful labor.' There then followed a strange silence on the issue of price formation. [...] This may indicate that the final official decision was not taken until the late summer of 1966 and that there were some hard-fought battles until the last minute."
  90. ^ Katz, Economic Reform (1972), p. 169.
  91. ^ Feiwel, Quest for Economic Efficiency (1972), p. 352.
  92. ^ Feiwel, Quest for Economic Efficiency (1972), p. 355–356. "One of the canons of the 1967 price revision was that wholesale price changes would not affect retail prices. Throughout the 1966-70 FYP, the prices of basic foodstuffs remained unchanged. The rates of housing rents, public utilities, and public transportation also remained stable. This does not mean, however, that the consumers' price level remained unaltered. As a rule, when new or improved products are introduced their prices are higher than those of existing substitutes. The substitutes often are withdrawn from production. Hence there is a continuous 'disguised price inflation' and an increasing cost of living."
  93. ^ a b Adam, Economic Reforms (1989), p. 53. "The economy did not perform well enough to impress opponents of the reform. It grew faster in 1966–1970 than it did in 1961–1965. Its development, however, showed some disquieting phenomena; primarily the relationship between wages and productivity in industry was not to the liking of the central planners. Nominal (and real wages) [sic] grew fast, but productivity lagged behind the target."
  94. ^ Ellman, Soviet Planning Today (1971), p. 139. "The new system is considered to have had a number of positive allocation effects. It has led to widespread selling, or giving way, of superfluous equipment. (This increases both the PDF and, ceteris paribus, profitability.) In addition, the reform has had a positive effect on a number of indices which are conventionally regarded as measures of efficiency. The head of Gosplan's department for the introduction of the new system has cited table 8.4, which refers to 580 enterprises transferred to the new system in 1966, to illustrate the positive effect of the reform on efficiency."
  95. ^ Tubis, Decision-Making in the Soviet Economic Bureaucracy (1973), p. 142.
  96. ^ Feiwel, Quest for Economic Efficiency (1972), pp. 327, 341, 377–383.
  97. ^ Adam, Economic Reforms (1989), p. 52–53. "However, the reform was short-lived. Some of its building blocks started to crumble when it was still expanding to other areas. In 1969 productivity targets were reintroduced; what is worse, the most important element—a new approach to the formation of the bonus fund—was dropped. Starting in 1972 the bonus fund was again assigned to enterprises from above, and the fund creating indicators, sales and profit, were reduced to corrective indicators (Adam, 1980). The number of success indicators started to grow again. Decentralised investment, for reasons already mentioned, played a minimal role."
  98. ^ Katz, Economic Reform (1972), pp. 180–181. "This development appears to have paralleled the general conservative tightening-up in other spheres of Soviet life, especially those of culture and ideology, which was at least partially related to the development of the reform movement in Czechoslovakia. With the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, the conservative backlash reached its high point and the economic reformist notions of that country came under such heavy attack as to strike caution into economic reformers elsewhere in the Soviet bloc."

Literatura[uredi | uredi izvor]

  • Adam, Jan (1989). Economic Reforms in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe since the 1960s. Hong Kong: Macmillan Press. ISBN 0333389476. 
  • Ellman, Michael. Soviet Planning Today: Proposals for an Optimally Functioning Economic System. University of Cambridge Department of Applied Economics, Occasional Paper 25. Cambridge University Press. 1971. ISBN 0521081564.
  • Feiwel, George R. The Soviet Quest for Economic Efficiency: Issues, Controversies, and Reforms: Expanded and Updated Edition. New York: Praeger, 1972.
  • Katz, Abraham. The Politics of Economic Reform in the Soviet Union. New York: Praeger, 1972.
  • Tubis, Richard Irving. Decision-Making in the Soviet Economic Bureaucracy: Administrative Implementation of the 1965 Economic Reform. Political science dissertation accepted at University of Illinois, Urbana–Champaign, August 1973.

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