Државни удар — разлика између измена

Садржај обрисан Садржај додат

Инлајн

Верзија на датум 24. јул 2022. у 23:43

Државни удар или пуч (нем. Putsch — пуч; франц. coup d'état — ку де `та, или само coup — ку),^[1] представља изненадну смену власти у некој земљи, и то противуставним средствима.^[2]^[3] Он може бити миран или (ређе) насилан, а најчешће га изводи политичка фракција, војска или неки високи државни званичник.^[4]^[5]^[6] Многи научници сматрају да је државни удар успешан када узурпатори преузму и држе власт најмање седам дана.^[4]

Државни удар се разликује од револуције по томе што га изводе људи из саме власти, за разлику од револуције коју изводе широке народне масе.

Распрострањеност и историја

According to Clayton Thyne and Jonathan Powell's coup data set, there were 457 coup attempts from 1950 to 2010, of which 227 (49.7%) were successful and 230 (50.3%) were unsuccessful.^[4] They find that coups have "been most common in Africa and the Americas (36.5% and 31.9%, respectively). Asia and the Middle East have experienced 13.1% and 15.8% of total global coups, respectively. Europe has experienced by far the fewest coup attempts: 2.6%."^[4] Most coup attempts occurred in the mid-1960s, but there were also large numbers of coup attempts in the mid-1970s and the early 1990s.^[4] From 1950 to 2010, a majority of coups failed in the Middle East and Latin America. They had a somewhat higher chance of success in Africa and Asia.^[7] Numbers of successful coups have decreased over time.^[4]

Исходи

Successful coups are one method of regime change that thwarts the peaceful transition of power.^[5]^[6] A 2016 study categorizes four possible outcomes to coups in dictatorships:^[8]

Failed coup
No regime change, such as when a leader is illegally shuffled out of power without changing the identity of the group in power or the rules for governing
Replacement of incumbent with another dictatorship
Ousting of the dictatorship followed by democratization (also called "democratic coups")^[9]

The study found that about half of all coups in dictatorships—both during and after the Cold War—install new autocratic regimes.^[8] New dictatorships launched by coups engage in higher levels of repression in the year that follows the coup than existed in the year leading to the coup.^[8] One-third of coups in dictatorships during the Cold War and 10% of later ones reshuffled the regime leadership.^[8] Democracies were installed in the wake of 12% of Cold War coups in dictatorships and 40% of post-Cold War ones.^[8]

Coups occurring in the post-Cold War period have been more likely to result in democratic systems than pre-Cold War coups,^[10]^[8]^[11] though coups still mostly perpetuate authoritarianism.^[7] Coups that occur during civil wars shorten the war's duration.^[12]

Предиктори

Типични примери државног удара су:^[13]^[14]

генерала Франка у Шпанији (1936);
бригадног генерала Боривоја Мирковића у Краљевини Југославији (1941);
генерала Батисте на Куби (1952);
пуковника Гадафија у Либији (1969);
генерала Пиночеа у Чилеу (1973);
генерала-потпуковника Омара Ел Башира у Судану (1989);
генерала Исајас Афеверки у Етиопији (1991);
пуковника Јаија Џаме у Гамбији (1994)
генерала Мушарафа у Пакистану (1999);
бригадног генерала Мохамеда Азиза у Мауританији (2008);
генерала Абдела Фатаха у Египту (2013);
генерала Мухамед Али Хути у Јемену (2014);
Емерсона Мнангагве у Зимбабвеу (2017).

The literature review in a 2016 study includes mentions of ethnic factionalism, supportive foreign governments, leader inexperience, slow growth, commodity price shocks, and poverty.^[15]

Coups have been found to appear in environments that are heavily influenced by military powers. Multiple of the above factors are connected to military culture and power dynamics. These factors can be divided into multiple categories, with two of these categories being a threat to military interests and support for military interests. If interests go in either direction, the military will find itself either capitalizing off that power or attempting to gain it back.

Often times military spending is a indicator of the likelihood of a coup taking place Nordvik found that about 75% of coups that took place in many different countries rooted from military spending and oil windfalls.^[13]

Coup trap

The cumulative number of coups is a strong predictor of future coups.^[14]^[16]^[17] This phenomenon is called the coup trap.^[17]^[18] A 2014 study of 18 Latin American countries found that the establishment of open political competition helps bring countries out of the "coup trap" and reduces cycles of political instability.^[18]

Regime type and polarization

Hybrid regimes are more vulnerable to coups than are very authoritarian states or democratic states.^[19] A 2021 study found that democratic regimes were not substantially more likely to experience coups.^[20] A 2015 study finds that terrorism is strongly associated with re-shuffling coups.^[21] A 2016 study finds that there is an ethnic component to coups: "When leaders attempt to build ethnic armies, or dismantle those created by their predecessors, they provoke violent resistance from military officers."^[22] Another 2016 study shows that protests increase the risk of coups, presumably because they ease coordination obstacles among coup plotters and make international actors less likely to punish coup leaders.^[23] A third 2016 study finds that coups become more likely in the wake of elections in autocracies when the results reveal electoral weakness for the incumbent autocrat.^[24] A fourth 2016 study finds that inequality between social classes increases the likelihood of coups.^[25] A fifth 2016 study finds no evidence that coups are contagious; one coup in a region does not make other coups in the region likely to follow.^[26] One study found that coups are more likely to occur in states with small populations, as there are smaller coordination problems for coup-plotters.^[27]

A 2019 study found that when civilian elites are polarized and electoral competition is low, civilian-recruited coups become more likely.^[28]

In autocracies, the frequency of coups seems to be affected by the succession rules in place, with monarchies with a fixed succession rule being much less plagued by instability than less institutionalized autocracies.^[29]^[30]^[31]

A 2014 study of 18 Latin American countries in the 20th-century study found the legislative powers of the presidency does not influence coup frequency.^[18]

Терминологија

Сам термин државни удар потиче од француског израза coup d'état који дословно значи удар на државу и који се користи као стручни термин за државни удар широм света. Настао је од француских речи:

coup, што значи изненадни ударац
État, што значи држава

У употреби је и скраћени, али неправилни облик coup.

Види још

Референце

^ „coup d'état”. Merriam-Webster. Merriam-Webster. Приступљено 4. 4. 2022.
^ Robertson, David (2004). The Routledge Dictionary of Politics (3rd изд.). London: Routledge. стр. 125. ISBN 0-203-36206-3. OCLC 56551222. „Coup d’état describes the sudden and violent overthrow of a government, almost invariably by the military or with the help of the military. A coup d’état tends to occur during a period of social instability and political uncertainty, and is usually the work of right-wing elements determined to impose a social discipline and political order that is felt to be missing.”
^ Brown, Garrett et al. A Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics and International Relations (4 ed., Oxford University Press, 2018): “The sudden, forcible, and illegal removal of a government, usually by the military or some part thereof, often precipitated by more immediate grievances bearing directly on the military.”
^ ^а ^б ^в ^г ^д ^ђ Powell, Jonathan M.; Thyne, Clayton L. (2011-03-01). „Global instances of coups from 1950 to 2010 A new dataset” (PDF). Journal of Peace Research (Preprint) (на језику: енглески). 48 (2): 249—259. ISSN 0022-3433. S2CID 9066792. doi:10.1177/0022343310397436. Приступљено 2022-06-20.
^ ^а ^б „Orderly transfers of power occur less often than you might think”. The Economist. ISSN 0013-0613.
^ ^а ^б Przeworski, Adam (јануар 2015). „Acquiring the Habit of Changing Governments Through Elections”. Comparative Political Studies (на језику: енглески). 48 (1): 101—129. ISSN 0010-4140. S2CID 154441890. doi:10.1177/0010414014543614. „an entire sequence of elections may occur peacefully, with or without alternations, and then some exogenous event may lead to a coup, usurpation of power by the current incumbent, civil war, or some other constitutional irregularity.”
^ ^а ^б Brooks, Risa A. (2019-05-11). „Integrating the Civil–Military Relations Subfield”. Annual Review of Political Science (на језику: енглески). 22 (1): 379—398. ISSN 1094-2939. doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-060518-025407 .
^ ^а ^б ^в ^г ^д ^ђ Derpanopoulos, George; Frantz, Erica; Geddes, Barbara; Wright, Joseph (1. 1. 2016). „Are coups good for democracy?”. Research & Politics. 3 (1): 2053168016630837. ISSN 2053-1680. doi:10.1177/2053168016630837 .
^ Varol, Ozan O. (20. 5. 2021). The Democratic Coup d'État. Oxford University Press. ISBN 9780190626020 — преко Amazon.com.
^ Marinov, Nikolay; Goemans, Hein (1. 10. 2014). „Coups and Democracy”. British Journal of Political Science. 44 (4): 799—825. ISSN 1469-2112. S2CID 55915744. doi:10.1017/S0007123413000264.
^ Miller, Michael K. (1. 10. 2016). „Reanalysis: Are coups good for democracy?”. Research & Politics. 3 (4): 2053168016681908. ISSN 2053-1680. doi:10.1177/2053168016681908 .
^ Thyne, Clayton (25. 3. 2015). „The impact of coups d'état on civil war duration”. Conflict Management and Peace Science. 34 (3): 0738894215570431. ISSN 0738-8942. S2CID 19036952. doi:10.1177/0738894215570431.
^ ^а ^б Nordvik, Frode Martin (1. 4. 2019). „Does Oil Promote or Prevent Coups? The Answer is Yes”. The Economic Journal. 129 (619): 1425—1456. S2CID 158738285. doi:10.1111/ecoj.12604.
^ ^а ^б Belkin, Aaron; Schofer, Evan (1. 10. 2003). „Toward a Structural Understanding of Coup Risk”. Journal of Conflict Resolution. 47 (5): 594—620. ISSN 0022-0027. S2CID 40848052. doi:10.1177/0022002703258197.
^ Bell, Curtis (17. 2. 2016). „Coup d'État and Democracy”. Comparative Political Studies. 49 (9): 0010414015621081. ISSN 0010-4140. S2CID 155881388. doi:10.1177/0010414015621081.
^ Przeworski, Adam; Alvarez, Michael E.; Cheibub, Jose Antonio; Limongi, Fernando (2000). Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950–1990. Cambridge Studies in the Theory of Democracy. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 9780521793797.
^ ^а ^б Londregan, John B.; Poole, Keith T. (1. 1. 1990). „Poverty, the Coup Trap, and the Seizure of Executive Power”. World Politics. 42 (2): 151—183. ISSN 1086-3338. JSTOR 2010462. doi:10.2307/2010462.
^ ^а ^б ^в Lehoucq, Fabrice; Pérez-Liñán, Aníbal (2014). „Breaking Out of the Coup Trap”. Comparative Political Studies. 47 (8): 1105—1129. S2CID 154707430. doi:10.1177/0010414013488561.
^ Hiroi, Taeko; Omori, Sawa (1. 2. 2013). „Causes and Triggers of Coups d'état: An Event History Analysis”. Politics & Policy. 41 (1): 39—64. ISSN 1747-1346. doi:10.1111/polp.12001.
^ Kim, Nam Kyu; Sudduth, Jun Koga (2021-03-03). „Political Institutions and Coups in Dictatorships”. Comparative Political Studies (на језику: енглески). 54 (9): 1597—1628. ISSN 0010-4140. doi:10.1177/0010414021997161 .
^ Aksoy, Deniz; Carter, David B.; Wright, Joseph (1. 7. 2015). „Terrorism and the Fate of Dictators”. World Politics. 67 (3): 423—468. ISSN 1086-3338. S2CID 154292179. doi:10.1017/S0043887115000118.
^ Harkness, Kristen A. (1. 6. 2016). „The Ethnic Army and the State Explaining Coup Traps and the Difficulties of Democratization in Africa”. Journal of Conflict Resolution. 60 (4): 587—616. ISSN 0022-0027. S2CID 54538341. doi:10.1177/0022002714545332. hdl:10023/9391 .
^ Johnson, Jaclyn; Thyne, Clayton L. (26. 6. 2016). „Squeaky Wheels and Troop Loyalty How Domestic Protests Influence Coups d'état, 1951–2005”. Journal of Conflict Resolution. 62 (3): 597—625. ISSN 0022-0027. S2CID 147707842. doi:10.1177/0022002716654742.
^ Wig, Tore; Rød, Espen Geelmuyden (1. 8. 2016). „Cues to Coup Plotters Elections as Coup Triggers in Dictatorships”. Journal of Conflict Resolution. 60 (5): 787—812. ISSN 0022-0027. S2CID 17684023. doi:10.1177/0022002714553106.
^ Houle, Christian (1. 9. 2016). „Why class inequality breeds coups but not civil wars”. Journal of Peace Research. 53 (5): 680—695. ISSN 0022-3433. S2CID 113899326. doi:10.1177/0022343316652187.
^ Miller, Michael K.; Joseph, Michael; Ohl, Dorothy (26. 5. 2016). „Are Coups Really Contagious? An Extreme Bounds Analysis of Political Diffusion”. Journal of Conflict Resolution. 62 (2): 410—441. ISSN 0022-0027. S2CID 148514914. doi:10.1177/0022002716649232.
^ Gassebner, Martin; Gutmann, Jerg; Voigt, Stefan (1. 12. 2016). „When to expect a coup d'état? An extreme bounds analysis of coup determinants”. Public Choice. 169 (3–4): 293—313. ISSN 0048-5829. S2CID 157580604. doi:10.1007/s11127-016-0365-0. hdl:10419/156099 .
^ Kinney, Drew Holland (2019). „Politicians at Arms: Civilian recruitment of soldiers for Middle East Coups”. Armed Forces & Society (на језику: енглески). 45 (4): 681—701. ISSN 1556-0848. S2CID 149675838. doi:10.1177/0095327X18777983.
^ Kurrild-Klitgaard, Peter (2000). „The constitutional economics of autocratic succession”. Public Choice. 103 (1/2): 63—84. ISSN 0048-5829. S2CID 154097838. doi:10.1023/A:1005078532251.
^ Kurrild-Klitgaard, Peter (2004). „Autocratic succession”. Encyclopedia of Public Choice. 103: 358—362. ISBN 978-0-306-47828-4. doi:10.1007/978-0-306-47828-4_39.
^ Escribà-Folch, Abel; Böhmelt, Tobias; Pilster, Ulrich (2019-04-09). „Authoritarian regimes and civil–military relations: Explaining counterbalancing in autocracies”. Conflict Management and Peace Science (на језику: енглески). 37 (5): 559—579. ISSN 0738-8942. S2CID 159416397. doi:10.1177/0738894219836285. hdl:10230/46774 .

Литература

Luttwak, Edward (1979) Coup d'État: A Practical Handbook. Harvard University Press. ISBN 978-0-674-17547-1.
De Bruin, Erica (2020) How to Prevent Coups d'État. Cornell University Press.
Schiel, R., Powell, J., & Faulkner, C. (2020). "Mutiny in Africa, 1950–2018". Conflict Management and Peace Science.
Singh, Naunihal. (2014) Seizing Power: The Strategic Logic of Military Coups. Johns Hopkins University Press.
Malaparte, Curzio (1931). Technique du Coup d'État (на језику: француски). Paris.
Finer, S.E. (1962). The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics. London: Pall Mall Press. стр. 98.
Goodspeed, D. J. (1962). Six Coups d'État. New-York: Viking Press Inc.
Connor, Ken; Hebditch, David (2008). How to Stage a Military Coup: From Planning to Execution. Pen and Sword Books Ltd. ISBN 978-1-84832-503-6.
McGowan, Patrick J. (2016). „Coups and Conflict in West Africa, 1955-2004”. Armed Forces & Society. 32: 5—23. S2CID 144318327. doi:10.1177/0095327X05277885.
McGowan, Patrick J. (2016). „Coups and Conflict in West Africa, 1955-2004”. Armed Forces & Society. 32 (2): 234—253. S2CID 144602647. doi:10.1177/0095327X05277886.
Beeson, Mark (2008). „Civil–Military Relations in Indonesia and the Philippines”. Armed Forces & Society. 34 (3): 474—490. S2CID 144520194. doi:10.1177/0095327X07303607.
n'Diaye, Boubacar (2016). „How Not to Institutionalize Civilian Control: Kenya's Coup Prevention Strategies, 1964-1997”. Armed Forces & Society. 28 (4): 619—640. S2CID 145783304. doi:10.1177/0095327X0202800406.

Спољашње везе

[1] „coup d'état”. Merriam-Webster. Merriam-Webster. Приступљено 4. 4. 2022.

[2] Robertson, David (2004). The Routledge Dictionary of Politics (3rd изд.). London: Routledge. стр. 125. ISBN 0-203-36206-3. OCLC 56551222. „Coup d’état describes the sudden and violent overthrow of a government, almost invariably by the military or with the help of the military. A coup d’état tends to occur during a period of social instability and political uncertainty, and is usually the work of right-wing elements determined to impose a social discipline and political order that is felt to be missing.”

[3] Brown, Garrett et al. A Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics and International Relations (4 ed., Oxford University Press, 2018): “The sudden, forcible, and illegal removal of a government, usually by the military or some part thereof, often precipitated by more immediate grievances bearing directly on the military.”

[:02-4] а ^б ^в ^г ^д ^ђ Powell, Jonathan M.; Thyne, Clayton L. (2011-03-01). „Global instances of coups from 1950 to 2010 A new dataset” (PDF). Journal of Peace Research (Preprint) (на језику: енглески). 48 (2): 249—259. ISSN 0022-3433. S2CID 9066792. doi:10.1177/0022343310397436. Приступљено 2022-06-20.

[PeacefulRare-5] а ^б „Orderly transfers of power occur less often than you might think”. The Economist. ISSN 0013-0613.

[ElectionHabit-6] а ^б Przeworski, Adam (јануар 2015). „Acquiring the Habit of Changing Governments Through Elections”. Comparative Political Studies (на језику: енглески). 48 (1): 101—129. ISSN 0010-4140. S2CID 154441890. doi:10.1177/0010414014543614. „an entire sequence of elections may occur peacefully, with or without alternations, and then some exogenous event may lead to a coup, usurpation of power by the current incumbent, civil war, or some other constitutional irregularity.”

[Brooks-7] а ^б Brooks, Risa A. (2019-05-11). „Integrating the Civil–Military Relations Subfield”. Annual Review of Political Science (на језику: енглески). 22 (1): 379—398. ISSN 1094-2939. doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-060518-025407 .

[:2-8] а ^б ^в ^г ^д ^ђ Derpanopoulos, George; Frantz, Erica; Geddes, Barbara; Wright, Joseph (1. 1. 2016). „Are coups good for democracy?”. Research & Politics. 3 (1): 2053168016630837. ISSN 2053-1680. doi:10.1177/2053168016630837 .

[9] Varol, Ozan O. (20. 5. 2021). The Democratic Coup d'État. Oxford University Press. ISBN 9780190626020 — преко Amazon.com.

[:3-10] Marinov, Nikolay; Goemans, Hein (1. 10. 2014). „Coups and Democracy”. British Journal of Political Science. 44 (4): 799—825. ISSN 1469-2112. S2CID 55915744. doi:10.1017/S0007123413000264.

[11] Miller, Michael K. (1. 10. 2016). „Reanalysis: Are coups good for democracy?”. Research & Politics. 3 (4): 2053168016681908. ISSN 2053-1680. doi:10.1177/2053168016681908 .

[12] Thyne, Clayton (25. 3. 2015). „The impact of coups d'état on civil war duration”. Conflict Management and Peace Science. 34 (3): 0738894215570431. ISSN 0738-8942. S2CID 19036952. doi:10.1177/0738894215570431.

[Does_Oil_Promote_or_Prevent_Coups-13] а ^б Nordvik, Frode Martin (1. 4. 2019). „Does Oil Promote or Prevent Coups? The Answer is Yes”. The Economic Journal. 129 (619): 1425—1456. S2CID 158738285. doi:10.1111/ecoj.12604.

[:5-14] а ^б Belkin, Aaron; Schofer, Evan (1. 10. 2003). „Toward a Structural Understanding of Coup Risk”. Journal of Conflict Resolution. 47 (5): 594—620. ISSN 0022-0027. S2CID 40848052. doi:10.1177/0022002703258197.

[15] Bell, Curtis (17. 2. 2016). „Coup d'État and Democracy”. Comparative Political Studies. 49 (9): 0010414015621081. ISSN 0010-4140. S2CID 155881388. doi:10.1177/0010414015621081.

[16] Przeworski, Adam; Alvarez, Michael E.; Cheibub, Jose Antonio; Limongi, Fernando (2000). Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950–1990. Cambridge Studies in the Theory of Democracy. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 9780521793797.

[Londregan-17] а ^б Londregan, John B.; Poole, Keith T. (1. 1. 1990). „Poverty, the Coup Trap, and the Seizure of Executive Power”. World Politics. 42 (2): 151—183. ISSN 1086-3338. JSTOR 2010462. doi:10.2307/2010462.

[LehoucqPérez-Liñán-18] а ^б ^в Lehoucq, Fabrice; Pérez-Liñán, Aníbal (2014). „Breaking Out of the Coup Trap”. Comparative Political Studies. 47 (8): 1105—1129. S2CID 154707430. doi:10.1177/0010414013488561.

[19] Hiroi, Taeko; Omori, Sawa (1. 2. 2013). „Causes and Triggers of Coups d'état: An Event History Analysis”. Politics & Policy. 41 (1): 39—64. ISSN 1747-1346. doi:10.1111/polp.12001.

[20] Kim, Nam Kyu; Sudduth, Jun Koga (2021-03-03). „Political Institutions and Coups in Dictatorships”. Comparative Political Studies (на језику: енглески). 54 (9): 1597—1628. ISSN 0010-4140. doi:10.1177/0010414021997161 .

[21] Aksoy, Deniz; Carter, David B.; Wright, Joseph (1. 7. 2015). „Terrorism and the Fate of Dictators”. World Politics. 67 (3): 423—468. ISSN 1086-3338. S2CID 154292179. doi:10.1017/S0043887115000118.

[22] Harkness, Kristen A. (1. 6. 2016). „The Ethnic Army and the State Explaining Coup Traps and the Difficulties of Democratization in Africa”. Journal of Conflict Resolution. 60 (4): 587—616. ISSN 0022-0027. S2CID 54538341. doi:10.1177/0022002714545332. hdl:10023/9391 .

[23] Johnson, Jaclyn; Thyne, Clayton L. (26. 6. 2016). „Squeaky Wheels and Troop Loyalty How Domestic Protests Influence Coups d'état, 1951–2005”. Journal of Conflict Resolution. 62 (3): 597—625. ISSN 0022-0027. S2CID 147707842. doi:10.1177/0022002716654742.

[24] Wig, Tore; Rød, Espen Geelmuyden (1. 8. 2016). „Cues to Coup Plotters Elections as Coup Triggers in Dictatorships”. Journal of Conflict Resolution. 60 (5): 787—812. ISSN 0022-0027. S2CID 17684023. doi:10.1177/0022002714553106.

[25] Houle, Christian (1. 9. 2016). „Why class inequality breeds coups but not civil wars”. Journal of Peace Research. 53 (5): 680—695. ISSN 0022-3433. S2CID 113899326. doi:10.1177/0022343316652187.

[26] Miller, Michael K.; Joseph, Michael; Ohl, Dorothy (26. 5. 2016). „Are Coups Really Contagious? An Extreme Bounds Analysis of Political Diffusion”. Journal of Conflict Resolution. 62 (2): 410—441. ISSN 0022-0027. S2CID 148514914. doi:10.1177/0022002716649232.

[27] Gassebner, Martin; Gutmann, Jerg; Voigt, Stefan (1. 12. 2016). „When to expect a coup d'état? An extreme bounds analysis of coup determinants”. Public Choice. 169 (3–4): 293—313. ISSN 0048-5829. S2CID 157580604. doi:10.1007/s11127-016-0365-0. hdl:10419/156099 .

[28] Kinney, Drew Holland (2019). „Politicians at Arms: Civilian recruitment of soldiers for Middle East Coups”. Armed Forces & Society (на језику: енглески). 45 (4): 681—701. ISSN 1556-0848. S2CID 149675838. doi:10.1177/0095327X18777983.

[29] Kurrild-Klitgaard, Peter (2000). „The constitutional economics of autocratic succession”. Public Choice. 103 (1/2): 63—84. ISSN 0048-5829. S2CID 154097838. doi:10.1023/A:1005078532251.

[30] Kurrild-Klitgaard, Peter (2004). „Autocratic succession”. Encyclopedia of Public Choice. 103: 358—362. ISBN 978-0-306-47828-4. doi:10.1007/978-0-306-47828-4_39.

[31] Escribà-Folch, Abel; Böhmelt, Tobias; Pilster, Ulrich (2019-04-09). „Authoritarian regimes and civil–military relations: Explaining counterbalancing in autocracies”. Conflict Management and Peace Science (на језику: енглески). 37 (5): 559—579. ISSN 0738-8942. S2CID 159416397. doi:10.1177/0738894219836285. hdl:10230/46774 .

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+{{short description|Смештење владе}}
-'''Државни удар''' или '''пуч''' ({{јез-нем|Putsch}} — пуч; {{јез-фр|coup d'état}} — ку де `та, или само ''-{coup}-'' — ку), представља изненадну смену [[власт|власти]] у некој [[Држава|земљи]], и то [[устав|противуставним]] средствима. Он може бити миран или (ређе) насилан, а најчешће га изводи политичка фракција, [[војска]] или неки високи државни званичник.
+{{Револуција сајдбар}}
-[[Датотека:EN Worldwide coups d'état.PNG|мини|Мапа света са успешним државним ударима и покушајима]]
+[[Датотека:Bouchot - Le general Bonaparte au Conseil des Cinq-Cents.jpg|thumb|250п|Генерал [[Napoleon Bonaparte|Наполеон Бонапарта]] током [[Coup of 18 Brumaire|Пуча 18 бримера]] у Сен Клуу, детаљ слике [[François Bouchot|Франсоа Бушоа]], 1840.]]
-Разликује се од [[Револуција|револуције]] по томе што га изводе људи из саме власти, за разлику од револуције коју изводе широке народне масе.
+[[Датотека:EN Worldwide coups d'état.PNG|мини|250п|Мапа света са успешним државним ударима и покушајима]]
+'''Државни удар''' или '''пуч''' ({{јез-нем|Putsch}} — пуч; {{јез-фр|coup d'état}} — ку де `та, или само ''-{coup}-'' — ку),<ref>{{cite web |title=coup d'état |url=https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/coup%20d%27%C3%A9tat |website=Merriam-Webster |publisher=Merriam-Webster |access-date=April 4, 2022}}</ref> представља изненадну смену [[власт|власти]] у некој [[Држава|земљи]], и то [[устав|противуставним]] средствима.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Robertson |first=David |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=gPJ-AgAAQBAJ&pg=PA125 |title=The Routledge Dictionary of Politics |date=2004 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=0-203-36206-3 |edition=3rd |location=London |page=125 |oclc=56551222 |quote= Coup d’état describes the sudden and violent overthrow of a government, almost invariably by the military or with the help of the military. A coup d’état tends to occur during a period of social instability and political uncertainty, and is usually the work of right-wing elements determined to impose a social discipline and political order that is felt to be missing.}}</ref><ref>Brown, Garrett et al.  ''[https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780199670840.001.0001/acref-9780199670840-e-295  A Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics and International Relations]'' (4 ed., Oxford University Press, 2018): “The sudden, forcible, and illegal removal of a government, usually by the military or some part thereof, often precipitated by more immediate grievances bearing directly on the military.”</ref> Он може бити миран или (ређе) насилан, а најчешће га изводи политичка фракција, [[војска]] или неки високи државни званичник.<ref name=":02">{{Cite journal |last1=Powell |first1=Jonathan M. |last2=Thyne |first2=Clayton L. |date=2011-03-01 |title=Global instances of coups from 1950 to 2010 A new dataset |journal=Journal of Peace Research |language=en |volume=48|issue=2|pages=249–259 |doi=10.1177/0022343310397436 |issn=0022-3433 |s2cid=9066792 |url=http://www.uky.edu/~clthyn2/powell-thyne-JPR-2011.pdf |type=Preprint |access-date=2022-06-20}}</ref><ref name="PeacefulRare" /><ref name="ElectionHabit" /> Многи научници сматрају да је државни удар успешан када [[usurper|узурпатори]] преузму и држе власт најмање седам дана.<ref name=":02" />
-Типични примери државног удара су:
+Државни удар се разликује од [[Револуција|револуције]] по томе што га изводе људи из саме власти, за разлику од револуције коју изводе широке народне масе.
+== Распрострањеност и историја ==
+{{рут}}
+According to Clayton Thyne and Jonathan Powell's coup data set, there were 457 coup attempts from 1950 to 2010, of which 227 (49.7%) were successful and 230 (50.3%) were unsuccessful.<ref name=":02"/> They find that coups have "been most common in Africa and the Americas (36.5% and 31.9%, respectively). Asia and the Middle East have experienced 13.1% and 15.8% of total global coups, respectively. Europe has experienced by far the fewest coup attempts: 2.6%."<ref name=":02"/> Most coup attempts occurred in the mid-1960s, but there were also large numbers of coup attempts in the mid-1970s and the early 1990s.<ref name=":02"/> From 1950 to 2010, a majority of coups failed in the Middle East and Latin America. They had a somewhat higher chance of success in Africa and Asia.<ref name="Brooks"/> Numbers of successful coups have decreased over time.<ref name=":02"/>
+== Исходи ==
+Successful coups are one method of regime change that thwarts the [[peaceful transition of power]].<ref name="PeacefulRare">{{Cite magazine |title=Orderly transfers of power occur less often than you might think |url=https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2020/10/16/orderly-transfers-of-power-occur-less-often-than-you-might-think |magazine=The Economist |issn=0013-0613}}</ref><ref name="ElectionHabit">{{Cite journal |last=Przeworski |first=Adam |date=January 2015 |title=Acquiring the Habit of Changing Governments Through Elections |url=http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0010414014543614 |journal=Comparative Political Studies |language=en |volume=48 |issue=1 |pages=101–129 |doi=10.1177/0010414014543614 |s2cid=154441890 |issn=0010-4140 |quote=an entire sequence of elections may occur peacefully, with or without alternations, and then some exogenous event may lead to a coup, usurpation of power by the current incumbent, civil war, or some other constitutional irregularity.}}</ref>
+A 2016 study categorizes four possible outcomes to coups in [[dictatorship]]s:<ref name=":2"/>
+* Failed coup
+* No regime change, such as when a leader is illegally shuffled out of power without changing the identity of the group in power or the rules for governing
+* Replacement of incumbent with another dictatorship
+* Ousting of the dictatorship followed by democratization (also called "democratic coups")<ref>{{cite book|last=Varol|first=Ozan O.|url=https://smile.amazon.com/Democratic-Coup-d%C3%89tat-Ozan-Varol/dp/019062602X|title=The Democratic Coup d'État|date=20 May 2021|publisher=Oxford University Press|isbn=9780190626020|via=Amazon.com}}</ref>
+The study found that about half of all coups in dictatorships—both during and after the Cold War—install new [[autocratic]] regimes.<ref name=":2"/> New dictatorships launched by coups engage in higher levels of repression in the year that follows the coup than existed in the year leading to the coup.<ref name=":2"/> One-third of coups in dictatorships during the Cold War and 10% of later ones reshuffled the regime leadership.<ref name=":2"/> Democracies were installed in the wake of 12% of Cold War coups in dictatorships and 40% of post-Cold War ones.<ref name=":2"/>
+Coups occurring in the post-[[Cold War]] period have been more likely to result in democratic systems than pre-Cold War coups,<ref name=":3">{{cite journal |title=Coups and Democracy |journal=British Journal of Political Science |date=1 October 2014 |issn=1469-2112 |pages=799–825 |volume=44 |issue=4 |doi=10.1017/S0007123413000264 |first1=Nikolay |last1=Marinov |first2=Hein |last2=Goemans|s2cid=55915744 }}</ref><ref name=":2">{{cite journal|last1=Derpanopoulos|first1=George|last2=Frantz|first2=Erica|last3=Geddes|first3=Barbara|author-link3=Barbara Geddes (academic)|last4=Wright|first4=Joseph|date=1 January 2016|title=Are coups good for democracy?|journal=Research & Politics|volume=3|issue=1|page=2053168016630837|doi=10.1177/2053168016630837|issn=2053-1680|doi-access=free}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last=Miller |first=Michael K. |date=1 October 2016 |title=Reanalysis: Are coups good for democracy? |journal=Research & Politics|volume=3 |issue=4 |page=2053168016681908 |doi=10.1177/2053168016681908 |issn=2053-1680|doi-access=free }}</ref> though coups still mostly perpetuate [[authoritarianism]].<ref name="Brooks">{{Cite journal|last=Brooks|first=Risa A.|date=2019-05-11|title=Integrating the Civil–Military Relations Subfield|journal=Annual Review of Political Science|language=en|volume=22|issue=1|pages=379–398|doi=10.1146/annurev-polisci-060518-025407|issn=1094-2939|doi-access=free}}</ref> Coups that occur during civil wars shorten the war's duration.<ref>{{cite journal |title=The impact of coups d'état on civil war duration |journal=Conflict Management and Peace Science |volume=34 |issue=3 |date=25 March 2015 |issn=0738-8942 |page=0738894215570431 |doi=10.1177/0738894215570431|first=Clayton |last=Thyne|s2cid=19036952 }}</ref>
+== Предиктори ==
+Типични примери државног удара су:<ref name="Does Oil Promote or Prevent Coups">{{cite journal |last1=Nordvik |first1=Frode Martin |title=Does Oil Promote or Prevent Coups? The Answer is Yes |journal=The Economic Journal |date=1 April 2019 |volume=129 |issue=619 |pages=1425–1456 |doi=10.1111/ecoj.12604|s2cid=158738285 }}</ref><ref name=":5"/>
+{{colbegin|colwidth=20em}}
 * генерала [[Франсиско Франко|Франка]] у [[Шпанија|Шпанији]] ([[1936]]);
 * бригадног генерала [[Боривоје Мирковић|Боривоја Мирковића]] у [[Краљевина Југославија|Краљевини Југославији]] ([[1941]]);
@@ Ред 17: / Ред 42: @@
 * генерала [[Мухамед Али Хути]] у [[Јемен|Јемену]] ([[2014]]);
 * [[Емерсон Мнангагва|Емерсона Мнангагве]] у [[Зимбабве|Зимбабвеу]] ([[2017]]).
+{{colend}}
+The literature review in a 2016 study includes mentions of ethnic factionalism, supportive foreign governments, leader inexperience, slow growth, commodity price shocks, and poverty.<ref>{{cite journal |title=Coup d'État and Democracy |journal=Comparative Political Studies |volume=49 |issue=9 |date=17 February 2016 |issn=0010-4140 |page=0010414015621081 |doi=10.1177/0010414015621081 |first=Curtis |last=Bell|s2cid=155881388 }}</ref>
+Coups have been found to appear in environments that are heavily influenced by military powers. Multiple of the above factors are connected to military culture and power dynamics. These factors can be divided into multiple categories, with two of these categories being a threat to military interests and support for military interests. If interests go in either direction, the military will find itself either capitalizing off that power or attempting to gain it back.
+Often times military spending is a indicator of the likelihood of a coup taking place Nordvik found that about 75% of coups that took place in many different countries rooted from military spending and oil windfalls.<ref name="Does Oil Promote or Prevent Coups"/>
+=== Coup trap ===
+The cumulative number of coups is a strong predictor of future coups.<ref name=":5">{{cite journal |title=Toward a Structural Understanding of Coup Risk |journal=Journal of Conflict Resolution |date=1 October 2003 |issn=0022-0027 |pages=594–620 |volume=47 |issue=5 |doi=10.1177/0022002703258197|first1=Aaron |last1=Belkin |first2=Evan |last2=Schofer|s2cid=40848052 }}</ref><ref>{{cite book |title=Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950–1990 |url=http://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/politics-international-relations/comparative-politics/democracy-and-development-political-institutions-and-well-being-world-19501990 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |last1 = Przeworski | first1 = Adam | last2 = Alvarez | first2 = Michael E. | last3 = Cheibub | first3 = Jose Antonio | last4 = Limongi | first4 = Fernando | date = 2000 | isbn = 9780521793797 | series = Cambridge Studies in the Theory of Democracy}}</ref><ref name=Londregan>{{cite journal |title=Poverty, the Coup Trap, and the Seizure of Executive Power |journal=World Politics |date=1 January 1990 |issn=1086-3338 |pages=151–183 |volume=42 |issue=2 |doi=10.2307/2010462 |first1=John B. |last1=Londregan |first2=Keith T. |last2=Poole |jstor=2010462}}</ref> This phenomenon is called the '''coup trap'''.<ref name=Londregan/><ref name=LehoucqPérez-Liñán>{{Cite journal|url=https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0010414013488561|doi=10.1177/0010414013488561|title=Breaking Out of the Coup Trap|year=2014|last1=Lehoucq|first1=Fabrice|last2=Pérez-Liñán|first2=Aníbal|journal=Comparative Political Studies|volume=47|issue=8|pages=1105–1129|s2cid=154707430}}</ref> A 2014 study of 18 Latin American countries found that the establishment of open political competition helps bring countries out of the "coup trap" and reduces cycles of political instability.<ref name=LehoucqPérez-Liñán/>
+=== Regime type and polarization ===
+[[Hybrid regime]]s are more vulnerable to coups than are very authoritarian states or democratic states.<ref>{{cite journal |title=Causes and Triggers of Coups d'état: An Event History Analysis |journal=Politics & Policy |date=1 February 2013 |issn=1747-1346 |pages=39–64 |volume=41 |issue=1 |doi=10.1111/polp.12001 |first1=Taeko |last1=Hiroi |first2=Sawa |last2=Omori |last5=Boehmer}}</ref> A 2021 study found that democratic regimes were not substantially more likely to experience coups.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Kim|first1=Nam Kyu|last2=Sudduth|first2=Jun Koga|date=2021-03-03|title=Political Institutions and Coups in Dictatorships|journal=Comparative Political Studies|volume=54|issue=9|pages=1597–1628|language=en|doi=10.1177/0010414021997161|issn=0010-4140|doi-access=free}}</ref> A 2015 study finds that terrorism is strongly associated with re-shuffling coups.<ref>{{cite journal |title=Terrorism and the Fate of Dictators |journal=World Politics |date=1 July 2015 |issn= 1086-3338 |pages=423–468 |volume=67 |issue=3 |doi=10.1017/S0043887115000118 |first1=Deniz |last1=Aksoy |first2=David B. |last2=Carter |first3=Joseph |last3=Wright|s2cid=154292179 }}</ref> A 2016 study finds that there is an ethnic component to coups: "When leaders attempt to build ethnic armies, or dismantle those created by their predecessors, they provoke violent resistance from military officers."<ref>{{cite journal |last=Harkness |first=Kristen A. |date=1 June 2016 |title=The Ethnic Army and the State Explaining Coup Traps and the Difficulties of Democratization in Africa |journal=Journal of Conflict Resolution|volume=60 |issue=4 |pages=587–616 |doi=10.1177/0022002714545332 |issn=0022-0027 |hdl=10023/9391|s2cid=54538341 |hdl-access=free }}</ref> Another 2016 study shows that protests increase the risk of coups, presumably because they ease [[Coordination game|coordination obstacles]] among coup plotters and make international actors less likely to punish coup leaders.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Johnson |first1=Jaclyn |last2=Thyne |first2=Clayton L. |date=26 June 2016|title=Squeaky Wheels and Troop Loyalty How Domestic Protests Influence Coups d'état, 1951–2005 |journal=Journal of Conflict Resolution |volume=62 |issue=3 |pages=597–625 |doi=10.1177/0022002716654742 |s2cid=147707842 |issn=0022-0027}}</ref> A third 2016 study finds that coups become more likely in the wake of elections in autocracies when the results reveal electoral weakness for the incumbent autocrat.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Wig |first1=Tore |last2=Rød |first2=Espen Geelmuyden |date=1 August 2016 |title=Cues to Coup Plotters Elections as Coup Triggers in Dictatorships |journal=Journal of Conflict Resolution |volume=60 |issue=5 |pages=787–812 |doi=10.1177/0022002714553106|s2cid=17684023 |issn=0022-0027|url=http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-0-359805 }}</ref> A fourth 2016 study finds that inequality between social classes increases the likelihood of coups.<ref>{{cite journal |last=Houle |first=Christian |date=1 September 2016 |title=Why class inequality breeds coups but not civil wars |journal=Journal of Peace Research |volume=53 |issue=5 |pages=680–695 |doi=10.1177/0022343316652187 |s2cid=113899326 |issn=0022-3433}}</ref> A fifth 2016 study finds no evidence that coups are contagious; one coup in a region does not make other coups in the region likely to follow.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Miller |first1=Michael K. |last2=Joseph |first2=Michael |last3=Ohl |first3=Dorothy |date=26 May 2016 |title=Are Coups Really Contagious? An Extreme Bounds Analysis of Political Diffusion |journal=Journal of Conflict Resolution |volume=62 |issue=2 |pages=410–441 |doi=10.1177/0022002716649232 |s2cid=148514914 |issn=0022-0027}}</ref> One study found that coups are more likely to occur in states with small populations, as there are smaller coordination problems for coup-plotters.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Gassebner |first1=Martin |last2=Gutmann |first2=Jerg |last3=Voigt |first3=Stefan |date=1 December 2016 |title=When to expect a coup d'état? An extreme bounds analysis of coup determinants |journal=Public Choice |volume=169 |issue=3–4 |pages=293–313 |doi=10.1007/s11127-016-0365-0 |issn=0048-5829 |hdl=10419/156099|s2cid=157580604 |hdl-access=free }}</ref>
+A 2019 study found that when civilian elites are polarized and electoral competition is low, civilian-recruited coups become more likely.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Kinney |first1=Drew Holland|title=Politicians at Arms: Civilian recruitment of soldiers for Middle East Coups |journal=Armed Forces & Society|volume=45|issue=4|language=en|pages=681–701|doi=10.1177/0095327X18777983|s2cid=149675838|issn=1556-0848|year=2019}}</ref>
+In autocracies, the frequency of coups seems to be affected by the succession rules in place, with monarchies with a fixed succession rule being much less plagued by instability than less institutionalized autocracies.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Kurrild-Klitgaard|first=Peter|date=2000|title=The constitutional economics of autocratic succession|journal=Public Choice|volume=103|issue=1/2|pages=63–84|doi=10.1023/A:1005078532251|s2cid=154097838|issn=0048-5829}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last=Kurrild-Klitgaard|first=Peter|date=2004|title=Autocratic succession|journal=Encyclopedia of Public Choice|volume=103|pages=358–362|doi=10.1007/978-0-306-47828-4_39|isbn=978-0-306-47828-4}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Escribà-Folch|first1=Abel|last2=Böhmelt|first2=Tobias|last3=Pilster|first3=Ulrich|date=2019-04-09|title=Authoritarian regimes and civil–military relations: Explaining counterbalancing in autocracies|journal=Conflict Management and Peace Science|volume=37|issue=5|language=en|pages=559–579|doi=10.1177/0738894219836285|s2cid=159416397|issn=0738-8942|hdl=10230/46774|hdl-access=free}}</ref>
+A 2014 study of 18 Latin American countries in the 20th-century study found the legislative powers of the presidency does not influence coup frequency.<ref name=LehoucqPérez-Liñán/>
 == Терминологија ==
@@ Ред 29: / Ред 73: @@
 * [[Војна диктатура]]
 * [[Војна хунта]]
+== Референце ==
+{{Reflist}}
+== Литература ==
+{{refbegin|30em}}
+* Luttwak, Edward (1979) ''Coup d'État: A Practical Handbook.'' Harvard University Press. {{ISBN|978-0-674-17547-1}}.
+* De Bruin, Erica (2020) ''How to Prevent Coups d'État.'' Cornell University Press.
+* Schiel, R., Powell, J., & Faulkner, C. (2020). [[doi:10.1177/0738894220934882|"Mutiny in Africa, 1950–2018".]] ''Conflict Management and Peace Science''.
+* Singh, Naunihal. (2014) ''Seizing Power: The Strategic Logic of Military Coups''. Johns Hopkins University Press.
+* {{cite book |last=Malaparte |first=Curzio |author-link=Curzio Malaparte |title=Technique du Coup d'État |language=fr |location=Paris |year=1931}}
+* {{cite book |first=S.E. |last=Finer |title=The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics |publisher=Pall Mall Press |location=London |year=1962 |page=98}}
+* {{cite book |first=D. J. |last=Goodspeed |title=Six Coups d'État |publisher=[[Viking Press]] Inc. |location=New-York |year=1962}}
+* {{cite book |first1=Ken |last1=Connor |first2=David |last2=Hebditch |title=How to Stage a Military Coup: From Planning to Execution |publisher=Pen and Sword Books Ltd |year=2008 |isbn=978-1-84832-503-6}}
+* {{cite journal |doi=10.1177/0095327X05277885 |title=Coups and Conflict in West Africa, 1955-2004 |journal=Armed Forces & Society |volume=32 |pages=5–23 |year=2016 |last1=McGowan |first1=Patrick J.|s2cid=144318327 }}
+* {{cite journal |doi=10.1177/0095327X05277886 |title=Coups and Conflict in West Africa, 1955-2004 |journal=Armed Forces & Society |volume=32 |issue=2 |pages=234–253 |year=2016 |last1=McGowan |first1=Patrick J.|s2cid=144602647 }}
+* {{cite journal |doi=10.1177/0095327X07303607 |title=Civil–Military Relations in Indonesia and the Philippines |journal=Armed Forces & Society |volume=34 |issue=3 |pages=474–490 |year=2008 |last1=Beeson |first1=Mark|s2cid=144520194 }}
+* {{cite journal |doi=10.1177/0095327X0202800406 |title=How Not to Institutionalize Civilian Control: Kenya's Coup Prevention Strategies, 1964-1997 |journal=Armed Forces & Society |volume=28 |issue=4 |pages=619–640 |year=2016 |last1=n'Diaye |first1=Boubacar|s2cid=145783304 }}
+{{refend}}
 == Спољашње везе ==
 {{Commonscat|Coups d'état}}
+* [https://www.johnjchin.com/colpus John J. Chin, David B. Carter & Joseph G. Wright. Dataset on all military and non-military coup attempts in the world since 1946.]
+* [https://web.archive.org/web/20210107034216/https://www.jonathanmpowell.com/coup-detat-dataset.html Powell, Jonathan & Clayton Thyne. Global Instances of Coups from 1950-Present] via Archive.org.
 {{нормативна контрола}}

Нормативна контрола
Државне	Шпанија Француска BnF подаци Немачка Израел Сједињене Државе Јапан Чешка
Остале	Енциклопедија савремене Украјине Енциклопедија Британика IdRef